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Abstract 
Groups commonly engage in reasoning but the topic is scarcely studied in comparison 
to individual reasoning. This thesis aims to further the understanding of group 
reasoning by studying mental models within a distributed cognition framework. This 
extends current mental model theory by accounting for cognitive systems larger than the 
individual, including groups. To do this a theoretical proposal is outlined in which the 
mental model itself is adopted as the unit of analysis. Mental models which are divided 
between group members such that each holds a part of the whole are referred to as 
`distributed mental models'. They are contrasted with groups in which each of the 
group members has all of the mental model, referred to as shared mental models, in 
which they use an independent rather than a distributed reasoning process. 
A task was developed to study the effect of the distribution of information within a 
group on reasoning. This involved conditional inference, but the inferences used had 
several conjunctions and were couched in a problem solving task to increase the amount 
of information required for the task and so facilitate the effective distribution of 
information. 
Differences in the division of mental models between people are possible in groups that 
do not exist in individuals. Two factors were studied, the extent to which the parts of 
the model held by a group member were shared within the group and the extent to 
which the parts formed autonomous modules that could be used independently by 
group members. It was found that both of these affected the collaboration of groups 
but mostly led to similar performance levels. In further experiments sources of difficulty 
were manipulated which targeted parts of the collaboration which the different divisions 
of the model had affected. As a result these had differential effects on the collaboration 
and performance of groups with shared and distributed mental models and also between 
groups and individuals. 
Overall, these findings suggest that group reasoning is an area of research with features 
distinct from individual reasoning and the distributed cognition approach to mental 
models used here proved fruitful in studying it. 
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Preface 
A Summary of the Thesis 
The aim of this thesis is to further the understanding of group reasoning by studying 
mental models within a distributed cognition framework. This extends current mental 
model theory by accounting for a wider range of phenomena, namely reasoning in 
cognitive systems larger than the individual, including groups. To do this a theoretical 
proposal is outlined in which the mental model itself is adopted as the unit of analysis, 
irrespective of the cognitive system it is instantiated in. Several questions about mental 
model factors that are common in groups but necessarily missing from an individual 
level of analysis emerge from this conceptualisation. Empirical work is conducted which 
enables some answers to be offered. 
In Chapter 1 distributed cognition and mental models are introduced and the 
perspective on them adopted in this thesis is outlined. Distributed cognition is used in 
slightly different ways by different authors within cognitive psychology, so the literature 
is reviewed in order to develop a comprehensive understanding of the concept. 
Hutchins (1995a) disregards the conventional boundaries of objects and analyses 
cognitive systems in terms of the propagation of representational states through 
different representational media. However the work specifically on reasoning by 
Dunbar (1997) and Moshman & Geil (1998) demonstrate the particular importance of 
the individual, albeit within a network of interacting agents. From the combination of 
these a `semi-permeable' view of individuals in groups is adopted. The cognitive 
processes within an individual are of greatest importance, but the boundary of the 
individual can be penetrated so that the processes that take place between people are 
also significant. 
The focus is then moved to reasoning. Of the wide range of possible reasoning 
domains, conditional inference is selected for study in this thesis because it is common 
in everyday life and has been extensively and productively researched. Different theories 
of deductive competence are reviewed and the weight of evidence is found to favour a 
mental model explanation. This theory is therefore applied to reasoning in groups. The 
existing approaches to mental models are reviewed in order to distinguish the key points 
from those specific to individuals in order that only relevant factors are applied to 
groups. From the review it emerges that the central feature of all mental model theories 
is solely that a model is a mapping onto the cognitive system from the target system. 
Existing work on mental models in groups is reviewed. The largest area is Shared 
Mental Model Theory. This is a theory of team performance which states that optimal 
performance will occur when all of the team members have compatible mental models 
which lead to common expectations about the task and each other. This leads to 
effective coordination and minimal communication and therefore high performance. 
This process relies on reasoning independently, that is, a non-distributed process. This 
thesis will further investigate the effects of sharing mental models on reasoning process 
and performance. There are also some papers which apply distributed cognition to 
mental models. These offer plausible accounts of specific situations but do not explain 
the full range of reasoning in which mental models have been used and the cognitive 
systems explainable with distributed cognition. 
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This thesis proposes a new conceptualisation that is more general than previous 
applications of distributed cognition to mental models. It is noted that models are not a 
uniquely human construct and that any mapping will have the properties of a model. 
The approach suggested here then is to view the model itself as a unit of analysis. This 
may be instantiated in any medium, or, if there is free propagation of representational 
states between representational media, in more than one medium. As long as the 
relations between the elements of the model are maintained then a mapping can exist. 
Thus a group can hold a single model which is divided between them but still use the 
model by communicating its representational state when necessary. This type of model 
will be referred to hereafter as a `distributed mental model'. They are predicted to cause 
a distributed, that is non-independent, reasoning process. The remainder of the thesis 
develops the understanding of these models through comparison with shared mental 
models. 
Chapter 2 addresses the need for a task to test these theories of reasoning in groups. In 
a review of existing work no tasks were found which were both unconfounded tests of 
reasoning and allowed the distribution of information to be effectively manipulated. 
Therefore a task was developed which fulfilled both of these criteria. To complete the 
task groups made conditional inferences. However the rules used several conjunctions 
and they were couched in a problem solving task which facilitated distribution of the 
model between people because other group members could not easily learn the parts 
they are not given due to the large amount of information. 
The task involved route finding through a series of islands. Participants had to move 
around the islands from their current destination to a goal island in the minimum 
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number of moves. However only certain moves were legal. This was determined by 
rules concerning the pairings of objects on the current and destination islands. 
Participants inferred which moves were legal by applying the conditional rule to decide 
which objects must be on the islands. As this inference required conditional reasoning it 
is reasonable to suggest that participants made it using mental models. 
Individual participants completed this task whilst thinking aloud. Their verbal protocols 
were analysed in order to discover more about how individuals solve the task. This 
helps inform the interpretation of the interactions of individuals when they are in a 
group. 
The first experiment on groups is presented in Chapter 3. This aims to explore the 
effects of mental model structure on group reasoning process and look for quantitative 
differences in performance. The structure of mental models in groups is a factor which 
does not apply to individuals because they must necessarily have a whole model. In 
groups there are several possibilities. In this experiment shared mental models were 
compared with distributed mental models. That is, all group members holding all of the 
model were compared with all group members holding only two-thirds of the model. 
Also the effect of modularity on distribution was investigated. That is, whether the part 
of the model that group members hold is a largely autonomous component or not. 
The process which groups use to solve the task is predicted to be influenced by these 
structural differences. The shared mental model process is described in the literature. 
They should independently solve the task to form common expectations of the solution. 
But this cannot occur with distributed mental models because no-one has the all of the 
4 
information required. A collaborative process is proposed in which group members 
suggest possibilities. These are then supported or eliminated by other group members 
as they add their conclusions to these possibilities until firm conclusions are reached that 
all agree with. 
As expected, groups with distributed mental models did use the collaborative process 
more than groups with shared mental models. With a modular distribution, the groups' 
collaboration was more efficient than with a non-modular distribution. As a result, there 
was no difference in reasoning performance between groups with modular distributed 
mental models and shared mental models, but groups with non-modular distributed 
mental models were slower. This demonstrates that mental model structure can 
influence group reasoning process and performance. 
Having established that the collaborative process used can be qualitatively different and 
that this leads to quantitative differences in performance, the experiments in Chapter 4 
investigated if the qualitative difference in reasoning process could lead to qualitative 
differences in performance. In particular, it looked at whether different sources of task 
difficulty have a different pattern of effects on groups with shared or distributed mental 
models or individuals. The sources of task difficulty chosen influence specific stages in 
the completion of the task identified in Chapter 2. As the process used to complete the 
task is entirely different at some of these stages, opposite effects on shared compared to 
distributed mental models were predicted for some sources of difficulty. In another 
experiment to investigate individual performance, participants completed the task alone. 
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The results did not turn out as predicted. The performance of groups with shared and 
distributed mental models did not differ on particular tasks. Individuals and groups did 
differ though; they showed the opposite pattern of influence to each other. That is, 
groups and individuals showed qualitative differences in performance. This is likely to 
be because of differences in process, but it is hard to be specific because the predicted 
differences between shared and distributed mental models were not found. As a result it 
is not clear exactly what groups did in the task. 
In Chapter 5 it was argued that the current conceptualisation of the group 
communication process is accurate and the lack of expected differences in the previous 
chapter was due instead to a flawed manipulation. An experiment is presented with a 
different manipulation intended to influence the collaborative process used by groups 
with distributed mental models, the number of islands in the task. The more islands 
there are, the more initial possibilities there are to discuss. The conditions were 
designed however with the same number of legal moves from each island. Therefore 
more reduction of the possibilities was required in the condition with many islands and 
as a result, more collaboration. However groups with shared mental models do not 
need to collaborate and therefore, shared mental model theory predicts, will not be as 
affected by the number of islands. 
As expected, there was a greater effect of island number on groups with distributed 
mental models than shared mental models. But the effect on performance and 
collaborative process was weak. So although a difference in performance between 
shared and distributed mental models was found which is attributable to their difference 
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in process, it seems likely that groups with shared mental models were also collaborating 
to some extent. This would account for the weaker than expected effects. 
Chapter 6 presents an experiment designed to test whether groups with shared mental 
models use the process that is predicted by shared mental model theory. That is, 
whether they solve the task independently or whether they rely on collaboration. 
Groups with all of the information on all of the islands were compared with groups with 
all of the information on only some of the islands. Two types of problem were used. 
With one type, one group member who had partial information could find the entire 
optimal route independently whereas with the other problem type this was not possible. 
If group members do attempt to operate independently they will perform as well as 
groups with shared mental models on the former but not the latter problem types. If 
they collaborate there will be no differences. 
It was found that there were almost no differences in performance or process as a result 
of these information sharing manipulations or because of the problem types. This 
suggests the possibility that groups in the shared mental model condition actually treat 
the information like groups in the other condition. That is, they do not use all of the 
information on all of the islands. They decide on a possible move and use all of the 
information on only those islands to draw a firm conclusion about a move rather than 
consider all of the possibilities. This is a different process to that predicted by shared 
mental model theory, but it is also a more independent process than used by the groups 
with distributed mental models so the previous experiments still allow a constructive 
comparison of independent and distributed reasoning. 
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The final chapter evaluates the contribution of the empirical work to the understanding 
of group reasoning. Evidence for the use of a collaborative process by groups with 
distributed mental models is found. The influence of structural differences of mental 
models, model distribution and modularity, is demonstrated on reasoning process and 
quantitative differences in performance are found. Some sources of difficulty are found 
which have a qualitatively different effect on groups compared to individuals and groups 
with shared mental models compared to groups with distributed mental models because 
of the difference in process used by these different cognitive systems. 
Unfortunately the impact of these points are weakened by doubts over the 
generalisability of the findings. The task used was necessarily unusual in order to 
manipulate the distribution of information. In future it will be necessary to clarify these 
findings using a different domain of reasoning which lends itself more naturally to 
distributing reasoning so that a less unusual task can be used. Despite these possible 
flaws there is enough evidence to conclude that the distributed cognition approach to 
mental models was justified and that overall a positive contribution to the study of group 
reasoning was made. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 General Introduction 
Group reasoning is a central and distinctive feature of human life; the extent to which 
we engage in it sets us apart from all other animals. Despite this it has scarcely been 
studied in comparison to the reasoning of individuals. Historically this bias is typical of 
all cognitive psychology. Cognitive processes are conventionally equated solely with the 
individual and so different units of analysis, such as the group, have not been considered 
relevant by psychologists (although there are notable exceptions including Fleck [1979] 
and Vygotsky [1962] amongst others). It is likely that group reasoning is implicitly 
thought to be reducible to individual reasoning, therefore no distinct explanation is 
required. The impact of the group is generally understood as occurring via social 
processes that moderate individual cognitive processes. For example inter-individual 
comparison has been proposed as an explanation for the risky shift effect (Lamm & 
Myers, 1978) and social conformity is said to underlie groupthink (Janis, 1972). 
However recently there has been a reappraisal of the nature of cognitive representations. 
Situated cognition (e. g. Clancey, 1997; Greeno & Moore, 1993), distributed cognition 
(e. g. Hutchins, 1995a) and embodied cognition (e. g. Clark, 1997) all consider 
representations to be intrinsically linked to other artefacts or people rather than being 
solely disembodied structures in the brain. Related work in which groups are treated as 
information processors (e. g. Hinsz, Tindale & Vollrath, 1997), sociocognition (e. g. 
Levine Resnick & Higgins, 1993), social cognition (e. g. Larson & Christensen, 1993) and 
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team cognition (e. g. Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 2001) all offer theories as to how groups 
may use cognitive processes. Together these approaches all indicate a general trend 
towards the study of cognitive units of analysis other than the individual, including a 
group level of analysis. 
1.2 Distributed Cognition 
The individual is the conventional unit of analysis for cognitive science. Distributed 
cognition can simply be described as an approach which applies classical cognitive 
science principles to a unit of analysis other than the individual. Commonly the unit of 
analysis is larger than an individual; it might include the environment, artefacts in the 
world, social interactions and culture. The implication of this approach is that studying 
the individual alone does not present a true picture of the phenomena. It might omit 
some effects or misattribute them to individuals when they are in fact properties of a 
larger system. It has been argued that this approach could demand a reappraisal of 
established theories if indeed they are based on a misättribution of cognitive processes 
(Hutchins, 1995a). At the very least the approach could lead to an exploration of new 
areas as larger cognitive systems are studied. Whilst the distributed cognition framework 
has been used in educational psychology (e. g. Perkins, 1993) and social psychology (e. g. 
Resnick, 1991) this thesis is specifically concerned with reasoning processes and so its 
application within cognitive psychology will be reviewed. 
There are two related theoretical implications which follow from expanding the unit of 
analysis for describing and explaining a cognitive process. Firstly, the boundary becomes 
larger and so other people and artefacts become part of the process and engage in some 
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computation themselves. This may reduce the individual task load, but it adds the 
problem of communicating and coordinating with other agents in the system. In 
addition the range of mechanisms which are thought to be involved in the cognitive 
process may expand to include other artefacts. Secondly, the nature of the computation 
itself may change. For example, if a problem is completed using tools then it may be 
transformed such that it requires different operations compared to performance without 
tools. The literature concerning these two issues will now be reviewed. 
In his portrayal of distributed cognition Hutchins (1995a; 1995b) focuses mainly on the 
representations themselves. He suggests that information can be represented in 
different representational media, but it is clear that he considers all of these media equal 
in status, including the brain. The object of study is the propagation of representational 
states through different representational media. An important issue is how these media 
coordinate in order to allow propagation between them to occur. The trajectories 
followed by the representations determines the agents which perform computations 
with them and therefore what computation is done. In principle, the representations 
could travel through any number of representational media, so there is no obvious 
boundary to this unit of analysis. The boundary can only be defined in terms of the 
representational media brought into coordination with each other thereby forming a 
system separate from those that are not. 
In an ethnographic study to illustrate this process occurring naturally, Hutchins (1995a) 
describes a bridge of a U. S. Navy ship as it approaches harbour. Navigating the ship 
through the correct channel requires expert navigation by a team and is a complex 
cognitive task. Within the distributed cognition framework this is treated as a single task. 
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The procedure, much simplified, involves taking bearings on each side of the boat and 
communicating these to the navigator who plots their location on the chart. The 
information being represented is the location of the boat; this state must be propagated 
from the people who take the bearings to the chart. Initially the boat is represented as a 
physical configuration of the alidade (compass) which is converted to a number (the 
bearing). During this propagation process the representation alters in order to facilitate 
the task. The analogue representation of the alidade is transformed into a digital 
representation which is easier for verbal communication and for representing on the 
chart. This is then communicated to the navigator who converts the number into a 
physical configuration of the hoey (protractor) and draws a line on the chart. This 
process is repeated for two other bearings so that three lines are drawn on the chart. 
Where they cross represents the location of the ship. Several representational media are 
used here and the propagation of the representational state between them is essential for 
computing the location of the boat. It is preferable to have bearings from both sides of 
the boat and it is essential to have these recorded at as nearly the same time as possible 
because the boat is moving. Thus at least two people are required, one for each side of 
the boat. These two bearings, or representations of the position of the boat, must be 
combined so they are propagated from the alidade to the navigator who combines them. 
So in studying the navigation task the importance of the representations and where they 
are is essential to understanding of how the whole system operates, along with the 
computations that are performed using the representations at each stage of the process. 
Another study by Hutchins (1995b) describes the sociotechnical system of an'aeroplane 
cockpit, comprising two pilots and the instruments that they use. To land the plane the 
pilots need to travel at the correct speed which can vary from flight to flight depending 
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on the weight of the plane. At different speeds the flaps and slats must be in specific 
positions. These are calculated in advance and stored in the form of a table. This is the 
initial computation and is an example of distributing cognition over time as well as 
between the table writer and the pilots. From this table the correct settings are read off 
and markers placed on the air speed indicator by one pilot. Thus the representation is 
transformed into a physical object and acts partly as a memory of the correct speed and 
partly to communicate the correct speeds to the other pilot, propagated via the 
representation in the artefact. Again the focus of this analysis is on the representations 
and how these move between representational media to form a single cognitive process. 
The pilots are not viewed as more important than any other representational media, nor 
as a system within a system. There is simply a large system of coordinating 
representational media. 
An important assertion made about distributed cognition by Hutchins but not 
mentioned in the above examples is that the cognitive properties of distributed cognitive 
systems may be different to those of individuals. If this is true then studies conducted in 
the laboratory or any other environment may have little relevance for performance in a 
different environment because the cognitive properties of the two systems may not be 
the same. This is one of the more critical ideas emerging from the distributed cognition 
approach. It means that distributed cognition cannot simply be bolted onto classical 
cognitive science; it may require a serious revision of it. Hutchins (1991) demonstrates 
this possibility using a model of confirmation bias made from a constraint satisfaction 
network. In this, several networks are connected such that they can settle into one of 
two states. The model shows that by changing only the strength of the interconnections 
of the networks (i. e. the `persuasiveness) the confirmation bias of the whole system can 
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be affected. A high persuasiveness causes a greater tendency to move towards the initial 
majority position than a low persuasiveness. Hutchins concedes that whilst this is 
perhaps not a very good model of confirmation bias, it is a useful demonstration of how 
changing only the social interaction (i. e. persuasiveness) and keeping the individuals the 
same can give rise to different cognitive properties. 
Clearly this model does not prove the initial assertion to be true, but it is an appealing 
concept. Again it works by not taking any of the individual agents as pre-eminent, they 
do not change. Only the interaction of the agents leads to the changes. By expanding 
the unit of analysis to include more than one agent it is possible to see these interactions 
and any changes they may cause. 
Norman's (1987) description of distributed cognition differs slightly from Hutchins's in 
that the human actor is accorded a central role in the system. He distinguishes between 
knowledge in the head and knowledge in the world, but clearly knowledge in the world 
serves as input to the head. One example he gives is of a nuclear power plant control 
room and in particular the question of why there are such large switches. Originally the 
switches were designed to carry large electrical currents, but it would be possible now to 
do everything using a computer. But physical attributes such as the position of a switch 
provide a memory for the state of the plant and also communicate this to other team 
members (Norman, 1993). So the large switches are well adapted for the smooth 
operation of the plant by providing a source of knowledge in the world. 
This approach to distributing knowledge between the head and the world is less 
sophisticated than Hutchins's distribution. There is a bipartite system in which 
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individuals are the focal point and the rest of the world responds to that. Individuals 
may be facilitated in completing tasks by external memory aids, but these are subsidiary. 
Artefacts in the world function by `amplifying' the individual performance by standing 
between the individual and the task, making aspects of it easier rather than being equal 
partners in the cognitive process. Thus the approach has little to say about cognition in 
groups, aside from the point that external artefacts can be used for communication. It 
also has little to say about more complex interactions between agents in the system 
because of the simplistic division into inside and out which cannot flexibly 
accommodate all the possible cognitive systems that could exist. For example, if this 
analysis was applied to the U. S. Naval vessel then an integrated description of the whole 
system would not emerge. Instead there would simply be some comments about the 
operation of some of the navigational tools by humans. Norman's approach is too 
firmly grounded in a human factors perspective to frame the study of cognition in 
groups, although within its own remit it is insightful. 
Dunbar (1997) has described empirical work on reasoning in groups which he refers to 
as distributed reasoning, but the approach is strongly related to and interpretable within 
a distributed cognition framework. The focus of Dunbar's analysis is only indirectly on 
representations. Specifically, he is concerned with the contribution of different people 
to continuous chains of inference. His research involved an investigation of 
microbiologists, in particular their meetings in which new data and experiments are 
presented and discussed. He highlights two major benefits of these meetings. Firstly, 
individuals construct different representations of the same material, allowing them to 
draw different inferences. Secondly, different people can contribute different premises 
from which a conclusion can be inferred that no individual would have been able to 
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draw alone. During the meetings these situations occurred regularly and often led to 
productive outcomes. These findings demonstrate the importance of reasoning in 
groups. 
Whilst Hutchins describes distribution in general terms, Dunbar makes specific points 
relevant for reasoning. These points are different to Hutchins's approach though 
compatible with it. Hutchins does not mention the importance of a diversity of 
representations in the group. Diversity leads to a complex, dynamic interaction of 
agents each of which are engaged in parallel computation and then this is propagated 
back to other group members. This exchange might continue for a while in the case of 
a protracted argument. All of these interactions are the propagation of representational 
states through the group. All of the group members are equally contributing to the 
process. It differs from Hutchins's case studies because of the chaotic nature of the 
interactions which are at odds with orderly military settings studied by Hutchins. 
However the analyses are essentially compatible. Similarly the contribution of different 
premises in an argument is an example of the propagation of representational state. As 
these are transferred between people they are able to perform different computations on 
the material. 
Despite these compatabilities Dunbar focuses more heavily on the individual than 
Hutchins. Whereas Hutchins looks at the coordination of representational media with 
no specific boundaries and Norman considers the effects of artefacts on individuals, 
Dunbar is concerned with groups of distinct individuals. The individuals are units in and 
of themselves, but they are interconnected too. There are effectively two boundaries 
here, the individual and the group. The individual boundary is not irrelevant as Hutchins 
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suggests; for example the important diversity of representations occurs at the individual 
level. Instead the approach divides the transformation and propagation of 
representational states into that which occurs within individuals and that which occurs 
between them. 
Moshman & Geil (1998) also studied reasoning in groups and found largely similar 
results in an experimental rather than a naturalistic setting. Wason's selection task 
(Wason, 1968) was administered to individuals and groups of five or six. It was found 
that a very low number of individuals selected the correct falsification pattern (9%) but 
75% of groups identified the correct responses. This was accounted for by the co- 
construction of arguments in groups which were qualitatively more sophisticated than 
those of individuals. This description of group reasoning is very like Dunbar's. It has 
been suggested that individuals solve the selection task using argumentation (Green, 
1996) so this may not be a qualitatively different process. However group performance 
is evidently so superior to individuals that it is clear there are strong benefits of the 
distributed process of argumentation. 
These studies suggest that the role of a distinct individual unit of analysis within the 
distributed process is greater than Hutchins would suggest. There are aspects of the 
external world such as culture which have been internalised by individuals and so a clear 
boundary cannot be drawn around the individual. But it does seem that when the 
general framework of distributed cognition is applied to the specific area of group 
reasoning, maintaining the idea of a `semi-permeable' boundary around the individual is 
a useful device. Differences in views on this point may in part stem from the domains 
studied. Hutchins describes highly rehearsed activities with strong technological 
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partnerships, situations in which you would expect distributed cognition to occur 
(Salomon, 1993). The reasoning tasks are less routine situations though and the task 
may require more cognitive processing, thus strengthening the role of the individual. 
There are two features of Hutchins's approach which are of value in understanding 
reasoning in groups. Firstly, it outlines a general framework which can be used to 
describe a wider range of tasks and systems than simply groups of people. Secondly, the 
explanations in terms of representational states are more appropriate for cognitive 
theories than the less specific descriptions in Dunbar and Moshman & Geil. Integrating 
these approaches by realising the relevance of individuals to reasoning but also their 
interconnectedness in a cognitive system of people and artefacts is the most effective 
way of considering the unit of analysis for the study of group reasoning. 
The second implication of the distributed cognition approach is that the nature of the 
computation can change if a different artefact or person is included in the process. 
Studies related to this have almost exclusively focused on the role of external artefacts. 
As this thesis will not investigate the use of external artefacts in group reasoning the 
literature will only be briefly examined. 
The proposed role of distributed cognition in changing the nature of a task is similar to 
that described in the situated activity approach (e. g. Clancey, 1997; Greeno & Moore, 
1993). Returning to the navigation task (Hutchins, 1995a), there are a considerable 
number of artefacts used that were portrayed as changing the nature of the task. One 
such artefact is a nautical slide rule which is used to compute the speed of the ship, 
essential for predicting her progress. This converts multiplication and division into 
alignments of logarithmic scales; line up the distance index with the desired distance and 
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the time index with the desired time and the speed index will point to the speed. This 
artefact changes the nature of the computation from a manipulation of mathematical 
symbols to the physical manipulation of an object. Also, neither the individual nor the 
artefact can be said to have completed the computation independently; the 
computation is the product of a system of individual and artefact interacting as one 
system. 
Zhang & Norman (1994) and Zhang (1997) conducted several experiments using 
isomorphs of the Tower of Hanoi and also noughts and crosses. In the Tower of Hanoi 
experiments the rules were manipulated so that they were either external properties of 
artefacts or, as is more usual, presented verbally. For example, in the conventional task 
there is a rule that a larger disc cannot be put on top of a smaller disc, though it is 
physically possible to do this. In the condition where this rule was externalised, the 
objects were shaped like bowls which had to be stacked inside each other making it 
impossible to place them in incorrect positions. Zhang & Norman noted superior 
performance when the rules were externalised. Norman (1993) sums this up by pointing 
out that `impossible things are impossible'. That is, in the real world there are often 
many constraints on action imposed by the environment that serve to reduce the 
choices we practically encounter and so minimise the associated computation required. 
The noughts and crosses experiments demonstrate that external representations are not 
merely inputs to the brain. Isomorphs such as the `Number' version in which 
participants select numbers from 1 to 9 alternatively in order to be the first to add up to 
15 were used. These different representations showed characteristic patterns of error 
and bias suggesting that they were not simply observed and transformed into an abstract 
structure in the brain for the purposes of computation. If that had been the case 
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performance would not have differed. Instead the representations determined what 
information was perceived and which processes were used. 
Although the use of external artefacts will not be studied in this thesis, the distribution 
of a cognitive process between group members may well have a similar effect. Group 
members must, in principle, combine their information in order to solve a problem. It 
is quite possible therefore that the process used by groups to do this will be different to 
that used by individuals. This is a question that can only be addressed properly through 
experimentation. 
Criticism of the distributed cognition framework has generally not been forthcoming. 
Rather, researchers have merely adopted the term and used it in their own specific way 
leading to a range of subtly varying perspectives, some of which have been described 
above. However in a review of Hutchins (1995a), Latour (1996) seeks to further specify 
one particular aspect of distributed cognition; namely which components of the mind 
are relocated outside the individual. Latour suggests that Hutchins's thinking agent is 
`like the desk of a well. organized executive: empty since everything else has been 
delegated outside to something or someone else' (p. 59). Hutchins does indeed suggest 
that much cognitive work is distributed to other cognitive agents. He also points to the 
importance of internalised factors such as culture and language as cognitive tools that 
can be within the skull yet are products of external factors. Yet not all computation can 
be delegated. If every person did so, who would do the work? The distributed 
cognition framework intends to connect the cognitive processes inside with those 
outside, not remove what is inside. 
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Distributed cognition is thus a powerful and flexible approach to studying cognitive 
processes. Hutchins's focus is on the propagation of representational states through 
representational media, irrespective of what these media are. His framework provides an 
excellent way of describing the cognitive processes of a group. However when 
distributed cognition is applied to the issue of group reasoning Dunbar and Moshman & 
Geil demonstrate the utility of considering the individual as a more important medium 
than some others, even when they are in a larger system. Thus both the boundaries of 
individuals and groups will be considered as important in group reasoning. These 
boundaries are not impenetrable, so the general framework of Hutchins's approach will 
still be used. This will be the distributed cognition approach to group reasoning used in 
this thesis. 
1.3 Individual Reasoning and Mental Models 
This thesis aims to investigate reasoning in groups within the distributed cognition 
framework. The theory of reasoning that will be applied to groups is mental models. 
The concept of a'mental model has been used extensively to account for individual 
reasoning in a wide range of areas. These include deductive reasoning (e. g. Johnson- 
Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991), inductive reasoning (e. g. Holland, Holyoak, 
Nisbett & Thagard, 1986), causal reasoning (e. g. Gentner & Stevens, 1983; Green, 1997 
and Green, 2001), control of complex systems (e. g. Moray, Lootseen & Pajak, 1986) and 
human-computer interaction (e. g. Payne, Squibb & Howes, 1991). Mental models are 
clearly an appealing notion that can be applied to a wide range of reasoning phenomena. 
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It is not possible to study all of these areas in one thesis, so the area of reasoning that 
will be studied is conditional inference. This has been chosen because it is an important 
type of reasoning as it underpins many common activities. It is also a well researched 
area in which competing theories have led to productive research. There is good 
evidence that individuals do use mental models when completing conditional inference 
problems. Therefore it is a useful test bed with which to initially consider group 
reasoning with mental models. Section 1.3.1 will review the major theories and evidence 
relating to conditional inference, ultimately concluding that the weight of evidence is in 
favour of a mental model explanation. 
Conditional inference uses an approach to mental models which differs slightly from 
some of the others listed above. In order to establish a general theory of mental models 
in group reasoning it is necessary to find the aspects of mental models that are common 
and central to all of these approaches, not those that are limited to a specific area. This 
will ensure that the essential and universal features of a mental model are applied to 
groups, not extraneous features which may be unique to individuals. Section 1.3.2 will 
review different mental model approaches in order to distil the essential features of 
mental models in order that the necessary aspects can be identified. 
1.3.1 Conditional Inference in Individuals 
There are three leading psychological theories of deductive competence for conditional 
inference. The major arguments for and against them will be reviewed here. The 
theories are that either reasoning depends on formal inference rules (e. g. Braine, 1978; 
Braine, Reiser & Rumain, 1984; Rips, 1983), or that reasoning depends on content 
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sensitive inference rules (e. g. Cheng & Holyoak, 1985) or that reasoning depends on 
mental models (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991; Johnson-Laird, Byrne & Schaeken, 1992). 
Formal rule theory proposes that the individual has a series of formal rules of inference 
such as the modus ponens: 
If pthen q 
p 
Therefore q. 
These rules are syntactic. That is they operate based on the abstract logical form of the 
premises rather than their meaning. Given a premises such as: 
`If there is a triangle then there is a circle' 
and 
There is a triangle' 
then reasoners extract the logical form of the premises, which is the modus ponens 
described above, then use whatever inference rules there are in order derive a 
conclusion. This abstract conclusion is translated back into the terms of the original 
premises. In this case, `There is a circle'. The difficulty of a particular deduction stems 
from length of the derivation which is in turn influenced by which rules exist in the 
mind. 
Content sensitive inference rules are somewhat different in that rules exist but they are 
specific to certain situations. These rules are known as `pragmatic reasoning schemas'. 
A commonly discussed rule is: 
`If action A is to be taken then precondition B must be satisfied'. 
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This is described as a permission schema and describes a common social convention. 
Errors occur when the wrong schema is applied or when there is no appropriate 
schema. 
Finally, mental models theory proposes that reasoners construct internal models of the 
situation presented in the premises using their knowledge of the language, supplemented 
by general knowledge. The nature of this model is described below in Section 1.3.2. 
The reasoner then tries to generate a parsimonious description of this model that asserts 
something not explicitly mentioned in the premises. From this they try to construct 
further models of the premises in which the conclusion does not hold. If there are 
none, the conclusion is valid. If not, then they must draw another conclusion and 
repeat the process. As there are a finite number of models for a given set of premises 
this search can in principle be exhaustive. The difficulty of a problem is determined by 
the number of potential models required in order to solve it. More models tax the 
reasoner's limited processing capacity, (See Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991 for a detailed 
exposition of the reasoning process using models). 
There is considerable debate as to which of these theories most accurately describes the 
process of deduction. The pragmatic reasoning schemas can account for some effects 
caused by the content of problems on some tasks such as the Wason selection task (e. g. 
Cheng & Holyoak, 1985). However as schemas are learnt from situations encountered 
in the past they cannot explain reasoning with unfamiliar materials with no close analogy 
to familiar situations, which reasoners can do. This is very limiting for the theory and 
consequently it cannot claim to be a general theory of deductive competence. 
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In contrast, formal inference rules can explain reasoning about unfamiliar and familiar 
material as the logical form can be extracted from any premises. However this means 
that the theory cannot as it stands account for effects of content on reasoning such as 
belief bias (the influence of prior beliefs on reasoning) e. g. Evans, Barston & Pollard 
(1983). Nor can it explain the suppression of inferences in the light of new evidence 
(Byrne, 1989). It does nonetheless account for a range of data on the reasoning 
performance of individuals (e. g. Rips, 1983). 
Mental model theory can explain reasoning in unfamiliar domains because models can 
be constructed from the meanings of known words. Yet it can also account for the 
effects of content on reasoning as it allows content to influence which models are 
constructed (e. g. the account of belief bias by Cherubini, Garnham, Oakhill & Morley, 
1998). Mental models can explain the suppression of valid inferences (Byrne, 1989), and 
accounts for a range of performance data such as why modus ponens is easier than 
modus tollens, conjunctions are easier than disjunctions, biconditionals are easier than 
conditionals etc. It also predicts novel findings such as `illusory correlations' found in 
double disjunctions (Johnson-Laird & Savary, 1996). So although the theory may not be 
correct in all details as the debate demonstrates, it is the most convincing theory 
currently extant. 
The lines of evidence mentioned indicate the wealth of data on conditional inference. 
For a comprehensive review see Evans, Newstead & Byrne (1993) and Johnson-Laird & 
Byrne (1991). The purpose of this section was merely to outline the model theory of 
conditional inference and to demonstrate that it is the most appropriate one to extend 
to group reasoning. 
25 
1.3.2 The Essence of Mental Models 
In order to extend the mental model theory to groups it is necessary to'consider what 
the essential parts of a mental model are. These must be distinguished from the 
specifically individual features in order that only the parts of the theory that are relevant 
to groups are applied to them. Differences in the conceptualisation of mental models 
are often highlighted (e. g. Wilson & Rutherford, 1989) and the conditional inference 
research above relies exclusively on the approach instigated by Johnson-Laird (1983). 
However Moray (1999) argues that differences in the concept are due to the range of 
contexts in which the construct is applied, not the construct itself. Therefore when 
searching for the fundamental features of mental models it is necessary to consider all of 
these areas and find commonalities between them. 
The lack of transfer between domains of mental model research is apparent in studies 
such as Kieras & Bovair (1984) in which the role of mental models in operating a simple 
machine is investigated. In this they define a mental model as `how a device works in 
terms of its internal structures and processes' (p. 255). This definition is highly specific 
to their field and so does not allow the same concept to be used in any other way apart 
from the operation of a device. At the same time the definition does not convey any 
essential idea of a model-like construct. There is very little specificity in terms of the 
nature of the cognitive structures that are required to comprise a model. 
The purpose of this section is to distil from previous work on individuals the elements 
that are necessary for a mental model to exist in order that they can then be applied to 
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groups. Therefore only accounts which focus on the nature of mental models will be 
reviewed here. There are four main approaches to mental models that provide detailed 
theoretical accounts of what a mental model is. These are represented in Craik (1943), 
Johnson-Laird (1983), Moray (1999) and Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett & Thagard (1986). 
From a review of this work an account of the essential nature of mental models will be 
derived. 
Craik (1943) is widely attributed to be the first psychologist to describe the use of 
models in reasoning. These he proposed were used in order to predict events, which he 
considered to be a fundamental property of thought. The example he gives is of 
building a bridge. This is not done haphazardly, choosing materials at random. Rather, 
he claims, a model can be constructed and tested mentally in order to ensure a sufficient 
safety factor is built in, instead of actually building a bridge and waiting to see if it 
collapses. This is a slightly strange example because bridges are rarely designed in such a 
way; typically algorithmic procedures are used to calculate the load bearing potential of 
particular bridges. Moreover design in construction engineering has been studied as a 
good example of distributed cognition (Perry, 1997). However it seems that Craik really 
is referring to a purely internal, qualitative process of modelling. It is clear that this 
process is internal because of the three proposed stages of reasoning that transfer the 
outside world into the mind: 
`(1) Translation' of external process into words, numbers or other symbols. 
(2) Arrival at other ymbolr by a process of `reasoning', deduction, inference, etc., and 
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(3) 'Retranslation' of these symbols into external processes (as in building the bridge to a 
design) or at least recognition of the correspondence between these ymbolr and external 
events (as in realising that a prediction is fulfilled). ' (p. 50). 
It is also clear from Craik's analogies that the process is primarily thought to be a 
qualitative simulation. One such analogy is Kelvin's tidal predictor. This is a machine 
which replicates tidal movement through a system of oscillation of pulleys, 
demonstrating the idea of an analogue simulation well. How the process operates in 
abstract thought that does not involve causal relations is not specified, but the 
implication is that models are intended to apply in that domain too. 
A definition of models is offered, and interestingly this is a definition of all models, not 
merely mental ones. This approach is maintained throughout, models in the mind have 
no special features, they are equivalent to all models. Hence a model is defined as: 
`any physical or chemical ystem which has a similar relation-structure to that of the 
process it imitates. By 'relation-structure' I do not mean some obscure non physical entity 
which attends the model but the fact that it is a physical working model which works in 
the same way as the process it parallels, in the aspects under consideration at any moment. ' 
(p. 51). 
It seems from this definition that the model is isomorphic to the process it is modelling, 
at least in the specific aspects under consideration. However, later on, Craik suggests 
that as a model is an analogy it will eventually break down at some point, revealing 
properties not found in the process it is imitating or alternatively not show properties of 
28 
the original process. In other words, the model cannot be identical to reality. Craik's 
conceptualisation can perhaps be thought of as a rough and ready kind of model, 
constructed with pragmatic aims. The intention to build an isomorphic model is there, 
but the implication is that it is unnecessary to bother with any aspects not of direct 
relevance. Realistically the model must be expected to fall down at some level of 
analysis. The aim is to build a model which is accurate for the purposes it is to be used 
for. 
In contrast, the mental models of Johnson-Laird (1983) seem more precise. There are 
three reasons for this. Firstly, the principles of cognitive science applied in the 
development of the theory lead to an emphasis on the development of effective 
procedures for computing the models. A benefit of this is that the processes 
hypothesised must be fully specified in order for the computational model to be 
implemented. This means it is impossible to create anything but a precise theory of 
mental models. 
Secondly, Johnson-Laird lays out several principles which combine to generate mental 
models that are parsimonious representations. The principle of constructivism states 
that `a mental model is constructed from tokens arranged in a particular order to 
represent a state of affairs' (p. 398). The principle of structural identity states that `the 
structures of mental models are identical to the structures of the states of affairs, 
whether perceived or conceived, that the models represent' (p. 419). All of the structural 
relations in the model play a symbolic role. The principle of economy states that `a 
description of a single state of affairs is represented by a single mental model even if the 
description is incomplete or indeterminate' (p. 408). Therefore the arrangement of the 
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tokens in the model is isomorphic to one particular state of affairs that it is modelling. 
Unlike Craik there is no proviso of the model breaking down at a certain level of 
analysis or of only some aspects of the state of affairs being modelled. This means that 
a model is a highly economical and accurate representation of the thing modelled. 
Thirdly, the domain that Johnson-Laird chose to study using mental model theory is not 
building bridges, but laboratory based deductive reasoning tasks. Syllogistic reasoning, 
for example, allows a much more detailed analysis of the models that can be constructed 
(e. g. Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984). Sixty-four formally distinct premises can be created 
and the potential number of mental models required to represent each of these can be 
calculated. For the twenty-seven syllogisms with valid conclusions a maximum of three 
models are required with a moderate number of tokens in each. This is a lot for the 
limited capacity of working memory to manipulate. However it is much more 
reasonable to consider the exact models held by participants in these tasks than in other 
tasks for which mental models are used. For example, nuclear power plants have in the 
order of forty-five degrees of freedom thus comprising a complex, dynamic system. To 
analyse this problem to the same degree of thoroughness would therefore be a difficult 
task (Moray, 1997). This means that some of the precision of the mental models 
described by Johnson-Laird stems from the tasks to which they refer rather than their 
formal specificity. However Johnson-Laird provides a typology of ten mental models 
which account for the range of states of affairs that can be represented. This implies 
that mental models are used in different tasks and will take a different form accordingly, 
although they will still operate according to basic mental model principles. In short, 
Johnson-Laird's conceptualisation of mental models originates from the domain of 
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deductive reasoning and as such they form a well specified theory of cognitive 
processes. 
Meanwhile, Moray (1999) approaches mental models from a human factors position, 
although his aim is explicitly to unify the field. Central to this approach is the concept 
of a homomorphic mapping, inspired by Ashby's work on models (Ashby, 1956). A 
homomorphic mapping requires that several elements in the system being modelled are 
represented by one element in the model. Moray claims that: 
`... to model something is to perform a homomorphic (that is, many-to-one) mapping from 
the domain which is the set whose elements are a complete description of the original 
"thing" onto the range which is the set whose elements are a complete description of the 
model' (p. 233). 
Thus something is a model precisely because it is a homomorphic mapping, if not it 
would be the real thing. It is further proposed that lattice theory is the appropriate 
formalism for describing these models (c. f. Cohn, 1981). A lattice is a diagram which 
represents the various homomorphisms of a model. 
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Figure 1.1. An example of a lattice. 
Every lattice has a single node at the top and a single node at the bottom (see Figure 
1.1). The element at the top represents the most complex state of affairs with every 
element distinguished. The node at the bottom represents the simplest state of affairs 
with every element merged into one. The nodes in between represent the various 
intermediate homomorphisms in which some, but not all of the distinctions are 
preserved. 
Moray makes two claims about how lattices can represent models. The first of these is 
that individuals, especially those whose mental models have developed over time such as 
operators of complex systems, have several mental models of the system modelled. 
These are all homomorphic mappings of each other with varying degrees of complexity 
and so the range of models can be ordered using a lattice. At the top of the lattice is the 
most detailed, complex model. Using this representation is cognitively demanding and 
individuals may not be able to cope with the required mental workload. Therefore they 
may form more abstract mental models in which several elements are mapped onto one 
element in the new model. These models have more homomorphic mappings, are 
simpler and therefore reduce mental workload. They would be represented 
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progressively further down the lattice. However, the problem with these models is that 
they are no longer perfect representations of the system modelled. This can lead to 
error. If it becomes necessary to distinguish between two crucial elements that are not 
differentiated in the model it will not be possible to simulate the modelled system 
accurately. Previous models will therefore have to be retrieved from memory in order 
to avoid error. 
The second claim concerning lattice theory is that it is an appropriate formalism for 
describing individual models. Each relationship between elements can be interpreted as 
causal (or presumably any other type of connective if the model is not a causal one). 
This claim is less plausible as lattices do not represent all causal systems well. They 
require a single element at the top and bottom, which may not be the case in all causal 
systems. They are unidirectional - things at the bottom cause things at the top and not 
vice versa. Thus they cannot account for feedback loops, a major feature of causal 
systems. Homomorphisms may well be a useful way of describing models, but lattice 
theory should be restricted to displaying families of models, not individual ones. 
Despite both Moray's and Johnson-Laird's claims for universal mental model theories, 
some striking differences between them can be identified. Most obviously Johnson- 
Laird's theory requires models to be isomorphic to the situations that they represent 
whereas Moray requires them to be homomorphic. Indeed much of their explanation 
follows from the chosen form of representation. In the case of Johnson-Laird, limited 
working memory capacity is used to explain much of the empirical performance data 
obtained. Presumably if some models were homomorphisms this likelihood would be 
reduced and there would not be such clear effects. Conversely low performance is 
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explained by Moray as due to models being homomorphic mappings that have 
developed to reduce mental workload. This then removes limited working memory 
capacity as an explanation. Also, Moray is silent about whether a model can represent 
more than one state of affairs whereas this has a crucial explanatory role in Johnson- 
Laird's theory of deductive reasoning. 
The source of these differences lies in the different contexts in which mental models are 
applied. Moray's example of a mental model bar excellence' (p. 26) is the operator of a 
complex system such as a process plant. This means the model will be repeatedly used 
over a long period of time and may well be stored in long term memory. There are 
many opportunities to test if different models are effective through interactions with the 
system and it may well be that some homomorphisms will lead to appropriate 
behaviour, at least in many situations. They will therefore be rewarded. In contrast, 
deductive reasoning tasks in the laboratory will often only be addressed once. This does 
not allow much opportunity for the model to be stored in long term memory, nor does 
it allow repeated feedback to find models that will lead to the correct answers without 
using isomorphic models. It is also less likely that such models exist for these problems. 
Taken literally these two theories contradict in several important ways. Moray's theory 
is closer to Craik's. There is an emphasis on the simulation of causal processes and the 
idea of imperfections in the model is central. Moray expresses this formally as 
homomorphisms, but Craik's idea of models which are accurate only to a certain 
approximation may turn out to describe accurately the inconsistent and illogical mental 
models that people actually use (c. f. Gentner & Stevens, 1983). 
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Finally, Holland et al. (1986) propose that the nature of mental models is that they are 
quasi-homomorphic mappings, or q-morphs. They suggest that the environment can 
be represented as a set of states coupled with a transition function that specifies how 
these states change over time. The object of a mental model is to represent these states 
and the transition function in order that the environment can be mentally simulated. 
However, the world is considered to be so complex that a limited cognitive system 
cannot represent it all isomorphically. Therefore, the cognitive system constructs a 
simplified model by aggregating states into categories and ignoring details that are 
irrelevant for achieving a particular goal. This mapping is a homomorphism, as 
described by Moray. A transition function which acts on the homomorphic mapping to 
generate predictions of future states completes the model. They also agree with Moray 
that such a mapping will break down at times. Some members of the category will not 
behave as the others do. However they suggest that in such a situation a new layer is 
added to the model. This layer addresses one category and makes a distinction between 
different states. A more accurate transition function can therefore be created. The 
higher layer with broader categories is used as a default, but if an exception arises a more 
specific lower level of the model is used. The layered set of transition functions is a 
quasi-homomorphism or q-morph. 
Although the use of q-morphs seems a more flexible portrayal of Moray's idea that 
models are homomorphic mappings, it does change the predictions of the theory. 
Moray's argument was that errors can be explained by the exceptions in 
homomorphisms. If they are accounted for by extra layers in the model though, this 
cannot explain error in performance. Nor can errors be explained by limited cognitive 
ability to represent the world, as this is what homomorphisms are used to avoid. 
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Instead there are three other potential causes of error. Firstly, the empirical rule 
describing the transition of a state over time can be wrong leading to incorrect 
predictions. Secondly, there may be hitherto undiscovered exceptions in the categories 
of environmental states. This leads to error until a new layer is added to the q-morph to 
handle them. Thirdly, it may be very difficult to find the specialised categories that 
account for transitions in some situations. Creating an accurate q-morph then becomes 
impossible. These are all problems with induction of the model, an issue which is 
avoided by Moray, not with using the model itself. Therefore the explanation of error is 
quite different for an essentially similar theory. 
The Holland et al. theory is also compatible with Craik. There is an emphasis on the 
simulation of causal processes and imperfections in the representation of the world. In 
this review of several contrasting theories however it becomes clear that the 
compatibility of Craik's theory is simply because it is ill specified rather because of any 
true universality. The differences from Johnson-Laird's theory lie again with the 
differences between isomorphic and homomorphic representations that were discussed 
in the comparison of Moray and Johnson-Laird's approaches. 
Even at this broad level of analysis large variations are apparent in the different 
approaches to mental models, especially the recent, well specified theories. Having 
reviewed the approaches it would now be possible to consider concessions that the 
different theories might make in order to reconcile them. Ultimately this must happen 
if a single theory is to account for a wide range of phenomena. However this is not the 
purpose of this review. Rather, the aim is to take the central ideas which are common 
to all the approaches and in doing so establish the universal features of a mental model. 
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The concept common to all of the theories is that the mental model is a mapping of the 
system to the cognitive system. The implication of this, explicitly described by Johnson- 
Laird as `the principle of structural identity', is that not only do tokens represent the 
system but all of the relations between the tokens of the model represent the relations 
between elements of the system and that there are no tokens or relations in the model 
that do not exist in the real system. Beyond this point the theories begin to diversify as 
to what the nature of the mapping is. This idea is nonetheless sufficient to place some 
constraints on the reasoning process. It must occur in an analogous fashion to the 
behaviour of the real system rather than using a different set of principles. No other 
principles or rules are required apart from those represented in the model. In short, as 
long as the mapping is maintained then reasoning with a model can take place. The 
conclusions drawn above will be used in Section 1.6 to develop a theory of mental 
models used by groups set within a distributed cognition framework. 
1.4 Shared Mental Models 
Of the existing research on mental models in groups and distributed systems there are 
some papers which propose different ways in which the concept can be applied. These 
are relatively independent from each other. The next section will review the different 
papers and integrate their proposals with some novel suggestions. However, one 
particular area of research has been widely investigated and requires more detailed 
discussion. It can be broadly labelled `Shared Mental Model Theory' (hereafter SMMT), 
although in fact there are several related ideas currently being tested. As these ideas all 
follow the same general theme, this section will examine them together. This approach 
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is notable because it relies entirely on independent reasoning by the group members. 
There is no distribution of reasoning at all. It therefore provides an interesting contrast 
to the distributed cognition approach adopted here. 
SMMT has been developed as a basis for team training and so the literature has a heavily 
pragmatic angle. As a result the emphasis is only indirectly on mental models insofar as 
they improve the performance of a team and there is insufficient attention to the 
cognitive processes the teams use. Nonetheless theoretical propositions are put forward 
that require reviewing and testing. This thesis will attempt to apply them to the 
cognitive processes of all groups and teams. 
SMMT was pre-empted by Athans (1982) but it was not until Cannon-Bowers, Salas & 
Converse (1990) coined the term `Shared mental models' that a programme of research 
began. Immediately following the original preliminary outline of SMMT by Cannon- 
Bowers et al. (1990), several papers were published by the same authors developing and 
specifying the theory further. However, since this time several other papers have been 
published that explicitly and implicitly suggest alternative shared mental model theories. 
As a result, there are currently at least four distinguishable theories claiming to be 
theories of shared mental models. More recently some empirical studies have been 
published. These present a mixed picture of the utility of shared mental models; they do 
not test the construct very well and do not demonstrate that it dramatically improves 
performance. However current work on finding a valid measure for shared mental 
models may improve this situation. 
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It is clear that shared mental models were originally a simple idea. SMMT adopted 
Rouse & Morris's (1986) definition of mental models and this has never subsequently 
been challenged. This definition is best categorised as a causal model of the type 
described by Moray in the selection described above. Team performance was proposed 
to be determined by the mental models that team members held of the task they were 
completing and of the other members of the team. This could be very useful in 
teamwork as, in principle, it allows team members to predict their team mates behaviour 
and needs more accurately using the mental model, thus obviating the requirement for 
overt communication. These predictions or expectations would then improve the 
coordination of the team. This becomes especially important because under high 
workload conditions overt communication is reduced, but it is under these conditions 
that coordination is required to be optimal. So in brief the theory proposed here is: 
Specifically, as the degree of overlap among team members' mental models increases, 
the likelihood that team members have accurate expectations regarding the needs of 
other team members also increases. Thus shared or overlapping mental models among 
team members should enhance the successful use of implicit coordination by allowing 
team members to anticipate the behaviour and information needs of team members 
more accurately'. (Cannon-Bowers et al., 1990, p. 2). 
Thus the basic idea is that if team members have the same mental models they will be 
able to improve their coordination because they know what to expect from their team 
mates without them even having to say. Cannon-Bowers et al. also note that a team 
probably would not just have one model to share, but may have separate models of the 
task equipment, the task itself and the team, for example each other's roles. 
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Although this theory sounds plausible initially, upon reflection it is too simple to explain 
ideal team performance. Specifically, the question of what is to be shared is not that 
straightforward. In real life teams it is surely not necessary for team members to know 
absolutely everything their team mates know. An example given by Cooke, Salas, 
Cannon-Bowers & Stout (2000) illustrates this point. A surgical team of surgeon and 
nurse perform a task requiring high coordination. The nurse does not know all that the 
surgeon knows in order to complete the task. In this situation only some knowledge 
needs to be shared for optimal performance. This line of thought led to the first 
development of the theory by Rouse, Cannon-Bowers & Salas (1992). They proposed 
that `enhanced and compatible mental models will yield improved team performance' 
(p. 1302) because `if team members know what to expect and can explain what they 
observe, team performance is likely to be enhanced' (p. 1302). There are therefore two 
key to changes to the original theory. Firstly, the mechanism by which the theory has 
an effect is slightly broadened so that explanations as well as expectations are proposed 
to be the route through which mental models improve team work. Secondly, and more 
importantly, the proviso that mental models must be shared has been dropped. The key 
feature of mental models is now proposed to be that they are compatible. It seems that 
this is meant in the sense that they generate the same expectations for any situation in 
which they come into contact completing the task, but in any other situation they may 
well have different expectations. Cannon-Bowers, Salas & Converse (1993) support this 
development and point out that the mental models must be accurate as well as 
compatible in order to be effective. 
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A further refinement of the concept of what is shared is the development of the idea of 
multiple mental models. Cannon-Bowers et al. (1990) suggest that there is likely to be 
more than one mental model used in the completion of a task. In this paper four major 
mental models are proposed: the equipment model covering the function of the 
equipment they use; the task model covering the nature of the task and how to 
accomplish it; the team interaction model covering team factors such as roles, 
communication channels and so on; and finally the team model covering team members' 
knowledge, skills, abilities and so on. The sharing required for each may vary and is 
likely to be task dependent. 
Orasnu & Salas (1993) propose another benefit of shared mental models in addition to 
the existing ones. Hitherto the proposed effect of shared mental models has been 
improved coordination under pressure. Orasnu & Salas suggest that a major benefit of 
shared mental models is in improving shared understanding which makes implicit 
communication easier. Shared mental models are proposed to provide a context for 
interpreting commands or information requests. In this respect shared mental models 
provide a similar function to `common ground' in theories of communication (e. g. 
Fussell & Krauss, 1987). Another point highlighted in this paper is the lability of shared 
mental models. Previously they have been described as structures stored in long term 
memory and, given the intended implications for training, it is clear that shared mental 
models were intended as long term, stable structures. Orasnu & Salas suggest that some 
mental models can be broadly shared by a culture, others are limited to a profession, 
some to a group and some to a particular situation. Thus shared mental models can be 
long or short term. Mental models of a particular situation are referred to as `situation 
models'. They appear to be the same as shared mental models in all respects. However 
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they are generally understood to be constructed in response to a particular non-routine 
situation for which there is not a model in existence already. This therefore provides a 
new prediction for shared mental models. Under pressure shared mental models have 
previously been proposed to reduce the need for overt communication. However a 
non-routine situation requiring a situation model to be built would require more 
communication. Thus under pressure effective teams may communicate more to create 
a shared situation model and only then can they coordinate effectively and communicate 
less. So the absolute amount of communication may increase or decrease according to 
the exact nature of the situation. 
These papers present a clear account of a theory in which the group or team under high 
pressure must have compatible mental models of several aspects of teamwork in order 
to produce the same explanations and expectations of the situation which will lead to 
improved communication and coordination and therefore performance. The process is 
highly individual insofar as there is not much distribution of the cognitive process. 
Team members solve the problems they face individually and by virtue of this they can 
communicate and coordinate effectively, having reached similar conclusions. Meanwhile 
other developments of SMMT propose less individualistic processes. 
Iüimoski & Mohammed (1994) and Levine & Moreland (1999) both argue for shared 
mental models (Klimoski & Mohammed refer to them as team mental models) from a 
sociocognitive perspective. Klimoski & Mohammed outline the theory. They suggest 
that an `actuarial' sharing of mental models is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
shared mental models. Teams must also have an awareness that the mental models are 
shared. Their reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, there is a theoretical argument 
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presented that a mental model cannot be shared unless there is awareness of it by the 
group because this is a requirement for it to be considered a group level construct. That 
is, if they have explicitly negotiated and agreed upon it then it is a product of the group 
as a whole and it is only this type of construct that can be considered at the group level. 
This argument is fundamentally at odds with the original perspective in two ways. 
Firstly, shared mental models were not conceived as a sociocognitive group level 
construct and secondly, this approach requires a return to shared rather than compatible 
mental models. The second argument for awareness of shared mental models is that 
without awareness of a shared mental model team members will not act upon their 
models effectively. That is, unless they are aware that their mental models are shared 
they will not realise that they can predict each other's needs, will not do so effectively 
and so will not reap the potential benefits. This is a much more practical argument 
which is open to empirical testing and could be incorporated into the original 
conception of shared mental models. 
Levine & Moreland (1999) hold a similar position on the importance of socially shared 
knowledge. They present a number of ways in which new members in an organisation 
develop shared mental models. This is essentially described as a process of socialisation 
which can be affected by newcomers' tactics such as acquisition of information and their 
qualities such as similarity to the group and the old timers' tactics such as feedback to 
newcomers and their qualities such as familiarity with the newcomers. Although this 
paper is interesting as a theory of the ways in which knowledge can be socially shared 
with newcomers, the use of the term mental models is quite imprecise and is used to 
include quite different concepts such as `shared perspectives'. As a result the ideas are 
quite general and are of mixed relevance to the understanding of shared mental models. 
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Overall then, the socially shared perspective is orthogonal to the other arguments 
concerning shared mental models. It is quite possible that it is conceptually more 
meaningful to discuss a mental model as shared only when it is a construction of the 
group. On the other hand, this issue does not greatly impact upon the research focus of 
the other shared mental model work, how effective teamwork occurs under pressure. 
As result the question has been largely ignored in empirical work and lip service only has 
been paid in theoretical work. 
The question of sharedness has also briefly been addressed by Carley (1997) with respect 
to her proposed method of measuring it. The method is to extract the major concepts 
and relations between the concepts from a text and plot them in a cognitive map 
showing a network of all the concepts and their relations. Several alternative maps can 
be created. A union of all the individuals' concepts added together can be extracted. 
The intersection of all the concepts held in common by all team members can be 
extracted. A map can be made of all the concepts held in common by a certain 
proportion of the team, for example 50% of team members or more. Typically shared 
mental models has only referred to the intersection or overlap as a shared mental model, 
these alternatives present different conceptualisations of sharedness. This theory 
promises a more flexible approach to what is and is not considered shared, but there has 
been no empirical work. 
Entin & Serfaty (1999) propose a theory of shared mental models which is directly 
relevant to the mainstream research, yet differs notably from it. They propose that 
shared mental models are: 
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`a common or consistent model of the tactical situation among team members and a set 
of mutual mental modeln about the other team-memberfunctions' (p. 313). 
The implication here is that there is not a single team model, rather team members hold 
a different model representing each of their team members. This approach also predicts 
performance benefits and so there is no difference to the previous theories here. But 
theoretically it presents a divergence from the existing concept. The change is not 
acknowledged and so only future publications will determine if Entin & Serfaty are 
actually adopting a separate stance on shared mental models or if it will not be referred 
to again. 
Another notable feature of Klimoski & Mohammed (1994), Levine & Moreland (1999) 
and Carley (1997) is that they apply shared mental models to low pressure situations. 
Carley studies teams of computer programmers, as do Levesque, Wilson & Wholey 
(2001). The other two papers refer to white collar organisations rather than military 
teams. Indeed some of these teams do not operate under high time pressure and could 
be said to be teams in name only. They are difficult to distinguish from any other form 
of group. Thus SMMT has more recently been interpreted as a general theory of mental 
models in groups and teams and not a specialist theory of military teams. As such it is 
not necessary to test it only in military situations since it has been suggested to have a 
role in all group and team situations. 
In summary then there are four distinct theories of `shared mental models': overlapping 
mental models (e. g. Cannon-Bowers, Salas & Converse, 1990); compatible mental 
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models (e. g. Cannon-Bowers, Salas & Converse, 1993); socially shared mental models 
(e. g. Klimoski & Mohammed, 1994) and a set of mutual models (e. g. Entin & Serfaty, 
1999). Variations such as Carley (1997) are not fully developed or proposed as separate 
theories. Socially shared mental models do not seem to address the same fundamental 
issues as compatible mental models and the set of mutual models may be effectively 
indistinct from compatible mental models. Thus the idea that shared mental models as 
compatible emerges as the most important theory to test at this stage. 
Empirical studies of shared mental models thus far have been methodologically similar 
and found broadly similar effects. There are three studies of performance of teams 
using a flight simulator (Heffner, Mathieu & Cannon-Bowers, 1995; Heffner, Mathieu & 
Goodwin, 1998; Mathieu, Goodwin, Heffner, Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2000), one of 
team performance using a tank simulator (Minionis, 1995) and one of team performance 
in a helicopter simulator (Stout, Cannon-Bowers, Salas & Milanovich, 1999). Mental 
models were assessed using individual's ratings of the relatedness of different task or 
team features. For example, task features of the plane simulator included how airspeed 
and banking are related (diving increases airspeed). Measures of team features included 
amount of information and quality of information. Link weighted networks of 
relatedness were created from these using Pathfinder analysis which were taken to 
represent the participant's mental models. These were then correlated to discover how 
similar they were within teams as a measure of mental model sharedness. 
The three plane simulator studies found that task and team mental models sharedness 
were significant predictors of team process, measured using judges ratings of team 
process. This in turn was a significant predictor of team performance. In addition 
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Mathieu et al. (2000) found that task mental model sharedness was a small but significant 
predictor of task performance and Heffner et al. (1995) found that team mental model 
sharedness was a small but significant predictor of task performance. The latter study 
also found that team mental model accuracy in terms of similarity to subject matter 
experts' ratings was a significant predictor of team process. Heffner et al. (1998) found 
no effect of training with the team mate on sharedness of mental models. 
In the tank simulator Minionis (1995) found slightly different effects in that team mental 
model sharedness predicted performance, but not team process. His measure of team 
process was the frequency of communication and not a judges rating of it though. 
Possibly absolute number of statements is not such a relevant measure as quality of 
communication. 
In the helicopter simulator Stout et al. (1999) found that shared mental models led to 
more planning, but not more communication provided in advance of a specific request 
for it (as predicted by SMMT). The effect on team performance is not presented. 
Overall the pattern of results suggests that shared mental models may be effective in 
improving teams performing under pressure, but the amount of variance accounted for 
is not great. That is, shared mental models seem to account for about 10% of team 
process and team process accounts for about 9% of team performance (Mathieu et al., 
2000). This is improved to 36% and 38% respectively when accuracy of mental models 
is included in Heffner et al. (1995). This relatively small effect could be due to a number 
of factors. Of course it could simply be that shared mental models do not improve 
performance greatly. But there are alternative explanations. It is possible that the 
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shared mental model construct is being inadequately assessed. The mental model 
measure looks at sharedness as a correlation, that is whether they are the same or not. 
Yet compatibility was proposed to be the key requirement for shared mental models. 
New measures are needed to properly assess compatibility. Also the task requires 
participants to operate a simulator, a difficult motor skill. It is possible that individual 
variation in this ability accounts for some variation in task performance. There are 
aspects of the tasks which depend on causal reasoning to some extent in order to 
control the simulated device and, it is proposed, to interact with the other team 
member. Reasoning though is by no means the only aspect of the experiment. From 
the applied perspective of the authors this is perhaps not an issue, but from a purely 
theoretical position the experiments are somewhat confounded as tests of mental 
models in teams or groups. 
SMMT is not a completely unified field and is only just beginning to gather empirical 
evidence. However there is a clear theme in all of the papers proposing how mental 
models are used in teams. This is that they should be the same when it comes to the 
parts of the task where team members are required to interact. If they are not the same 
then team members will not be able to operate effectively together. There is also a clear 
process describing how teams use mental models. This is an entirely independent 
process; none of the reasoning is distributed. That is, each member predicts 
independently what he or she needs to know about the task and their team mates, 
thereby minimising the need for communication. If they do not have shared mental 
models then any communication is likely to be inefficient and result in suboptimal 
performance. Thus teams optimally should have shared mental models. 
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This thesis attempts to conduct more controlled experiments on mental models in 
groups than the shared mental model experiments published to date. Therefore applied 
experiments in military settings are not used and there is not a focus on the training of 
teams. SMMT presents a major proposal about how groups and teams should use 
mental models. The experiments presented in this thesis will test these proposals to 
investigate more precisely how shared mental models influence the cognitive processes 
used by groups. Unlike previous shared mental models experiments, predictions derived 
from SMMT will be compared with those derived from an alternative theory based in 
the distributed cognition framework. This will contrast independent and distributed 
reasoning processes and allow for constructive development of theory concerning 
mental models and the role, if any, of distribution in groups. 
1.5 Distributed Cognition and Mental Models: Existing Approaches 
The aim of this section is to review the existing literature on distributed cognition and 
mental models. A theory is needed which will maintain the potential of mental models 
and distributed cognition to account for a wide range of phenomenon. The literature 
will be assessed for the validity and generality of the extant theories. Distributed 
cognition has not often been applied to mental models, but some notable exceptions 
exist and will be reviewed including Green (2000), O'Malley & Draper (1992) and Bauer 
& Johnson-Laird (1993). 
Green (2000) proposes that groups exchange arguments and counter-arguments when 
discussing an issue. This leads to the construction of an argument model in which the 
arguments are represented as tokens that can be related to other arguments. It is 
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considered a distributed process in that the arguments themselves are representations. 
That is, they are cognitive artefacts which are used by group members and internalised 
in forming the argument model. 
Some aspects of this theory are not yet fully delineated. A great deal of the explanatory 
power rests in the characteristics of the tokens. In conditional inference a token can 
simply represent an element, e. g. a circle. In an argument model however they must 
represent an argument and also its strength. It is possible that the strength of an 
argument is inherent to it, but in that case it is necessary to explain why different people 
rate arguments as having different strengths. Perhaps the strength is determined by 
general knowledge about the topic. Potentially it could be determined by any number of 
factors. To fully understand how the tokens are used in a model of such complex 
systems more specificity about them is needed. 
When applied to groups there are also some details about the group process which are 
not completely described. Group members exchange arguments, but their choice of 
arguments to exchange and the effect they have on other group members is not 
explained. This is crucial to the group level process. Group members presumably do 
not produce arguments in random order, but mention those that directly respond to 
previous comments. The temporal sequence is likely to be influential to the 
persuasiveness of an argument, as highlighted but also not explained in Moshman & 
Geil's co-construction of arguments. It is also not clear if each group member has their 
own, possibly different, argument model which is altered through the influence of 
argumentation or if each person produces arguments that can be integrated into a 
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shared model which is jointly constructed. Experimentation will resolve many of these 
issues. 
Argument models are potentially an important form of mental models in groups. As 
the theory stands several issues about their use are unresolved, but these seem to be 
largely tractable problems. However argument models do not provide a general 
distributed cognitive theory of mental models. The role of artefacts in the environment, 
culture and other social factors are important to most of the theories of distributed 
cognition reviewed and these cannot be incorporated into an argument model as they 
do not easily represent arguments. By dealing with a specific situation, argument models 
are making specific and informative claims about the reasoning process. The 
unfortunate consequence of this is a loss of generality. The aim here is to identify a 
general distributed cognitive theory of mental models applicable to groups as well as 
other units of analysis. The conclusion here must be that argument models denote one 
instance that a general theory must be able to account for, but they do not in themselves 
offer a general framework. 
The approach of O'Malley & Draper (1992) differs from the argument models in several 
ways. Their purpose is to explain a user's operation of computer software by 
establishing what information about the software is held in the mind of the individual. 
To do this they created a dummy word processor and asked participants to find specific 
items on the menus that are revealed when the headers are clicked on using a mouse. In 
some conditions either the header labels were obscured or the items on the menu were 
obscured. The question was whether subjects could find the relevant items anyway. If 
they could then this information must be stored in an internal mental model. Their 
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results were a little confusing. They found that users could find the correct menu item 
location even when it had been obscured if the header for that menu was still visible, but 
were much worse if the header was obscured. If, on the other hand, the headers were 
obscured, users were still very good at finding the correct location where the header 
ought to be. This is not easy to interpret because if the users knew where the headers 
were anyway, why was performance poor without them? Nonetheless it does suggest 
that users have internalised the location of menu items, but that this information is only 
used once the correct header is accessed. It is not clear what mental models they 
actually hold, but it implies that the internal mental models are not a complete model of 
the device as was suggested previously by researchers such as Young (1983) or Kieras & 
Bovair (1984). Rather, much information remains in the computer with the model 
being designed to facilitate interaction with it. Thus a complete understanding is 
distributed between the user and the computer. 
This approach is similar to that of Norman (1987). For Norman, the role of the artefact 
is mainly to hold information about the operation of the device in order that it can be 
offloaded from the user. No actual reasoning is completed by the computer, it simply 
allows information to be transferred back to the user when required. So although there 
is a distribution of information it is still clearly only the user who actually uses the 
mental model. Again this is a specific application of distributed cognition to mental 
models. The role of the artefact is incorporated into the system, but only as an external 
memory. Applying this to groups, the concept of holding a mental model of other 
group member's information is plausible and indeed is described in the shared mental 
models literature. However, there is no description of how reasoning is distributed or 
how the reasoning of different group members are integrated as they are in argument 
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models, for example. This is not a general theory applicable to all units of analysis. As 
with argument models, a general distributed cognitive theory of mental models must 
incorporate mental models of this type, but in itself applies only to specific situations. 
Bauer & Johnson-Laird (1993) do not explicitly mention distributed cognition, but the 
paper is clearly interpretable within distributed cognition framework. They considered 
how diagrams facilitated disjunctive reasoning. Participants were given disjunctions 
along with different diagrams which represented the information. Initially arbitrary 
symbols were used in the diagrams but these had no effect on reasoning. But an 
electrical circuit and an abstract diagram which represented the relations in the 
disjunction improved the speed and accuracy of conclusions compared to verbal 
presentations. It is suggested the reason for this is that participants could readily 
envisage manipulations of the diagrams and they had been constructed such that it was 
impossible to represent an untrue state of affairs using them. Thus they operated as a 
cognitive artefact which a) transformed the reasoning into a visualisable puzzle and b) 
constrained the reasoning such that it was guided towards the correct answer. 
This approach focuses on the second implication of distributed cognition outlined in 
Section 1.2. The first implication was that as the boundary is extended then more 
people and artefacts take part in the computation. The first two approaches reviewed 
could be categorised as principally making this point. The second implication of 
distributed cognition was that the nature of the computation can change. This is what 
Bauer & Johnson-Laird describe. The reasoning is distributed between the artefact and 
the individual in the sense that the reasoning is situated in the artefact. This description 
of mental models is not well suited for explaining how the boundaries of mental models 
53 
are extended to allow other agents to take part in the computation. Thus again this 
approach cannot be described as a general application of distributed cognitive to mental 
models. 
Overall, the existing theories in which mental models are interpreted in a distributed 
cognition framework are specific in nature. They make insightful points, but only apply 
to restricted domains. Mental models and distributed cognition are both general in 
nature though. A distributed cognitive theory of mental models should be applicable to 
a wide range of phenomena. The next section will propose such a possibility. 
1.6 Distributed Mental Models: A General Theory 
What is needed is a framework that will incorporate all of these specific examples of 
distributed cognition, and future ones, into a single distributed cognitive theory of 
mental models. Drawing heavily from the distributed cognition literature this theory will 
not only account for group reasoning but also the role of cognitive artefacts, the 
environment, culture, social factors and any other elements which might be adopted in a 
unit of analysis for describing and explaining mental models. This will provide an 
alternative theory which can be contrasted with SMMT. It will be developed here by 
returning to the central idea of a mental model, that it is a mapping of the system 
modelled. 
As was noted by Craik (1943) and Moray (1999) in particular, a model is not exclusively a 
human construct. Models take all manner of forms, for example mathematical or PC 
based. Therefore there is no requirement for a model to be instantiated solely in the 
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brain as models are not conceived fundamentally as brain structures. They have simply 
been used that way by psychologists. We can therefore look at the model as the unit of 
analysis in its own right and assess the information that it processes rather than limiting 
the research to only those models that are instantiated in a single individual. 
This means that a model can be viewed as a unit of analysis for a group. As mentioned 
above, the central feature of a model is that it is a mapping, but within the distributed 
cognition framework the medium which the system is mapped need not be an 
individual. As long as there is `free propagation of the representational state across [the] 
representational media (Hutchins, 1995a, p. 117) then computationally there is one 
continuous cognitive process. So a model can be a mapping onto more than one 
medium as long as the relations between the tokens are maintained. These media could 
be a group of people, or a group plus cognitive artefacts, and each person could hold 
part of the model. If the relations between the tokens are maintained by 
communication between the group members then this model can be treated as a single 
unit of analysis rather than solely studying the parts of the model that the individuals 
hold and therefore not the relations between them. Although it is clearly individuals 
who reason and collaborate in order to use the model it is the whole system that will be 
studied here. A model of this type will be referred to as a `distributed mental model' in 
contrast with the shared mental models with which they will be compared. 
This tentative theory suggests several possible questions. Firstly, the reasoning process 
must rely on the propagation of possible states between people. They will transform 
these through an iterative process until finally a conclusion is reached to which they 
have all contributed. This collaboration, that is the interactions between people, as well 
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as the reasoning they complete individually are all part of a distributed cognitive process. 
What is the collaborative process used by groups with distributed mental models? 
The theory also suggests that different structures of model are possible in groups 
compared to individuals. Mental models could be shared or distributed between a 
group. In addition there are different ways in which a model might be distributed. How 
is the collaborative process affected by different mental model structures? 
The mental model structures may also affect reasoning performance. SMMT proposes 
that performance of groups are optimal when mental models are shared. The 
distributed cognition approach suggests that distributing the mental model is a better 
explanation of what groups actually do. The division of labour, for example, may confer 
performance benefits. How do shared and distributed mental models compare in 
reasoning performance? 
If different collaborative processes are used by groups with different mental model 
structures, then these differences could give rise to characteristic patterns of 
performance. That is, if one process is influenced by factors that a different process is 
not, and vice versa, there will be qualitative differences in their performance. The 
different models will not trivially be optimal and sub-optimal, as SMMT would suggest, 
but have different properties. Do shared and distributed mental models have qualitative 
differences in performance? 
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In addition, the processes used in groups may well be different to individuals. Therefore 
for the same reason individuals may well have different properties to groups. Do 
individuals and groups have qualitative differences in performance? 
This thesis will seek to assemble a body of empirical evidence which can be used to 
answer these questions. 
1.7 Conclusion 
An increasing number of theories and frameworks are noted here that consider units of 
analysis for cognitive processes other than an individual. Thus it seems timely to 
develop a cognitive theory of reasoning in groups. Distributed cognition is selected as 
an appropriate framework for developing such a theory and the basis of the framework 
is outlined along with its implications. Mental models are chosen as the basis for a 
theory of group reasoning because of the current theory of individual reasoning it 
accounts for most data across a wide range of phenomena. The central idea of a model, 
that of a mapping, is established by comparing a range of otherwise contrasting mental 
model approaches. Of the work on mental models in groups by far the largest is the 
research on Shared Mental Model Theory which explains performance through 
individuals' reasoning. This research is reviewed and the process described is found to 
rely on independent rather than distributed reasoning. Other work on mental models 
using a distributed cognitive framework is reviewed. Finally a tentative theory of 
`distributed mental models' within the distributed cognition framework is proposed. In 
this the model is taken as the unit of analysis, even if it is divided between the group 
members. This thesis compares the independent reasoning process in shared mental 
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models with the distributed cognition approach in distributed mental models in order to 
discover if there is a role for distributed cognition in group reasoning, the effect of 
different mental model structures, what cognitive processes they use and what 
characteristic properties they have compared to each other and individual reasoning. 
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Chapter 2 
Development and Initial Exploration of a Task for Studying Mental 
Models in Groups 
2.1 Introduction 
This thesis aims to discover how the distribution of the information comprising a 
mental model affects the reasoning of a group. This chapter considers what the 
necessary features of any task used to examine this are. A review of existing paradigms 
for studying mental models will demonstrate that no existing task allows hypotheses of 
this nature to be tested adequately. Therefore a second aim of this thesis is to develop a 
task which is appropriate for investigating the issue. The task and the rationale behind it 
will be outlined in Section 2.3. In addition, the verbal protocols of individuals 
completing the task will be presented in Section 2.4. Although the main focus of the 
thesis is group reasoning, individuals comprise groups and so it will help interpretation 
of the group interactions if more is known about what individuals are doing which leads 
them to make their contributions. 
2.2 The Required Characteristics of a Task for Testing Mental Models in Groups 
There are two major criteria which the task must fulfil in order to test the theory in this 
thesis; it must require reasoning in order that the group is principally using mental 
models to solve it and it must be possible to manipulate the information so that it can 
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either be shared amongst all of the group members or distributed between them. The 
existing literature on mental model tasks will now be reviewed in order to search for a 
task which fulfils these criteria. 
Current research into mental models in groups and teams mostly concerns Shared 
Mental Models and these experiments use similar tasks. Therefore the review of 
potential tasks will begin with these. The existing work on Shared Mental Models does 
not adequately meet either of the criteria. The paradigm involves teams of two 
operating a military simulator, most commonly an F-16. Mental models are measured at 
the end of the task. This is acceptable within the research's own remit as it explicitly has 
the aim of improving pilot performance rather than studying mental models. Therefore 
studying an aeroplane simulator is a natural task to use. The aim of this thesis is not 
however to apply mental model theory to pilots but to develop theory of mental models 
in groups. There are several aspects of this task which mean that it is not a rigorous test 
of mental models in groups and so is not suitable for this thesis. 
Firstly, little is known about the mental models used in the task. These are causal 
models of the aeroplane and the other pilot, but the way in which they generate causal 
predictions is not specified in the shared mental model papers. Further, other areas of 
literature which do address causal understanding and judgement focus mainly on single 
cause-effect relationships. Causal cognition about complex, dynamic systems such as 
these are much less well understood (White, 2000). In these experiments it is not clear 
what the individuals are doing and so discovering how they interact would be difficult. 
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Secondly, eliciting mental models is difficult and there are currently no satisfactory 
methods available. Cooke, Salas, Cannon-Bowers & Stout (2000) and Brannick, Roach 
& Salas (1993) both make several suggestions for measuring shared mental models but 
none have been used with great success. The most common method requires 
individuals to rate the relatedness of several concepts that are in the model. From this 
data a link-weighted network can be constructed using Pathfinder analysis and the 
similarity of the team members networks can be assessed. This method has several 
problems. It prescribes which concepts are in the model when in fact group members 
may have different concepts to each other or those assumed by the experimenter. 
Moreover, differences between group members should be a principal hypothesis when 
comparing shared with distributed mental models. It is not possible to test this 
hypothesis using this method. The final statistic only reports the similarity of the mental 
models. This is insufficient to test the theory because the issue is not simply that teams 
have shared or different mental models, but what exactly is being modelled and into 
what sections the model is divided. It is necessary to find out which person has what 
information and is not apparent in the above method. The method also assumes that 
team members can consciously and retrospectively report the relationships in the mental 
models they used when actively engaged in the task. It is possible that this information 
is not consciously accessible to report after the task, so it is hard to be confident that the 
reports are reliable and valid. 
Thirdly, the paradigm has not hitherto allowed effective manipulation of the models. 
The experiments have typically allowed groups to complete the task without any specific 
intervention and then measured shared mental models and performance and related the 
two. Thus the experimental design is correlational and so the causal relations implied are 
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not strongly tested. There has been an attempt to manipulate the mental models held 
by team members through training specific models (e. g. Heffner, Mathieu & Goodwin, 
1998) but this was unsuccessful; that is, there were no effects of the manipulation. This 
suggests that training mental models on the task is at best unspecific. It is not clear what 
has been learnt, and at worst it may not influence the mental models held at all. 
Finally, as this is a complex and naturalistic task it is probable that other factors 
influence the performance of teams and confound the results. For example, prior 
experience at the task may improve motor coordination which is a large component of 
the task and must account for some variance in performance. The length of the task 
and the training involved may develop social cohesion, group efficacy or other social 
factors which can affect performance. This is likely to occur with all group tasks but in a 
task as dynamic as this one the effects are liable to be greater. To test reasoning 
rigorously it is necessary to find a task that does not require so many other skills in order 
to complete. For these reasons the paradigm used in previous shared mental model 
experiments will not be used here. 
An alternative which would meet the first criterion is to study conditional inference 
problems as, for example, in Johnson-Laird & Byrne (1991). These problems have 
many benefits. There is a large body of literature testing competing theories, see Section 
1.3.1. This has tended to increase the specificity of the theory so there is a much clearer 
picture of the process that individuals use when solving the problems and there is good 
evidence that mental models are used in this process. This provides a solid foundation 
on which to build a theory of mental models in groups. The problems are also readily 
manipulated experimentally. This is beneficial given the difficulty in measuring mental 
62 
models in the previous experiments and because stronger inferences about causality can 
be made. The problems do not require as many skills to complete as the flight 
simulators, so the role of mental models in their completion is not diluted. For these 
reasons a type of conditional reasoning task will be used in this thesis. 
Unfortunately the existing conditional reasoning tasks do not meet the second criterion, 
that the information must be readily shared or distributed in a group. Tasks using 
conditional inference such as the Wason Selection task have been studied in groups by 
Moshman & Geil (1998). Although they did not attempt to distribute the information, 
the dialogue reported in it suggests that the information is readily shared by the group so 
that it would be very difficult to sustain a distribution of it throughout the experiment. 
The actual problem is small and once it has been mentioned then other group members 
easily remember it. Typically conditional inference task problems are of a similar size, 
e. g.: 
`If there is a triangle then there is a circle' 
and 
`There is a triangle' 
Thus again the problems are small and it would be impossible to have an effective 
distribution of a mental model. A second objection to these problems is that it is 
impossible to reason about it without having all of the information. That is, in order to 
solve the task it is necessary for each group member to share the information and 
therefore form shared mental models. Thus conditional reasoning problems cannot be 
used in this form to test the hypotheses of this thesis because it will not be possible to 
implement the required manipulations practically. A new type of task must be 
developed. 
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Fortunately these problems can be overcome by using a task in which there is 
considerably more information than in typical conditional reasoning problems. More 
information is harder for one person to remember and so the model cannot be easily 
shared. One way of adding to the information in a model is to use a conjunction. A 
conjunction in the premises of a conditional inference problem ensures that, according 
to mental model theory, there are more tokens in each model. But it does not increase 
the number of models that can be constructed (in the type of problem which will be 
used). In this task several conjunctions will be used to create a larger model which can 
more easily be divided between group members but could also be shared. This makes it 
possible to manipulate the distribution of the information practically. 
A necessary feature of distribution is that not all group members are focusing on the 
same piece of the task at the same time. If they did then they would be fulfilling many 
of the features of shared reasoning in that they would form a model of the same thing. 
This was the second objection raised above against typical conditional reasoning 
problems. 
This manipulation is clearly difficult to implement practically. The method finally 
adopted partly depends on the conjunctions in the problem. This is explained in greater 
detail in Chapter 3, but essentially they mean that the model can be broken down into 
relatively independent parts or modules. The modules can be divided amongst the 
group who can draw some conclusions based on the module and then combine this with 
the conclusions of other group members subsequently. 
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The second aspect of the method used is that groups were not presented with one 
problem, rather they could solve several different problems at once. This means that 
they were not constrained to work on the same problem at the same time as there are 
several valid options. However they will eventually have to address many or all of the 
same problems. This approach has the effect of further increasing the amount of 
information presented at one time, decreasing the chance that groups with distributed 
information will simply learn all that they are not presented with. 
This seemingly unusual situation can easily be created in a problem solving task. The 
task involved route finding between several locations. Groups are required to solve 
conditionals which determine whether they can or cannot move from one location to 
another. The object of the task is to reach a specified destination in the minimum 
number of moves between locations. However the problem space is very small and so 
the search component of the task is minimised. The major component of the task is 
concluding whether it is legal to move to an island or not. This process must be 
repeated for several islands to find out the optimal path. They each require conditional 
reasoning and so each one will involve the construction of a mental model. As there are 
several possible moves different group members can consider different problems at the 
same time and combine their conclusions subsequently, distributing the reasoning. 
Alternatively they may share all of the models and so not distribute the reasoning at all. 
Thus this task both meets the criteria laid out for testing the theory in this thesis and 
also it is plausible that it can be carried out effectively. This basic task will be used in all 
of the experiments in this thesis. 
65 
2.3 Outline of the Task 
The task described here was used in Experiments 1 and 2. Slight changes were made to 
the task for Experiments 3,4,5 &6 in order to test specific hypotheses and to improve 
some undesirable aspects which became clear through the research programme, but 
essentially most of its features remained the same. The task was computer-based and 
was completed by three participants who interacted with the computer using a mouse. 
Each sat at a different computer and these were arranged in a small circle facing inwards 
so that they could see their monitor but no one else's yet still communicate face to face. 
On the screens they were presented with a display of six `islands'. An impression of this 
display is shown in Figure 2.1. The islands were small coloured rectangles on the screen 
arranged roughly in a circle. Each was labelled with a name such as `North island' or 
`South island' in order that participants could easily discuss them. On each island there 
was a number of icons depicting various objects. The islands were the different 
locations to which the group could travel and the objects were necessary to decide 
whether a move was legal or not. In addition there was a small icon depicting a boat on 
one island. This indicated the current location of the group. The group always 
remained together in the boat. Also on each island there was a small numbered square. 
These were referred to as `scrolls'. The object of the task was to pick up these scrolls in 
numerical order in the minimum number of moves and as quickly as possible without 
making errors. Therefore the group was required to find a route from the current 
location of the boat to the next scroll, beginning with number 1. When all six scrolls 
were collected the trial finished. Time taken, number of errors and number of moves 
were recorded on a database on the computer. The remaining icons and information on 
the monitor was necessary for the subjects to determine which moves were legal. They 
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could do this by applying a rule to the information provided which led to a conclusion 
as to whether the move was legal or not. 
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West island 
Protected by the god of 
fire. Can't precede war. 
South island 
East island 
Protected by the god of 
fire. Can't precede war. 
Figure 2.1. Representation of the screen presented to participants during the 
experiment. 
N. B. The boat was represented by an icon in the experiment. 
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North island 
Protected by the god of 
love. Can't precede fire. 
Peppermint island 
Protected by the god of 
love. Can't precede fire. 
Fourth island 
Protected by the god of 
war. Can't precede peace. 
Protected by the god of 
peace. Can't precede love. 
The rule for deciding whether a move from one island to another was legal or not was a 
conditional with several conjunctions and took the form: 
If and only if (a and b) and (c and d) and (e and f) then the move is legal. 
The parentheses show the three modules of which the rule is composed and the pairs of 
letters within them refer to the elements within each module. The modules all shared 
the feature that an element on the current island had to be paired with an element on 
the destination island for a move to be legal, hence there are two letters in each module. 
However the exact nature of the task was quite complicated in Experiments 1 and 2, it 
was simplified for later experiments. 
The modules each comprised a different type of information; there was a `colour' 
module which referred to the colour of the islands, an `inhabitants' module which 
referred to the occupants of the island and the food they lived on and a `gods' module 
which referred the different deities protecting each island. The islands were coloured in 
one of three colours, blue, green or red, and for a move to be legal the destination island 
had to be a different colour to the current island. Or, in the manner in which the rule is 
presented above, the islands had to be `blue and not blue' or `green and not green' or 
`red and not red'. The inhabitants were either headhunters, trolls, priests or vegetarians. 
The food was either heads, fish, devils or pumpkins. For a move to be legal the 
inhabitant on the current island had to be paired with a specific food on the destination 
island. There was one inhabitant and two foodstuffs on each island. The rules were: 
either there had to be a headhunter and a head or a troll and fish or a priest and a devil 
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or a vegetarian and a pumpkin. These pairings were given to participants in written 
form so that they would not be forgotten. There were also four types of god: war, 
peace, love and fire. There was one god on each island. The rule was that there were 
certain pairings of current and destination island god which were not allowed so the 
move would be illegal. These were: love on the current island and fire on the 
destination island, fire and war, war and peace, peace and love. These pairings were 
presented on the screen so that they would not be forgotten. The tasks were designed 
such that all of the possibilities were used as equally as possible and the numbers of 
different items used in the task were also as equal as possible so that participants did not 
become accustomed to any item or part of the rule more than another. 
An example using Figure 2.1 will demonstrate the reasoning process. The boat is 
currently at East island. Is it possible to go to Peppermint island, where Scroll number 1 
is? East island is blue and Peppermint island is not blue, East island has a head and 
Peppermint island has headhunters and East island cannot precede War and Peppermint 
island is not War. Therefore the move is legal. If Scroll number 1 had been on North 
island then both East island and North island are blue, so the move would not be legal. 
It would be necessary to go to a different island and find a legal route from there. 
Deciding whether a move was legal or not was therefore a complicated task requiring the 
integration of several pieces of information into the model. However the actual rule 
itself was a biconditional and so there were , only two models which could 
be created, 
one in which the current and destination have matching information and the move is 
legal and one in which the islands do not have matching information and the move is 
illegal. Previous studies have found low numbers of fallacious conclusions drawn from 
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biconditional premises and the small number of models has been used to explain this 
(e. g. Johnson-Laird, Byrne & Schaeken, 1992). However the rule used here is very 
different to the premises of biconditionals studied elsewhere. The greater amount of 
information required may well increase error rates and there are other changes to the 
presentation of the biconditional. Thus it will not be appropriate to compare the results 
of this task with existing findings. This is not of great concern here though because the 
aim of the research is not to further explore biconditional reasoning per se but more 
generally to study the effects of how mental models are shared or distributed in a group. 
In sum, while this task is built on existing mental model theory it does not explicitly test 
It. 
The major component of the task is deciding which moves are legal according to the 
rule above. However the object of the task was to move around the islands collecting 
the scrolls. This is a simple route finding task. There were six scrolls to be collected in 
numerical order and so six separate routes to plan. The starting point of one route was 
the finishing point of the previous one. It was always possible to go to and leave every 
island, there were no dead ends. One of the scrolls could be reached in a minimum of 
one move, four could be reached in a minimum of two moves and one could be reached 
in a minimum of three moves. Thus the problem space through which the groups had 
to search was not large in comparison to many other tasks, for example the Tower of 
Hanoi. Problem solving itself was therefore a relatively minor component of the game. 
In total nine games were created for Experiment 2. These all had the same numbers of 
minimum moves, but in a different order. They also had the items on different islands 
so that participants could complete several different games. However there were always 
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a total of twelve legal moves out of a potential thirty, (if it had been possible to go to 
every island from every other one). As a result the different games were similar in 
difficulty. All of the games for all of the experiments are presented in Appendix 1. 
This task will not further the understanding of conditional inference in individuals. It 
does not critically compare theories and it will not be possible to tell what process 
individuals use to solve draw the inferences. Also, it will not be possible to demonstrate 
exactly which inferences are being made at any one time. However the individual is not 
the focus of this study. The task builds on the existing literature which has put forward 
evidence for a mental model account of conditional inference. On this basis the 
processes that individuals use will simply be assumed to be those that have been found 
elsewhere. This enables the experiment to move on and look at how the group interacts 
without explicitly studying the individual behaviour as well. As long as inferences are 
being made they will be assumed to rely on mental models. In other words, as the task 
requires conditional inference a mental model interpretation will be used even though it 
will not be possible to confirm this. 
This position is in line with the `semi-permeable' view of distributed cognition that was 
argued to be a useful application of distributed cognition to reasoning in groups. 
Although the group is viewed as a single unit of analysis, previous experiments have 
shown the individual to maintain an important role within the system. The system can 
be viewed at two levels, individual and group, although neither of these boundaries are 
impenetrable. In this task the individual draws inferences and all the individuals interact 
on the basis of their conclusions. The experiments in this thesis will focus on the group 
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level, that is the interactions between individuals rather than the processes of inference 
within individuals. 
2.4 Verbal Protocols of Individuals Completing the Task 
2.4.1 Introduction 
The experiment reported here aims to discover how individuals complete the task 
described above on their own. Although exploring individual reasoning is not the aim 
of this thesis, the interaction of the group members is the product of individuals' 
behaviour, so understanding how individuals approach the task alone provides a clue to 
the nature of group interactions. 
Furthermore, the task is quite different to previous tasks in the mental model literature. 
So although it is possible to make some theoretical predictions about the use of mental 
models in the task there is no empirical evidence demonstrating how individuals perform 
the task. It is therefore beneficial to empirically investigate individual performance in 
order to combine this with and strengthen the conjectures based on existing theory. 
In order to understand how individuals solve the task, participants will complete it whilst 
thinking aloud. These verbal protocols will be analysed and from this rich source of data 
it will be possible to draw some conclusions about individual behaviour. It has been 
argued by, for example, Johnson-Laird (1983) that mental models are formed rapidly and 
may not be consciously accessible. Therefore verbal reports will not be effective in 
finding out which mental models are formed. However the approach will be useful here 
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because the aim is not to discover how the reasoning occurs, this issue has been 
addressed elsewhere in the literature, but to show that participants do complete the 
inferences and in what order they do them and so forth. The verbal protocols will show 
which parts of the task participants are consciously attending to throughout its 
completion. In other words it will provide a more general understanding of the 
individual's approach to the task will be developed rather than the details of their 
cognitive processes. Thus a basic picture of individual reasoning can be drawn from 
theory coupled with data derived from verbal protocols to aid the interpretation of the 
group experiments. 
The verbal protocol analysis conducted here will be based on that described by Ericsson 
& Simon (1993). They describe three levels of vocalisation which can be used. At Level 
1 only articulatory or oral encodings are vocalised. At Level 2 participants are asked to 
`Think aloud' and so thought content is vocalised even if it is not oral in nature. It is 
described or labelled if necessary. At Level 3 thought processes are explained. Here 
vocalisations are not simply a recoding of information present in working memory, extra 
information may be used in the explanation. 
Level 1 is not ideal for this task as there is quite a large non-verbal component, for 
example there are many pictures in the task. Therefore quite a lot of information would 
be missed if this approach was used. Level 3 involves changing the sequence of 
information attended to and requires the generation of additional material in the form of 
explanations. It is therefore likely to alter the heeded information and so not allow an 
accurate report of typical performance. However Level 2 suffers from neither of these 
drawbacks. In a review of several studies Ericsson & Simon conclude that Level 2 
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vocalisation does not greatly alter the structure of cognitive processes involved in the 
task. Level 2 seems to be the most appropriate for this experiment as it allows the 
verbalisation of all components of the task but should also provide a veridical picture of 
the process used to complete it. Thus participants were asked to verbalise at this level. 
The exact method used to achieve this is described in the Procedure Section 2.4.2.3. 
2.4.2 Method 
2.4.2.1 Participants 
The participants were 10 students at the University of Surrey who volunteered to take 
part in the study. There were 7 female and 3 male participants. Their mean age was 
23.3 years with a standard deviation of 5.5 years. 
2.4.2.2 Apparatus 
The task described in Section 2.3 was used. Participants interacted with the computer 
by clicking on appropriate buttons on the screen using a mouse. In order to make a 
move they were required to select the island they wished to go to, the required food and 
the required god. Their choices appeared on the screen below the islands. If they 
wished to change a choice they simply clicked an alternative button. When they were 
satisfied with the choices they clicked a `Go' button. The computer then evaluated the 
selection. If the move was legal then the boat moved to the relevant island. If not the 
boat did not move and a message appeared informing participants that the move was 
illegal. When the boat reached the island containing the scroll that the participant was 
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currently aiming for, the scroll automatically disappeared from the screen and 
participants began looking for the next one. 
2.4.2.3 Procedure 
Participants completed the task individually. They were taken to a laboratory and were 
told they were about to complete a reasoning task whilst thinking out loud. In order to 
practice this skill they were asked to imagine they were walking around their house and 
to describe each of the rooms to the experimenter. It was explained that they were not 
required to elaborate more than usual on their thoughts because of the experiment. 
They were asked to simply say aloud whatever was going through their mind as they 
completed the task, describing anything if necessary, but no more that this. The 
experimenter provided feedback about this description to ensure that all participants 
spoke clearly and at level 2 during the task. Participants then completed a practice trial 
consisting of four islands in order that the participants could learn the rules of the task. 
During this the experimenter was present to explain the task and answer any questions 
which arose. Participants were then asked to complete two more six island problems. 
Whilst doing this they were required to think aloud. The experimenter left the room for 
the remaining problems in order to avoid distracting the participants. The verbal 
protocols were tape recorded and transcribed. 
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2.4.3 Results and Discussion 
2.4.3.1 Development of the Coding Scheme 
Two participants were randomly selected from the sample and their transcripts were 
used to create a coding scheme for the task. The scheme was partly informed by 
expectations derived from the theoretical assumption that mental models would be used 
to complete the task and partly by the experimenter's interpretation of the meanings of 
the statements made. The transcripts of the remaining eight participants were then 
coded with this scheme. All of these codes are presented in Table 2.1 and are described 
below. 
Table 2.1 Codes used in the analysis of the verbal protocols. 
Read Current Read Items on Read a Rule Read Goal Island 
location Island 
Infer Requirements Infer a Move is Infer a Move is 
For a Legal Move Legal Illegal 
Island Propose X Island Reject Island Support 
Possible Island Possible Island Possible Island 
Other Not relevant Action 
Prefix: Prefix: Prefix: Prefix: 
Question Implies 2d & 3td Hone 
Six classes of statement were made: these were read statements in which information 
about the task was read off the screen, infer statements in which inferences were drawn 
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about the legality or otherwise of a move, island statements in which the particular 
islands which were being considered were named, other statements which referred to all 
the remaining statements relevant to the task but not covered by other codes, not relevant 
statements which referred to statements not about the task and action statements which 
referred to the operation of the computer. Three further codes could be prefixed to 
each of these codes in some situations. These altered the meanings of the initial codes. 
When added to a code question meant that the statement was phrased as a question. 
Implies prefixes were used to link two codes together if the literal meaning of the 
statement is classified as one code but it is clear from the context of the statement that it 
is suggesting another code. 2d and 3' prefixes preceded the coding of a statement if it 
referred not to the next move, but the subsequent ones; the second or third respectively. 
Hone prefixes were used when more than one island is currently being considered and 
then of these a smaller number of islands are endorsed, implicitly rejecting the excluded 
islands. The reason for this prefix was to allow some comparison with the performance 
of groups in the later experiments. As will be explained in Chapter 3, groups with 
distributed mental models would be expected to make statements of this type, so it is 
pertinent to discover if individuals do too. 
The first three of these statements, read, infer and island, were all further decomposed into 
subcategories. There were four types of read statement. Read current location was used 
when the position of the boat was mentioned, e. g. `I'm in West island'. Read items was 
used when any of the items on the island relevant for the inferring a legal move were 
mentioned, e. g. `I have a devil'. Read a rule was used when the rule governing legal 
moves or any part of it was mentioned, e. g. `Trolls want fish'. Read goal was used when 
the island with the next scroll on it was mentioned, e. g. `Right, scroll number 5. It's on 
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Fourth island'. There were three types of infer statement. Infer requirements was used 
when some items were mentioned which must be either on the current island, goal 
island or intermediary islands for a move to be legal, e. g. `I need a fish'. Infer legal was 
used when it was mentioned a move is legal according to the rule, or part of it e. g. 
`South, the gods are OK'. Infer illegal was used when it was mentioned that amove was 
illegal according to the rule, or part of it e. g. `Can't go there'. There were three types of 
island code. Island purpose x was used when an island or islands were suggested as 
possibilities, e. g. `so it's either Fourth island or South island'. The x'was a number 
representing the number of islands mentioned, in this case two. Island-reject was used 
when an island was found to be illegal or otherwise dismissed e. g. `Can't go to [scroll 
number] 5'. Island-support was used when an island or islands which had been initially 
proposed were then reasserted after further reason had been found to use them e. g. 
`Yeah, I could go to east island'. 
The other, not relevant and action codes were not subdivided but covered quite a broad 
range of statements. Other statements included `Must be somewhere' and 'OK, what can 
I do here then? ' Typically they were too general to reflect any meaningful part of the 
process. Not relevant statements included `So there we go' and unfinished statements 
such as `I'm going to have to go... '. Action statements were typically something like 
`North island, taking a devil, god of peace. Go'. 
The prefixes could be used with any of the codes and so potentially there are many 
combinations. A few of the most common ones will be presented here to illustrate their 
use. `Right, where are we? ' is an example of question-read location, `So where have we got 
devils? ' is an example of question-read inhabitants, and `Can I go straight to [scroll] 5? ' is an 
example of question propose 1. 
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The implies prefixes were the most subjective of the codes, however it is possible to tell 
from the context that sometimes one statement can be coded in two ways. For example 
`Right, now I need to get to peppermint island where number 4 is. I can't go straight 
there'. The first sentence as it stands should be coded as read goal however the second 
sentence is island reject In order to have rejected the island as a possible move the 
participant must have considered the peppermint island not just as the ultimate goal but 
as a potential move. In the context of the task this is very sensible and so it is 
reasonable to code this as read goal implies island propose 1 because although the participant 
did not explicitly say she was considering the move, it is implied by the context that it 
was her intention. Another common code was read inhabitants implies infer legal For 
example, `Headhunters like heads. We've got heads. South island, heads and fire'. The 
first sentence is coded as read rule, the last sentence is coded as action as this is the 
information as in the form it is entered into the computer. The middle statement is read 
inhabitants because it is a statement about what is on the island. There is no explicit 
inference that this move is legal. But in the context of the preceding statement which is 
the relevant rule and the following statement which is an actual move, it is reasonable to 
suppose that the inhabitants were not mentioned arbitrarily, it is clear from the context 
that he implied the move was legal. Hence this was coded as read inhabitants implies infer 
Legat 
2 and 3d prefixes also was assumed from the context. For example, But I'm going to 
try going to the east. Looks like I can then get to the one with 1 on it which is south'. 
The first sentence was coded as island propose 1 and the second sentence is clearly 
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referring to the subsequent move. Therefore this was coded as 2d island propose 1. The 
3`ý prefixes were identified in the same way. 
Hone prefixes solely depended on the context because they did not refer to a particular 
type of statement. They were intended to indicate when the set of islands under 
consideration was reduced. For example, `So it's west and south. Lets try south'. The 
first sentence was coded as island propose 2 because the participant had found two 
possible alternatives. He then settled upon one of them, reducing the number of islands 
considered to one. Therefore the second sentence was coded as island propose 1- hone. 
This coding scheme was found to fit the two initial transcripts very well. It was flexible 
and accounted for a large number of statements with a relatively small number of basic 
codes, implying that it covered the major aspects of the process parsimoniously. It was 
also theoretically sensible as it fitted the kind of processes that might be expected in a 
problem solving task depending heavily on conditional reasoning to find legal moves. 
The codes also seemed to tie in with the experimenter's subjective interpretation of the 
intentions of the participants as they completed the task. Therefore it was applied to the 
rest of the transcripts in order to assess more objectively the processes that participants 
used in this task. 
2.4.3.2 Analysis of the Data 
In total thirty-eight codes were used by the participants. Table 2.2 presents these codes 
and descriptive statistics. It is clear from the codes that a wide range of possible actions 
which had been incorporated into the coding scheme were used. The mean frequency 
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of these codes provides an indication of the amount of each type of behaviour necessary 
for the task. The more common codes indicate which events were important for 
completing the task as they were repeated across trials and participants. It is therefore 
useful to determine which the most frequently used codes were in order to remove the 
minor codes and allow a picture of how the task was principally completed to emerge. 
Unfortunately this process could eliminate codes which were infrequent but critical 
when they did occur, but this is an unavoidable situation and is outweighed by the 
benefits of clarifying which codes constitute the bulk of the verbal protocol. 
The coding scheme was designed to be flexible through combining codes to create a 
large number of possibilities. Some of these were common but many were infrequent 
and used by only some of the participants. Frequencies of the different codes were 
compared to discover which were more frequent. Due to some low frequencies the data 
could not be analysed using parametric statistics because the assumption of equality of 
variance was infringed in many instances. Therefore the data was analysed using the 
Friedman test. The frequencies of the codes were found to be significantly different 
(x2=250.11, d. f. =37, p<0.0001). Dunn's multiple comparisons were conducted to find 
out which of the codes differed. All 703 possible comparison cannot be reported here 
easily, so only a summary of the findings will be presented here. The twenty-eight codes 
with the lowest ranks were found not to differ from each other (p>0.05). With the 
exception of one code these were also the least frequent. Of the remaining ten codes, 
nine were the most frequent and were greater than several of the other codes. Read 
inhabitants was greater than the least frequent twenty-two codes, propose one island was 
greater than twenty-one codes, action was greater than twenty codes, infer which object is 
required for a move to be legal was greater than twenty codes, infer that a move is illegal was 
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greater than twenty codes, read inhabitants implies legal move was greater than nineteen 
codes, infer that a move is legal was greater than eighteen codes, support was greater than 
fourteen codes, read goal implies one proposed island was greater than eight codes. All of 
these comparisons were at the p<0.05 level. 
These nine codes emerge as the major codes used in the task and indicate the typical 
behaviour of participants during it. They were the most frequent and were significantly 
more common than several of the other codes. All of these codes were used by all of 
the participants except for the read goal implies one purposed island and action codes which 
were used by all but one participant. There were no codes used by all of the participants 
that were not amongst the nine. The tenth code, read inhabitants implies illegal move, which 
is ranked higher than the other codes in the analysis is not the tenth most frequent code, 
so it will not be treated as a major code. 
Inevitably the results of this analysis are not clear cut because none of the nine most 
frequent codes were significantly more frequent than all of the less frequent codes. So 
the codes cannot be divided neatly into major and minor groupings. However the test 
does provide support for some codes being more frequent than others and an indication 
of which these codes are, so it has heuristic value. The nine codes which were found to 
be both more frequent and significantly different from most other codes offer a feasible 
story of the typical actions of a participant completing the task. They would be 
expected to read the goal, read the inhabitants of the island, infer which object is 
required on another island to match the current one for a move to be legal, infer a move 
was legal or illegal, propose an actual island, support this proposition and finally move 
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there. These are all the types of behaviour which participants were intended to engage 
in when the task was designed. 
Notable by their absence from this list of codes are pro pose 2 and pro pose 3. The 
implication of this is that participants typically considered only one island at a time, not 
two or three. It is therefore not surprising that hone codes were also missing. The 
number of islands under consideration cannot be honed down if there is only one at a 
time. Other statements were also not amongst the most frequent. This is an 
endorsement of the coding scheme as this code specifically referred to task relevant 
statements not covered by the coding scheme. Given that it is a broad category, its 
infrequency suggests that the coding scheme accounted for the most common aspects 
of the process. 
Overall then, a wide range of codes were used. However some of these codes were 
more frequent than others. These are likely to be the major codes used in the task and 
so they show what the typical behaviour of participants was during the task. The 
behaviour was found to be largely as expected; subjects find the goal, look at the 
inhabitants, form an inference as to whether the move is legal, suggest it and make the 
move. This provides evidence that the task taps the cognitive processes that this thesis 
intends to test. 
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Table 2.2 Number of participants using each code, mean and standard deviation for 
each code. 
Code N4 of participants Mean Standard deviation 
using code 
_ .......................................................................................................... _....................................................................... .. 1. Read location 8 2.13 0.83 
2. Question read 1 2 - 
location 
3. Read inhabitants 10 24.2 15.22 
4. Question read 1 5 - 
inhabitants 
5. Read inhabitants 3 2.67 2.08 
implies 1 proposed 
island 
6. Read inhabitants 2 1.50 0.71 
implies 3 proposed 
islands 
7. Read inhabitants 10 17.6 19.78 
implies legal move 
8. Read inhabitants 1 1 - 
implies legal move: 
positive hone 
9. Read inhabitants 9 5.11 3.59 
implies illegal move 
10. Read inhabitants 1 1 
- 
implies 1 proposed 
island, implies legal 
move 
11. Read rule 5 9.20 6.18 
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Table 2.2 continued. 
Code N4 of participants Mean Standard deviation 
using code 
..... ............ 12. Read rule implies 3 4.00 ............................................. 3.46 .......... . 
legal move 
13. Read goal 9 3.33 3.64 
14. Question read goal 1 1 - 
15. Read goal implies 1 9 7.33 7.00 
proposed island 
16. Infer which object is 10 12.00 5.29 
required for a move to 
be legal 
17. Infer which object is 2 1.00 0.00 
required for a move to 
be legal, implies illegal 
move 
18. Infer which object is 1 1.00 - 
required for the second 
move to be legal, 
implies illegal move 
19. Infer that a move is 10 10.70 8.01 
legal by one or more of 
the rules 
20. Question Infer that 2 1.00 0.00 
a move is legal by one 
or more of the rules 
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Table 2.2 continued. 
Code N4 of participants Mean Standard deviation 
using code 
........... .... ............... ........... 21. Infer that a move is ......... _................................................. 5 ..................................... 1.40 ........................... .......... ............... 0.89 
legal by one or more of 
the rules, implies 1 
proposed island 
22. Infer that a move is 2 1.50 0.71 
legal by one or more of 
the rules, positive hone 
23. Infer that the 2 1.00 0.00 
second move is legal by 
one or more of the rules 
24. Infer that a move is 10 11.00 6.18 
illegal by one or more 
of the rules 
25. Infer that the 1 1.00 
second move is illegal 
by one or more of the 
rules 
26. Propose 1 island as 10 19.60 7.34 
a possible move 
27. Propose 2 islands as 3 6.33 3.06 
possible moves 
28. Propose 3 islands as 2 1.50 0.71 
possible move 
29. Propose 1 island as 7 2.57 1.40 
a possible second move 
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Table 2.2 continued. 
Code N4 of participants Mean Standard deviation 
using code 
......... .............. .... ....................................................................................... _.... ........................................................................... . .1.. island . as 3 1.67 0.58 30. P ropose . 
a possible move, implies 
positive hone 
31. Propose 1 island as 1 1.00 - 
a possible third move 
32. Reject an island 7 3.43 2.07 
33. Support a proposed 10 7.30 5.03 
island 
34. Other statement 8 8.38 5.45 
35. Not relevant 8 6.00 5.66 
36. Describe an action 9 29.78 15.81 
37. Question propose 186.13 3.04 
island 
38. Question propose 132.00 0.00 
island, second move 
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In order to understand the process which participants used to solve the task it is 
necessary to look at the sequences of codes as well as their frequencies. To do this first 
order Markov chains were used e. g. Kemeney & Snell (1960). In these the probability of 
any code immediately following any other code is computed from the data. The 
resulting matrix of transition probabilities constitutes the Markov chain, that is, a 
stochastic model of the sequences of codes. The maximum likelihood estimation of 
these transition probabilities is computed for codes A and B, for example, by finding the 
frequency with which code B follows code A and dividing this by the total frequency of 
code A. This process was repeated for all combinations of codes and using the data 
from all participants. The resulting matrix is presented in Table 2.3. 
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This matrix is very large and as a result is difficult to interpret. It has many infrequently 
used codes. However a Markov chain does not indicate whether a code is common or 
not. If a code is not used frequently then this suggests that the code is not a major part 
of the process. However it may have a high transition probability because of the few 
times it was used it was typically followed by one other statement. It therefore appears 
to be a major transition whereas in fact it is rare. In order to make the matrix smaller 
and easier to interpret and also to focus on the major codes, the most common codes 
and greater transition probabilities were taken from the larger chain to create a new 
chain. The nine most frequently used codes identified were taken to create a chain of 
manageable size. In addition only the transition probabilities of 0.1 and above were 
reported in order to focus on the main transitions. This reduced Markov chain is 
presented in Table 2.4. 
The final constituents of the smaller chain cannot be interpreted as the only relevant 
ones nor is it a true Markov chain any more, but it is a useful device for interpreting the 
verbal protocols. These codes were then represented as a flowchart in Figure 2.2. The 
width of the arrows connecting the codes approximately indicates the size of the 
transition probability between those codes. 
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Figure 2.2 Flowchart representing the reduced Markov chain. 
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The reduced Markov chain provides a good descriptive account of the sequences of 
behaviour typically employed in completing the task. The flowchart can be interpreted 
as having three main paths highlighted in red, green and blue on the chart, although 
there are other connections on the chart which show that there are variations on the 
basic patterns. The blue and red paths are simple processes of checking the goal, finding 
a legal move and going there.. These seem most likely to be used for the direct moves, 
when it is legal to move to the goal island the current island. Alternatively they might 
indicate a simple strategy in which participants think only one move ahead. In this the 
participants make any legal move they see, then check if they can go to the goal island. 
If not, make any legal move then check if it is possible to go to the goal island from the 
new location. Eventually, by chance, it will be possible. These paths, as well as the 
green path, culminate in making the move which then loops back to reading the next 
goal and beginning that move. 
The green path is more complicated. The basic steps are highlighted in green, but there 
are a number of other connections indicating variations. Essentially though, participants 
initially find the goal island. Then they read the inhabitants, either on the current or the 
destination island. Then they infer what must match these for the move to be legal. 
Presumably they then find an island with this because the next code is proposing an 
island as a move. If this is the goal island they can move there. If not they loop back to 
read the inhabitants on the new island, infer what is required, find and propose an island 
with this and so on until a series of moves is found which leads to the goal island. 
There are variations to this. After reading the goal participants may well immediately 
check a direct move. As there is only one in each game this is likely to be illegal. This 
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may explain why infer illegal often follows readgoal and then leads into the green path 
described above at one of two points. Another variation is that read inhabitants implies 
legal move often follows propose I. This may simply be to confirm that the island found is 
indeed a legal move. This then leads to action, returning to the main path. There will 
also be many variations caused by the less frequent codes which are not included here. 
However the three paths described here are a reasonable interpretation of the major 
sequences of behaviour used by participants in completing the task. 
Overall then, participants make single step moves, either where the goal is only one step 
from current location or as a strategy of only looking ahead one step. The basic process 
here is to infer a legal move and go there. Sometimes they work out multiple steps 
before acting. The process here is to infer what object is required for a move to be 
legal, find an island with this on and if this is not the goal island, repeat the process until 
it is. Once the route has been planned then the boat can be moved through the 
sequence. These sequences suggest that individuals are completing the task by drawing 
inferences about legal moves and then searching for these possibilities. Therefore 
individuals are completing it in a fairly straightforward manner. This is exactly what was 
required of the task and of this experiment. It has not been possible to conclude how 
these inferences are drawn, or how islands are chosen. It is possible nonetheless to say 
that they search through the small problem space applying the rule to decide about legal 
moves, and therefore are likely to be using mental models to draw these inferences. 
This simple understanding of individual behaviour is adequate to provide a basis for 
looking at individuals in groups. The interaction of group members in future 
experiments can now be more easily interpreted because the processes they are using 
individually to drive the interactions are known. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter considered the method that will be used throughout the thesis. In order to 
test the theories laid out in Chapter 1a task was needed that is interpretable within 
- mental model 
theory and also allowed the manipulation of information so that it could 
be either shared or distributed. Methods used in previous studies were reviewed but 
there were both theoretical and practical concerns about the utility of all of these for 
adequately testing the hypotheses in this thesis. Therefore a new task was developed. 
This task relies on conditional inference, an area in which the mental model explanation 
is dominant. However the reasoning used more information than is typical and is 
couched in a simple problem solving task in order to allow the distribution of the 
information to be practically manipulated. As a novel development there is no existing 
empirical data about this task. Therefore the behaviour of individuals whilst completing 
it was explored. Individuals completed the task whilst thinking aloud and the resulting 
verbal protocols were analysed. A coding scheme was created and the most common 
codes identified. Sequential data analysis revealed the basic processes individuals use. 
This gives a simple understanding of individual behaviour in the task which will provide 
a basis for interpreting the interactions of individuals in groups in future experiments. 
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Chapter 3 
Exploring Structural Differences in Mental Models: The Effect of 
Sharing and Modularity on Group Reasoning Process and 
Performance 
3.1 Introduction 
The first experiment on groups will begin to explore the issue of how the structure of 
the mental models in a group affects reasoning. Specifically, how does it affect the 
group's reasoning process and its resulting performance? SMMT, as outlined in Section 
1.4, suggests that the optimal representation of information in groups is for all group 
members to know all of the information. They use this to solve the task independently, 
that is, using a non-distributed process. In contrast, the distributed mental models 
hypothesis proposed in Section 1.6 suggests that reasoning in groups may best be 
characterised as-a distributed process. A collaborative process will be proposed which, if 
actually employed by groups, will imply that the cognitive process is distributed between 
them. These theories will be compared to find how, if at all, sharing or distributing 
information affects group reasoning process and performance. In addition the effect of 
modularity of information in distributed mental models will explored. Together these 
manipulations will demonstrate whether mental model structure is an influential factor 
affecting group reasoning process and performance. 
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SMMT proposes that fully shared information will lead to superior performance in the 
group. It suggests that optimum performance occurs when each individual in a group or 
team has all of the model which is relevant to the task. This allows them to draw 
compatible conclusions independently because they each have all of the required 
information. Therefore the reasoning process is not distributed, it is essentially an 
independent one. 
The distributed mental model theory does not directly compete with SMMT as a theory 
of optimal reasoning performance in groups. As the theory is outlined above it does not 
propose that distributed rather than shared mental models necessarily leads to superior 
performance in groups, although in particular task and team conditions they could well 
do. Distributed mental models are merely presented as a way of conceptualising mental 
models in groups as one cognitive structure. The issue then is simply to ascertain 
whether a distributed mental model can be used by a group to reason effectively. In 
short, is it possible for a reasoning process to be distributed? Or will participants be 
unable to complete the task unless they form shared mental models by the transfer of 
information between them? In contrast, shared mental models use an independent 
process. This comparison of these will highlight differences in the process used in 
distributed and independent reasoning and search for differences in performance. 
The distributed mental model hypothesis suggests that a group can reason using a 
mental model without any single member of the group holding the whole model. The 
information comprising the model is divided between the group members. This is likely 
to result in a different process to that proposed by SMMT in that it suggests that there 
will be more communication and collaboration between group members. An important 
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question then is how this process compares with that used in groups with shared mental 
models. 
There is only one way of sharing a mental model: all group members must have it. But 
there are more variations in how a model may be distributed. For example, there may 
be a proportionately high or low number of relations between the parts of the model 
held by different group members even when the amount of the model that they know is 
the same, depending on which part it is. This issue is referred to by Chandrasekaran 
(1981) as modularity. The term `modularity' is not meant in the way intended by Fodor 
(1983) but in the sense that a model can be decomposed into relatively independent 
components of the whole system. The modules are subsystems which have a relatively 
high number of intraconnections, but a relatively low number of interconnections. Thus 
modularity is expected to affect the communication of a group with distributed mental 
models. If the individuals have complete modules then they will, in principle, be able to 
complete some reasoning independently as the module is by definition a relatively 
independent part of the whole model. Thus the amount of communication required 
between people is likely to be relatively low. If, on the other hand, group members do 
not hold whole modules then much less reasoning can be completed independently. 
They will require more communication in order to maintain the relations between 
different parts of the model, thereby influencing the process of reasoning. In the 
experiment to be described in this chapter, two distributed mental model conditions will 
be examined; one in which individuals have whole modules and one in which they only 
have partial modules. The predicted effect of modularity on distributed mental models 
can then be explored empirically. 
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Whatever the degree of modularity, communication will always be necessary with 
anything but a completely shared mental model. Group members must collaborate in 
order to combine the information that they do have in order reach a conclusion. This 
collaboration is central to the reasoning process because it describes the way cognition is 
distributed between the group. Here a collaborative process used by groups with 
distributed mental models is proposed. The task used in Experiment 1 will be used 
again here except that it is developed for groups of three people. Various types of 
sharing and distribution are manipulated by altering how much information about each 
island group members are given. The task involves biconditionals which have either the 
conclusion `It is legal to move to the island' or `It is illegal to move to the island'. In all 
conditions group members know at least what all the islands are, if not what is on them, 
and so they effectively know all of the possible conclusions to the problem'. 
The proposed collaborative process is simply that group members search through the 
information that they have and, based on what they know, provisionally suggest possible 
conclusions to the group. Other group members add their own conclusions to these, 
reducing, supporting or increasing the number of possible conclusions. This iterative 
process continues until all group members stop adding information and they agree upon 
the conclusions drawn, i. e. the islands that are legal moves. Having established this, the 
bulk of the task, they must solve the problem of which route to take, an easy search 
through a small problem space. 
1 The situation in which all group members know all possible conclusions is a special case. It is quite 
possible to create a distributed mental model 
in which some group members do not know all of the 
possible conclusions. However that is a more complex situation so this thesis will begin by considering 
only tasks in which all possible conclusions are 
known. 
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This collaborative process is expected to be greatly facilitated by modularity. The extent 
to which conclusions can be drawn by individuals in order to add them to the 
conclusions under consideration depends on the independence of the part of the model 
they have. If it is a relatively independent module then conclusions can be drawn about 
that part of the model, if not then conclusions cannot be drawn without further 
information about the model. In this case group members must, at least in theory, 
communicate information about the model before reaching any conclusions. 
Applied to the current experiment, the process is expected to operate as follows. The 
task was designed to consist of three modules; concerning either the colours of the 
islands, the inhabitants of the islands or the gods of the islands. The basic structure of 
the rule used (ignoring negations for convenience) is: 
If and only if (a & b) and (c & d) and (e & f) then the move is legal. 
For example: If and only if there are (heads on the current island and headhunters on 
the destination island) and (the current island is blue and the destination island is not 
blue) and (the god of fire is on the current island and the destination island is not war) 
then the move is legal. 
This is somewhat different to the form of the biconditionals usually studied (e. g. 
Johnson-Laird, Byrne & Schaeken, 1992) in that it has many conjunctions. However it 
is the conjunctions that allow the modularity to be manipulated in this task. One person 
might know that there are heads on the current island and headhunters on the 
destination island. Such a module allows the provisional conclusion that it is legal to 
move to that island. However another person might know that both of these islands are 
blue and so draws the conclusion that it is not legal to move to that island. The 
conjunction indicates that both of. these modules must lead to the conclusion that the 
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move is legal for it to be so. So when the first person provisionally suggests the move is 
legal the second (and third) group members can check if the conclusion follows in the 
modules they hold. If it does not follow for one or more of the modules then the 
conclusion must be eliminated. Thus the conjunction between parts of the model held 
by different people is maintained by separate group members checking the conclusion in 
each of the three modules and agreeing that it is legal in each, or rejecting it if it is not 
legal in at least one. To do this requires verbal communication. Here it is assumed that 
statements made by group members are part of the distributed cognitive process within 
a distributed cognition framework. Hence the communication was coded according to a 
scheme which was created to assess the proposed collaborative process. This is a 
different coding scheme to that described in Chapter 2 as it aims to code group 
interactions, not individual processes. 
A statement which suggested possible conclusions was coded as a prvpase statement. 
Typically this would be one or more islands which signified possible legal moves based 
on the part of the model held by the individual that speaks. Subsequently group 
members could reject some of these proposed possibilities if they were not valid 
conclusions based on the part of the model they knew. They could narrow the range of 
possibilities by hone statements which actively endorsed only a limited number of the 
islands under active consideration but did not explicitly eliminate the others. They could 
support all of the possibilities under consideration or widen the number by suggesting 
some others. Any details offered about the model were coded as information. Each 
person added their own conclusions to the ongoing search as part of an iterative process 
until a solution was found that was consistent with them all. 
This was not the product 
of a single person knowing the whole model, as in SMMT, but of a collaborative process 
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in which no single person knew the whole model. This proposed process was examined 
in detail to discover if it accurately described the collaborative process used when group 
members have distributed mental models. 
In addition to these codes there were some prefixes and suffixes which were added to 
the main code in order to more accurately describe the collaborative process. Any of 
the above statements could be phrased as a question, so there were question information 
statements, i. e. a request for information, as well as question propose, question-reject, question- 
hone, quertion sscßport and question-widen statements. The number of islands under 
consideration at any one time was coded as a number attached to the main code, for 
example if four possible islands were proposed this was coded as Propose4. Chains of 
reasoning were also coded. Following the initial statement any subsequent statements 
were coded as diferent in addition to its normal code if a different person spoke next but 
continued to further refine the same conclusions. In this way it was possible to tell if 
the whole group had contributed to the process, or just a single person. As in Chapter 
2, there were statements which, if taken at face value, would be coded in one way yet it 
was clear from the context that they were intended to mean something else (and were 
interpreted as such by the group). It would be misleading to code these statements on 
their explicit content because that would not accurately describe the collaboration. 
Therefore these statements were given two codes, the first was the code of the explicit 
meaning and the second was the code of the implied meaning. They were linked using 
the code implies, for example, information implies support. 
In the current experiment there were three conditions. In the `Shared' condition all of 
the group members had all of the model. Therefore they had fully shared mental 
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models and in principle could find the solutions independently with very little 
communication. In the `Modular' condition each participant had two-thirds of the 
complete model. However the task was designed to be composed of three modules 
which comprised the complete model. These modules concerned either the colours of 
the islands, the inhabitants of the islands or the gods of the islands respectively. Each 
group member had information about two of three modules and no information about 
the third. They each had a different pair so that the information was equally distributed. 
Therefore they had a `modular' distributed mental model. In the `Non-modular' 
condition group members also had two-thirds of the total information in the model. 
However, they did not have whole modules but two-thirds of all three modules. This 
meant that the degree of sharing was the same as in the Modular condition without the 
benefits of modularity. Therefore they had a `non-modular' distributed mental model. 
Comparing the Shared condition with the two distributed conditions, Modular and 
Non-modular, reveals the effect of sharing. Comparing the Modular with the Non- 
modular condition reveals the effect of modularity (the amount of sharing is the same). 
The Shared condition necessarily avoids the problems of non-modularity. 
SMMT suggests that groups in the Shared condition will perform best and that both the 
distributed groups - Modular and Non-modular - will perform equally because they 
shared the same amount of information. Distributed mental model theory does not 
challenge the prediction that shared mental models will perform best as it does not make 
any specific predictions about this. However, following from the discussion on 
modularity above, it is likely that holding complete modules will greatly facilitate task 
completion. Therefore the Modular condition is predicted to perform better than the 
Non-modular condition. Three indices of performance were used; time to complete the 
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task, number of errors made and number of moves needed. The performance 
hypotheses are therefore: 
Hypothesis I a: The time taken to complete the task will be shorter in the Shared condition than in the 
Modular condition which in turn will be shorter than in the Non-modular condition. 
Hypothesis 1 b: The number of ermrr will be fewer in the Shared condition than in the Modular 
condition which in turn will be fever than in the Non-modular condition. 
Hypothesis ic: The number of moves will be fewer in the Shared condition than in the Modular 
condition which in turn will be ferner than in the Non-modular condition. 
Analysis of the communication codes presents a more detailed picture of the proposed 
collaborative process. Firstly, the transfer of information between group members is 
investigated. In the Shared condition all participants have all of the model and so it is 
very unlikely that they will pass information between them. However in the Modular 
condition each group member has only two-thirds of the model; it might be reasonable 
therefore to expect them to transfer more information between themselves in order to 
complete their models. However, if the reasoning process is distributed between them 
then they will rely on the proposed collaborative process described above. In this they 
do not pass information about the model to each other; instead they each contribute to 
refining the conclusion. Thus, if groups are using a distributed cognitive process it is 
unlikely that they will transfer any more information between themselves in the Modular 
condition than in the Shared condition. But in the Non-modular condition group 
members have only part of a module which cannot be used to draw conclusions 
110 
independently of the rest of the model. Group members will need to build up full 
modules in order to complete the task. Thus it is expected that they will transfer more 
information in this condition than in the other two. The transfer of information about 
the model is indicated by two codes: information statements which offer information 
about the model and question-information statements which request information about the 
model. The information hypotheses are therefore: 
Hypothesis 2: The number of information and question-information statements in the Shared and 
Modular conditions will be the same. However the number of information and question-information 
statements in the Non-modular condition will be greater. 
The remaining statements that concern the collaborative process are propose, r ject, bone, 
support and widen. Propose and support will be used in all conditions as they are needed to 
decide on a solution. If the SMMT process is correct then groups in the Shared 
condition will be able to find a solution independently, propose it and other group 
members will support it. Similarly groups in the other conditions, if they rely on the 
collaborative process, will propose a solution which is then refined before all group 
members support the solution. The difference between the two lies solely in the 
refining of the answer and not in the proposal or support of the conclusions. There is 
therefore no reason to predict that the conditions will differ in the number of propose 
and support statements they make. The same arguments apply to question propose and 
question-support statements. Hence: 
Hypothesis 3: There will be no diference in the number of purpose, support, question-pro pose and 
question-support statements between each of the three conditions. 
111 
However the crucial test of the collaborative process is in the reject, hone and widen 
statements. These statements are likely to be used after a preliminary conclusion has 
been suggested in order to offer the conclusions of other group members. SMMT 
predicts that this process will not occur in the Shared condition, but will be essential for 
the effective use of distributed mental models. Therefore groups in the Shared 
condition are expected to use these statements less than the two distributed conditions. 
However the only differences likely to be evident between the Modular and Non- 
modular conditions lies in the organisation of their information and therefore the 
transfer of information between group members. It does not necessarily follow that 
either one will have to collaborate more once participants in the Non-modular condition 
have acquired the information they need. Therefore it is predicted that these two 
conditions (Modular and Non-modular) will not differ in numbers of these statements. 
The same arguments apply to question-hone, question-rrject and question-widen statements. 
Therefore: 
Hypothesis 4: The Shared condition will have fewer hone, ree ect, widen, question-hone, question-reject 
and question-widen statements than the Modular and Non-modular conditions, which will themselves 
have the same. 
The number of islands explicitly considered in any statement was also recorded. The 
SMMT prediction is that group members will draw final conclusions independently. 
Therefore they will not discuss many possible islands in the Shared condition and so 
have fewer two, three or four statements than in the distributed conditions. Also, because 
they are not expected to use a collaborative process, they will have fewer hone, reject and 
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widen statements. Commonly these are coded as one as they often only refer to one 
island, so there will be fewer one statements too. Thus groups in the Shared condition 
will be characterised by fewer number statements of all types. The distributed 
conditions - Modular and Non-modular - rely on the collaborative process to reduce the 
number of islands considered, so they will begin with higher numbers and eliminate 
them. It follows that there will be more four, three and two statements in these conditions 
than in the Shared condition and also more one statements that refer to single islands 
during the collaborative process. As before however there is no reason to predict that 
either the Modular or Non-modular condition will collaborate more than the other. 
Therefore: 
Hypothesis S: The number of one, two, three and four statements will be smaller in the Shared condition 
than the Modular and Non-modular conditions which will themselves be the same. 
The collaborative process requires longer chains of reasoning as initial statements are 
refined leading to a final conclusion. In the distributed conditions different people hold 
different parts of the model and so each person adds to the reasoning process. This will 
be indicated by different statements and so more of these are expected in the distributed 
conditions than in the Shared condition. As before the collaborative process in the 
Modular and Non-modular conditions is predicted to be similar, so there should be no 
differences in the number of different statements either. Therefore: 
Hjpothesis 6: There will be fewer `&fferent' statements in the Shared than the Modular and Non- 
modular conditions, which will themselves be the same. 
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3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Participants 
The participants were 36 students at the University of Surrey who volunteered to take 
part in the study. There were 25 female and 11 male participants. Their mean age was 
28.2 years with a standard deviation of 8.7 years. 
3.2.2 Apparatus 
The experimental task was the same as that used in Experiment 1 except that it had 
been developed into a group reasoning task. It was presented on three networked PCs 
arranged in a small circle facing inwards so that participants could see each other but not 
what was on the others' monitors. As before, the computer display held the 
information required to complete the task. However, in this experiment there were 
some conditions in which each participant had only part of the total amount of 
information. This is detailed below. Each participant also had a set of on-screen 
buttons corresponding to one of the modules; either gods, inhabitants or colours. 
Participants controlled one each. By clicking on one of the buttons their choice of god, 
inhabitant or island was displayed on their screen and relayed to their group member's 
screens. There was a `Go' button which participants clicked when they were satisfied 
with the choices of the group. If any choice was changed then all of the participants 
had to click go again. In this way consensus was ensured. Upon clicking go the 
computer checked the legality of the move. If legal the boat would move to that island. 
If illegal, a message box appeared telling all participants the move was illegal. 
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In total there were nine trials and so nine games were created in order that the solution 
to each was novel. These were all equivalent to those described in Chapter 2 in terms of 
task difficulty. This was ensured by creating games with the same number of legal 
moves, the same number of moves that must be made and as near to the same number 
of each type of object on the islands as was possible. 
3.2.3 Design 
A repeated measures design was used to examine the effects of three conditions; 
`Shared', `Modular' and `Non-modular'. The order of the games, the conditions and 
which module participants had the buttons for was initially randomised. This order was 
then rotated using a Latin square design in order to counterbalance order effects. The 
games were rotated at a rate of one position per group, the buttons were rotated at two 
positions per group and the conditions at four positions per group. This ensured that all 
three factors were rotated relative to each other so that the effects of one were not 
confounded by another. 
3.2.4 Procedure 
Participants completed the task in groups of three people. There were three trials in 
each condition and so a total of nine trials were completed. Prior to this a four island 
practice trial was completed in order that the participants could learn the rules of the 
task and satisfy any queries. In total this took approximately two and a half hours, so 
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the trials were split into two sessions of five trials on consecutive days which lasted one 
and a quarter hours to reduce the effect of fatigue on performance. 
In the Shared condition all of the information was presented on all of the participants' 
screens. In the Modular condition each participant was given two complete modules. 
That is, one participant had information on gods and colours but no inhabitants, a 
second had information on gods and inhabitants but no colours and a third was given 
colours and inhabitants but no gods. In the Non-modular condition two-thirds of the 
information on all three modules was given to each participant. They each lacked a 
different third so all of the information was present in the group. In each of the three 
trials comprising a condition the participants controlled the buttons corresponding to a 
different module so that they each controlled each module once in all of the conditions. 
The timing of all button clicks and movements of the boat were recorded on a database. 
All of the verbal communication during the experiment was recorded, transcribed and 
coded according to the coding scheme described above in order to systematically 
compare the communication process across different conditions. The codes were: 
information, propose, reject, hone, support, widen. These five could each be phrased as a 
question. If the code followed an initial statement as part of a chain of reasoning they 
could be additionally marked as different if another group member made the second 
comment. If the statement referred to the islands under consideration it was 
additionally coded with a number indicating how many islands were explicitly 
mentioned. If a statement had an implied meaning that would be coded differently to its 
explicit code then the explicit code was written followed by implies followed by the 
implicit meaning. The transcripts were coded by the experimenter. A second coder, 
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naive to the aims of the study, coded one-quarter of the transcripts in order that the 
inter-coder reliability could be assessed. Cohen's Kappa (1960) was calculated to be 
0.76. 
3.3 Results 
Hypotheses la-c predicted that the reasoning performance in the Shared condition would 
be superior to that in the Modular condition which in turn would be better than that in 
the Non-modular condition. These hypotheses received only some support. Table 3.1 
displays the mean time taken to complete the trials, the number of errors per trial and 
the number of moves per trial. There were significant differences in the time taken 
(F(2,22) = 18.41, p<0.0001). Tukey's HSD revealed that the Shared condition was not 
significantly different to the Modular condition (p>0.05) but that the Non-modular 
condition was significantly slower than both of these (p<0.05). However there were no 
significant differences in the number of errors (F(2,22) = 1.31, p>0.05) nor the number 
of moves (F(2,22) = 1.72, p>0.05). 
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Table 3.1 Mean time in seconds, mean number of moves and mean number of errors 
(standard deviations in parentheses) as a function of condition (Shared, Modular, Non- 
modular). 
Shared Modular Non-modular F ratio, p value 
and post hoc 
M (S. D. ) M (S. D. ) M (S. D. ) test summary* 
.. _........... Time .............................. 422.10.......................... 541.80.......................... -715.09...................... F-18.41....... _.. 
P<0.0001 
(70.28) (118.44) (213.95) S=M<N 
N4 of Errors 0.72 1.00 1.19 F=1.31, 
p>0.05 
(0.74) (0.92) (0.95) 
N4 of Moves 12.61 12.75 13.19 F=1.72, 
P>0.05. 
(0.84) (0.55) (1.01) 
*S= Shared condition, M= Modular condition, N= Non-modular condition. 
Hypotheses 2 to 6 concerned the frequencies of the communication codes. These 
reflect the reasoning that the group members engage in and are part of the distributed 
cognitive process. This means that they begin to explain the performance of the group. 
Table 3.2 shows the mean number of statements of each communication code. As this 
large table is difficult to interpret, the most theoretically important codes are presented 
graphically in Figure 3.1. In order to reduce the number of codes 
being considered, the 
implies codes were all treated using their implied meaning only. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that there would be the same number of information and question- 
information statements in the Shared and Modular conditions, but that there would be 
more in the Non-modular conditions. 
This was supported. There was a significant 
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effect of condition for information statements (F(2,22) = 75.07, p<0.0001). Tukey's HSD 
revealed that the Shared condition was not significantly different to the Modular 
condition (p>0.05) but both of these had significantly fewer statements than the Non- 
modular condition (p<0.05). 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that there would be no difference in the number of propose, support, 
question propose and question-support statements. This hypothesis was not supported. There 
was a significant difference in the number of propose statements (F(2,22) = 8.86, p<0.01), 
support statements (F(2,22) = 31.89, p<0.0001), question propose statements (F(2,22) _ 
15.65, p<0.001) and question-support (F(2,22) = 16.37, p<0.0001). Tukey's HSD revealed 
that for the propose statements the Shared condition had significantly fewer statements 
than the Non-modular condition (p<0.05), but the Shared condition did not differ 
significantly from the Modular condition (p>0.05) and the Modular condition did not 
differ significantly from the Non-modular condition (p>0.05). For the support statements 
the Shared condition had fewer statements than the Modular condition (p<0.05) which 
in turn had fewer statements than the Non-modular condition (p<0.05). For the 
question purpose statements the Shared condition was not significantly different to the 
Modular condition (p>0.05) but both of these had significantly fewer statements than 
the Non-modular condition (p>0.05). For the question-support statements the Shared 
condition had significantly fewer statements than both the Modular and Non-modular 
conditions (p<0.05) but these two did not themselves 
differ significantly (p>0.05). 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that the Shared condition would have fewer hone, eject, widen, 
question-hone, question-reject and question-widen statements than the Modular and Non- 
modular condition, but that these would be the same. Only the frequencies of rrject 
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statements fitted the predicted pattern. There was a significant difference in the number 
of hone statements (F(2,22) = 8.14, p<0.01) and reject statements (F(2,22) = 14.45, 
p<0.0001). Tukey's HSD revealed that for the request statements the Shared condition 
had significantly fewer statements than both the Modular and Non-modular conditions 
(p<0.05) but these two did not themselves differ significantly (p>0.05). For the hone 
statements the Shared condition did not differ significantly from the Non-modular 
condition (p>0.05), but both of these had fewer statements than the Modular condition 
(p<0.05). There was no significant effect of condition for widen statements (F(2,22) = 
1.33, p>0.05); question-reject statements (F(2,22) = 1.57, p>0.05); question-hone statements 
(F(2,22) = 1.73, p>0.05) or question-widen statements (F(2,22) = 0.87, p>0.05). 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that the number of one, two, three and fourstatements would be 
smaller in the Shared condition than the Modular and Non-modular condition, but these 
would be the same. This pattern was found for the one statements but not the two and 
three statements. There were significant differences in the frequency of one statements 
(F(2,22) = 32.52, p<0.0001); two statements (F(2,22) = 12.68, p<0.0001) and three 
statements (F(2,22) = 6.72, p<0.01). Tukey's HSD revealed that there were fewer one 
statements in the Shared than the Modular and Non-modular conditions (p<0.05), but 
these two did not differ significantly (p>0.05). But there were more two and three 
statements in the Modular condition than the Shared and Non-modular condition 
(p<0.05), but these two were not significantly different (P>0.05). Four statements were 
not analysed as there were none in the Shared condition. 
Hypothesis 6 predicted that there would be fewer diferent statements in the Shared 
condition than the Modular and Non-modular condition, but these would be the same. 
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This prediction was supported. There was a significant difference in the frequency of 
different statements (F(2,22) = 28.05, p<0.0001). Tukey's HSD revealed that for the 
diferent statements the Shared condition had significantly fewer statements than both the 
Modular and Non-modular conditions (p<0.05) but these two did not themselves differ 
Significantly (p>0.05). 
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Table 3.2 Mean number of statements by communication code (standard deviations in 
parentheses) as a function of condition (Shared, Modular, Non-modular). 
Shared Modular Non-modular F ratio, p value 
and post hoc 
M (S. D. ) M (S. D. ) M (S. D. ) test summary* 
..................... _ ... Information .......... ......... ............... 4. . 33 
... ........... .......... .................. 9.28 ...... ..... ..... ........ ...... ........... 52.08 .......... _ ..... ...... F=75.07, _ ... .... 
P<0.0001 
(2.47) (5.48) (20.19) S=M<N 
Question- 0.42 2.97 30.75 F=110.35 
P<0.0001 
information (0.53) (2.79) (10.00) S=M<N 
Propose 10.42 13.25 15.72 F=8.86, P<0.01 
S=M, M=N, 
(3.05) (3.55) (5.75) S<N 
Reject 10.61 17.39 16.03 F=14.45, 
p<0.0001 
(3.31) (4.42) (4.85) S<M=N 
Hone 0.50 1.39 0.72 F=8.14, P<0.01 
S=N<M 
(0.44) (0.86) (0.55) 
Support 16.25 24.22 28.72 F=31.89, 
P<0.0001 
(5.99) (6.48) (9.39) S<M<N 
Widen 0.47 0.36 0.72 F=1.33, p>0.05 
(0.30) (0.39) (0.80) 
*S= Shared condition, M= Modular condition, N= Non-modular condition. 
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Table 3.2 Continued. 
-- Shared Modular Non-modular F ratio, p value 
and post hoc 
M (S. D. ) M (S. D. ) M (S. D. ) test summary* 
Question- 7.67 10.00 13.64 F=15.65, 
P<0.0001 
propose (3.51) (4.87) (6.00) S=M<N 
Question-reject 0.06 0.11 0.17 F=1.57 
p? u. u5 
(0.13) (0.22) (0.22) 
Question-hone 0.19 0.33 0.11 F=1.73, 
p>0.05 
(0.17) (0.47) (0.16) 
Question- 0.67 3.08 3.72 F=16.37 
P<0.0001 
support (0.49) (1.99) (2.01) S<M=N 
Question widen 0.11 0.03 0.08 F=0.87, 
p>0.05 
(0.22) (0.10) (0.15) 
Different 22.78 37.28 37.64 F=28.05 
p<0.0001 
(7.61) (8.92) (11.98) S<M=N 
One 46.00 66.97 76.83 F=32.52, 
p<0.0001 
(11.93) (13.79) (20.96) S<M=N 
Two 0.81 2.36 1.11 F=12.68, 
p<0.0001 
(0.58) (1.19) (0.90) S=N<M 
Three 0.11 0.75 0.17 F=6.72, 
p<0.01 
(0.22) (0.75) (0.39) S=N<M 
Four 0.00 0.08 0.03 
(0.00) (0.21) (0.10) 
*S= Shared condition, M= Modular condition, N= Non-modular condition. 
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Figure 3.1 Communication codes (Information, Propose, Reject, I lone, Support, 
Widen) as a function of condition (Shared, Modular, Non-modular). 
3.4 Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 mostly support the theory that groups can re, tsý, n using, 
distributed mental models but that this requires a different process to groups with 
shared mental models. The benefits of modularity in distrihuied mental models were 
clear. I lowever, not all of the hypotheses were supported. The pattern of results 
suggests two things. Firstly, that the proposed collaborative process used in clistril)utccl 
mental models is largely but not entirely supported. Secondly, that the performance 
benefits of shared mental models are not as great as its proponents claim in comparison 
to a modular distributed alternative, although shared mental models were sul>cri(r I 
non-modular distributed mental models. Overall these results suggest that there is an 
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effect of mental model structure, sharing and modularity, on reasoning process and 
performance but that this is not entirely as predicted. 
Hypothesis 1 stated that the reasoning performance of groups with shared mental models 
would be superior to modular distributed mental models which in turn would be 
superior to non-modular distributed mental models. In terms of time the Non-modular 
condition was certainly slower, but the Shared and Modular condition were equally 
quick. This finding contradicts both SMMT and the predictions of the distributed 
mental model hypothesis. The slowness of the Non-modular condition can, as 
predicted, be accounted for by the greatly increased requirement for communication 
which will be shown below. However there is no obvious explanation for the relative 
speed of performance in the Modular condition as it too had more communication than 
the Shared condition. There must be a performance benefit of modular distribution 
which counteracts the increase in communication such that more is said but less time is 
spent thinking about it. This issue will be returned to after the analysis of the group 
communication. 
The lack of significant differences between the conditions for number of errors or 
number of moves could be interpreted as the collaborative process being equally 
effective at completing the task as the process used 
in shared mental model situations. 
However the absolute number of errors are low and number of moves is close to 
optimum so it is equally possible to interpret this finding as a floor effect. The task may 
have been difficult in terms of collaboration but too simple in terms of the reasoning 
individuals were engaged in. 
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Hypothesis 2 concerned the transfer of information between group members and so 
indicates whether the groups in the distributed conditions can complete the task without 
any member discovering enough information to hold a complete model. In other words 
can the group use a distributed cognitive process in order to complete the task? The 
results suggest that they can in the Modular condition but are ambiguous in the Non- 
modular condition. Groups in the Modular condition asked and gave the same amount 
of information about the model as those in the Shared condition. But they began with 
only two-thirds of the information each. Thus groups in the Modular condition were 
able to solve the problem with less information than in the Shared condition. Table 3.2 
shows the mean numbers of Information andQuestion-information statements are small and 
arguably insufficient for an individual to build a complete model based on what other 
people say. Therefore it seems likely that in the Modular condition individuals did not 
know the full model but relied instead upon the collaborative process to solve the task. 
This implies that they used a distributed cognitive process. 
Groups in the Non-modular condition made more information related statements; 
Table 3.2 shows that the mean number of these statements was quite high. Thus it is 
quite possible that individuals learnt all of the information comprising the model and 
completed the task using an individual rather than a distributed cognitive process. It is 
also possible that they learnt some information and then used a 
distributed cognitive 
process, but these explanations cannot 
be distinguished with this data. The collaborative 
process, which is addressed in Hypothesis 4, sheds 
further light on this question. 
Hypothesis 3 was based on weaker reasons than the other hypotheses. Neither the 
SMMT process nor the collaborative process predicted that propore or support statements 
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would vary and so it was predicted that they would be equal across the conditions. This 
prediction proved to be incorrect suggesting that the theories are not specific enough to 
make precise predictions. The Shared condition produced fewer propose statements than 
the Non-modular condition, although the Modular condition did not differ from either. 
The Shared condition showed fewest support statements, the Modular condition had 
more and the Non-modular condition had the most. This pattern is not readily 
interpretable. The Non-modular condition seemingly encourages more suggestions than 
the Shared condition, but the effect on the Modular condition is not so obvious as it 
falls in the middle. Most probably this finding reflects a small but non-significant 
increase in suggestions though it is difficult to draw strong conclusions based on a non- 
significant result. Increasing distribution and modularity appears to cause more support 
statements. This increase may be caused by the support of group members at each stage 
of the collaborative process. This would not only be useful in terms of confirming that 
the suggested solutions were not rejected but might also provide a social function of 
maintaining the efficacy of the group. 
Hypothesis 4 concerned the communication codes which were used to refine the 
conclusions during the collaborative process. High numbers of these are therefore 
indicators of a distributed cognitive process. As predicted there were fewer reject 
statements in the Shared condition than in the Modular and Non-modular conditions 
which did not differ. This supports the idea that with shared mental models group 
members can propose correct solutions initially. On the other hand, groups with 
distributed mental models must propose some solutions which are feasible on the basis 
of what they know but when the conclusions of other group members are added to 
them they must be ruled out. This is part of the proposed collaborative process. As 
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predicted, the similarity between the Modular and Non-modular conditions suggests that 
this part of the collaborative process occurs to a similar degree in both conditions. 
The hone statements were not exactly as predicted. Instead they present an interesting 
possibility. The number of hone statements in the Shared and Non-modular conditions 
was the same, but there were a greater number in the Modular condition. Hone 
statements differ from reject statements in that possible islands are not explicitly rejected, 
rather a subset of the islands considered are supported which implicitly reduces the 
number directly under consideration. Thus there must be an initial suggestion of several 
islands that are narrowed down whereas reject statements can occur if a single island is 
proposed and then rejected. This suggests that modularity encourages the proposal of 
several islands which are reduced in number whereas shared mental models and non- 
modularity do not. This possibility will be considered further in the next hypothesis 
which addresses how many conclusions, that is islands, are explicitly considered in any 
statement. 
There were no differences in the number of widen statements, contrary to the prediction. 
This does not support the proposed collaborative process and suggests that it is not an 
accurate reflection of the groups behaviour. In the Modular and Non-modular 
conditions group members have partial information and so they can conclude that more 
islands are possible than actually are because adding information serves only to reduce 
the number of possibilities. Adding information will not serve to increase the number 
of possibilities. Therefore, on this evidence, it seems that widening may not be a 
fundamental part of the collaborative process. Alternatively the result may simply be an 
artefact of the task. Indeed, the absolute number of statements were low in all 
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conditions. However some widen statements were made indicating that it is by no means 
impossible, so no strong conclusions can reasonably be drawn concerning the role of 
widen statements. Likewise there were no differences in the number of question-reject, 
question-hone and question-widen statements, but as the numbers of these were small in all 
conditions it is again not clear if this is because of the nature of collaborative process or 
an artefact of the specific task chosen. 
Hypothesis 5 concerned the number of possible islands considered explicitly in each 
statement. There were fewer one statements in the Shared condition than the Modular 
and Non-modular conditions which were the same. This result was as predicted and, as 
suggested before, is likely to be due to the greater number of reject and hone statements 
that refer to one island as well as more one island purpose statements in the distributed 
conditions. 
Of more interest is the number of two and three statements. The pattern here was not 
entirely as predicted, but it does fit in with the other findings. The number of these is 
the same in the Shared and Non-modular condition, but greater in the Modular 
condition - the same pattern as found 
for the bone statements. It was predicted that 
shared mental models would generate fewer two and three statements, but not that there 
would be more in the Modular condition than 
in the Non-modular condition. Evidently 
modularity encouraged group members to explicitly discuss several islands at once 
whereas non-modularity did not. In order to reach a solution in the Non-modular 
condition islands must be considered 
individually by group members and then accepted 
or rejected. One possible reason for this 
is that group members have only partial 
modules on their screen and so cannot engage in much independent reasoning. They 
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can only work out a small number of possible conclusions independently compared to 
the Modular condition. Thus the collaborative process would involve more frequent 
initial suggestions but each of these would be about a small number of islands, perhaps 
only one at a time, which are then rejected. In contrast group members in the Modular 
condition could work out and suggest many possible islands at once. This range of 
possibilities can then be reduced to the correct ones over a longer chain of reasoning. 
This implies a distributed process of reasoning is being used in Modular condition. 
Hypothesis 6 suggested that there would be fewer diferent statements in the Shared 
condition than the Modular and Non-modular conditions, which would be the same. 
This was the case. A different statement occurs when an initial statement is followed by a 
further one which is part of the collaborative process, that is a reject, hone or widen 
statement, except that a different person makes it. Thus finding many different 
statements suggests that not only is a chain of reasoning occurring in the distributed 
conditions as predicted, but also that different people are engaged in it. It is not a single 
person's chain of thought. This also implies a distributed process of reasoning in the 
Modular and Non-modular condition. In contrast, as the Shared condition produced 
fewer statements of this type, this suggests that shared mental models do not require 
chains of distributed reasoning. This 
is what SMMT predicts. 
Overall then, the Shared condition, in which the group was able to form shared mental 
models, performed well and required 
less communication than the other conditions. 
This is consistent with the predictions of SMMT. It should nonetheless be noted that it 
is not possible to be certain that participants in this condition used all the information 
with which they were presented to 
form fully shared mental models. They may simply 
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have ignored some information. However the similarity of the communication code 
frequencies to the predicted pattern supports the idea that participants in this condition 
at least have greater sharing of mental models than in the other conditions. 
Also as predicted, groups in Non-modular condition performed less well. These groups 
had distributed mental models but could not engage in much reasoning independently as 
they did not have whole modules. Half a module is insufficient to allow an individual to 
add or eliminate a conclusion. They need to communicate more in order to be able to 
reason. Also the low number of two and three statements indicates that only a small 
number of islands were considered at once. Possibly as a result of this there were fewer 
hone statements. There were however a larger number of propose, reject an d support 
statements. Overall this suggests a process in which an individual could not draw many 
conclusions based on fractured information and so presented a single possibility which 
was rejected. Another person did the same and so on until a move was found that was 
supported by all of the group. This is a slow process and may account for the poor 
performance of the group. However as group members collaborate to reach the 
solution it does mean that they are using a distributed cognitive process, but not a very 
efficient one. 
More interesting is the Modular condition. These groups had distributed mental models 
but performed as well as in the Shared condition. They produced more two and three 
statements and also more hone statements. This suggests a process in which individuals 
can consider several possible moves initially because they hold whole modules and thus 
can draw more conclusions independently. These possibilities are then narrowed down 
until a final solution is found. This collaboration also implies that the groups are using a 
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distributed cognitive process. It requires more communication than in the Shared 
condition, but is just as quick. Therefore the amount of time spent considering each 
statement must be less. 
This indicates a potential benefit of distributing the model. In the Shared condition 
each person considers the whole model before making a suggestion. However in the 
Modular condition each person only considers two-thirds of that information before 
making a suggestion. It is possible that this reduces the load on the individual so that 
they are able to draw these conclusions more quickly. There may be more stages to the 
reasoning process, but each stage is quicker leading to a similar time overall. 
Although no quantitative differences in performance were found between shared and 
modular distributed mental models, the qualitative differences in process may lead to 
qualitative differences in performance in certain situations. Chapter 4 will further 
investigate this by manipulating aspects of the task which specifically target the 
differences in collaborative process between shared and distributed mental models. 
These differences would further support the differences in reasoning process and 
confirm that distributed mental models are a worthy topic of research in their own right 
because they cause characteristic patterns of reasoning performance. 
3.5 Conclusion 
These findings suggest that structural changes in the mental model, that is shared and 
distributed mental models and modular and non-modular distributed mental models 
132 
affect the reasoning process of groups and sometimes the reasoning performance. 
Groups with shared mental models seemed to use a more independent reasoning 
process whereas groups with distributed mental models were able to use a distributed 
cognitive process. The proposed collaborative process for groups with distributed 
mental models was largely supported. Some quantitative differences in performance 
were found, groups with non-modular distributed mental models performed poorly 
compared to the other conditions. This was attributed to their greater need for 
communication because of the inefficient distribution of the model. 
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Chapter 4 
Exploring Qualitative Differences in Individual, Shared and 
Distributed Mental Models: The Effect of Task Difficulty on 
Reasoning Process and Performance 
4.1 General Introduction 
Experiment 2 established that there were some quantitative differences in reasoning 
performance which were attributable to the qualitative differences in process which were 
in turn caused by structural differences in the mental model held by the group. The 
purpose of Chapter 4 is to present two experiments which investigate qualitative 
differences in the performance of mental models used by individuals, shared mental 
models in groups and distributed mental models in groups. These are predicted to arise 
from the qualitative differences in process caused by these different mental model 
structures. 
The differences explored were variations in performance caused by different sources of 
task difficulty. These were selected to influence different stages in the completion of the 
task. By varying sources of difficulty to target each stage of task completion, in the 
stages where the process differs the source of difficulty may give rise to differential 
effects on performance. Differences in the overall pattern of effects of the sources of 
difficulty would indicate qualitatively different reasoning performance stemming from 
the differences in process. It would also support the proposed differences in process 
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between shared and distributed mental models. Similarly, a different overall pattern of 
the effects of task difficulty on individual performance compared to group performance 
would indicate qualitative differences in reasoning performance of individuals compared 
to groups. 
4.2 Experiment 3 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Experiment 3 will address differences in the effects of task difficulty on shared and 
distributed mental models. The same basic task will be used as for Experiment 2 but 
with some methodological changes which are required to test the hypotheses of this 
experiment and improve the task. 
The expected effect of changing task difficulty is to influence the reasoning process. 
Experiment 1 found that there are several stages in the completion of the task. 
Experiment 2 suggested that the process used by groups in these stages differed 
according to whether they had shared or distributed mental models. By identifying 
sources of difficulty which target these stages independently, the processes used to 
complete each of these stages can be influenced separately. Using this method will 
provide further evidence for the suggestion from Chapter 3 that groups with shared and 
distributed mental models use different processes. If one condition is affected more by 
one source of difficulty than another then the process used at this stage must differ 
between conditions. As specific sources of difficulty target specific stages it will be 
possible to identify where differences lie. In addition, they will demonstrate that 
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different processes can cause a characteristic pattern of effects in shared and distributed 
mental models. That is, rather than causing a general increase or decrease in reasoning 
performance, certain distributions of the model will be affected more by specific sources 
of difficulty and less so by others whereas other distributions of the model may show a 
different pattern. The different forms of model could then be viewed as qualitatively 
different, demonstrating that the variations are more than trivially optimal and sub- 
optimal distributions of information in a group. 
Participants were found to use three main stages in completing the task in Experiment 1. 
The first stage was to work out what objects must be on the destination island for it to 
be a legal move. The next stage was to find the islands with those things on. If one of 
these was not the goal island, then the third stage was to go back to stage 1 and work 
out all the islands it is possible to move to in two steps. These stages were repeated until 
a route was found to the goal island. Some participants used this process in reverse and 
worked out how to get from the goal island to the current island, but the stages were the 
same. 
A source of difficulty for each of these stages was identified and they were manipulated 
independently. The first stage, deciding what objects must be on the destination island 
for it to be a legal move, was manipulated by having two rule conditions. In the 
`Affirmative' rule condition the rules were straightforward in form: `If and only if a and 
b then the move is legal'. Thus one of the rules was `If there is an umbrella on the 
current island and rain on the destination 
island then the move is legal'. The objects 
were also meaningfully related by the rule - an umbrella would 
be useful on a rainy 
island. The `Negative' condition was the same except that the rule involved a negation, 
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therefore because of the double negation effect it was predicted that it would be harder 
to infer legal moves (Evans, Clibbens & Rood, 1995; Schaeken & Schroyens, 2000). For 
each module the rule took the form `If and only if a and b then the move is not legal', 
therefore to find a legal move participants must reason: 
There is not a and b 
Therefore the move is not not legal. 
It has been suggested the reason for this effect is that it is hard to see that the double 
negative equals an affirmative. However the exact explanation is not critical here, the 
effect is simply being exploited as it is established that this form makes the inference 
more difficult. The same objects were used as in the Affirmative condition, and so one 
of the rules was `If there is an umbrella on the current island and rain on the destination 
island then the move is illegal'. Half of the rules meaningfully related the objects and 
half of the rules did not meaningfully relate them, as in the example above. This change 
ensured there was no positive transfer of the affirmative rules into the Negative 
condition. 
The second stage, finding an island with the appropriate objects on it, was manipulated 
by having two conditions with different numbers of legal moves. In this experiment 
eight islands were used and so if all of the islands had the appropriate objects on them 
then if it would be possible to go from any island to any other island and there would be 
forty-nine legal moves. The fewer islands there are with the correct objects on then the 
fewer legal moves there will be in total. In the `Many paths' condition there were 
twenty-one legal moves. In the `Few paths' condition there were less islands with the 
correct objects on, making ten legal moves. 
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The third stage, repeating the process until the goal is reached, was manipulated by 
having two conditions with a different minimum number of moves to reach the goal 
from the starting island. In the `Two moves' condition the goal was two moves away 
from the starting island, that is with one intermediary step. In the `Three moves' 
condition the goal was three moves away. 
The first of these manipulations is predicted to alter the difficulty of the inferences that 
group members must make directly. The other two manipulations do not affect the 
individual inference but potentially influence the collaborative reasoning process that 
was proposed in Chapter 3. 
Groups in the Shared condition are expected to solve the task relatively independently 
and so generate similar expectations about the solution, as predicted by SMMT. 
Therefore they would perform essentially as individuals during the problem solving stage 
and only confirm their final answers with each other. That is, they would each work out 
the objects required for a legal move and search for them. In the Many paths condition 
there are a large number of moves that are legal so they would be expected to find a 
legal path earlier and more easily in their search and so perform better in the Many paths 
than Few paths condition. However the collaborative process proposed to be used by 
groups in the Distributed condition is different and so they would be expected to 
perform differently as a result. Participants do not have all of the information and so 
cannot work out the objects required and terminate their search when they have been 
found. Instead they each have a different set of possible legal moves but must find the 
ones that all group members agree on. 
Therefore the largest component of the task is 
the discussion and elimination of possibilities. In the Many paths condition there are a 
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large number of moves that are legal. Therefore there is much more discussion required 
than in the Few paths condition and as a result the Many paths condition is harder than 
the Few paths condition. The effect on the collaborative process is to increase the 
possibilities considered and so the manipulation is equivalent to a different task in which 
there is one model with many possible valid conclusions in terms of eliminating 
numbers of possibilities. 
The effect of the number of moves manipulation is simply to increase the amount of 
reasoning required to solve the task. It is not predicted that the collaborative process 
will change. This manipulation was included simply in order to ensure that the task did 
not become predictable and to make it more difficult in an attempt to avoid the floor 
effect in the number of errors found in Experiment 2. Although this factor may interact 
with the other manipulations it is not of great theoretical interest and so only the main 
effects will be reported'. 
Finally, shared and distributed mental models will be compared in all of these difficulty 
conditions. There will be two conditions. As before, there is a `Shared' condition in 
which all participants have all of the information they require to complete the task. This 
allows them to form shared mental models. In the `Distributed' condition each group 
member holds all of the information about one of the three modules. This is therefore 
a modular distribution similar to the Modular condition in Experiment 2. But in 
Experiment 2 each participant had two modules whereas in this experiment each group 
member has only one out of the three modules, so there is no sharing at all. The reason 
for this is to accentuate the differences between the groups with shared and distributed 
1 Further analysis revealed that these interactions were as expected. 
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mental models. In Experiment 2 there were no significant differences in the reasoning 
performance of shared and distributed mental models. This could have been due to the 
partial overlap in the models. Here there is no overlap between the models at all. Thus 
if there are no differences between the conditions again then it will not be due to any 
slight overlap in the models. The manipulations allow the maximum possible sharing of 
mental models to be compared with the maximum possible distribution of mental 
models. If there is a different reasoning process used by groups with distributed mental 
models then it will be most evident because there is no sharing of the model at all. 
Similarly, any potential benefits of distributed mental models, such as the division of 
labour, will be maximised. Any differences that exist between shared and distributed 
mental models will be most likely to be revealed with these conditions. 
Based on the shared mental model and distributed mental model theories described 
above, several predictions about the effect of these sources of difficulty on the reasoning 
process and performance can be made. As this is an experiment with many factors 
there are potentially many interactions of both reasoning performance indices and 
communications statements. In order to keep the hypotheses to a manageable number 
only those interactions of particular theoretical interest will be explicitly stated and 
analysed. All of the main effects are relevant though so they will be listed, even those 
which are not predicted to cause a significant 
difference. 
Experiment 2 found that reasoning performance with a modular distributed mental 
model is just as good as the performance with a shared mental model. These are the 
only two types of model manipulated 
in this experiment, and so no main effect of model 
type on reasoning performance is expected. The same three indices of reasoning 
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performance will be used as in Experiment 2: time to complete the task, number of 
errors made and number of moves needed. The hypotheses are therefore: 
Hypothesis 1 a: There till be no overall difference in the time taken to complete the task between the 
Shared and Distributed conditions. 
Hypothesis 1 b: There will be no overall difference in the number of ermrc made between the Shared and 
Distributed conditions. 
Hypothesis 1 c: There will be no overall difference in the number of moves required between the Shared 
and Distributed conditions. 
The sources of difficulty are all predicted to have a main effect of reducing performance 
in the more difficult condition. The effect of the different rules is predicted to be worse 
performance in the Negative condition. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 2a: The time taken to complete the task in the Af rmative' condition will be quicker than 
in the Negative' condition. 
Hypothesis 2b: The number of ermrc in the Af rmative' condition will be fewer than in the Negative' 
condition. 
Hypothesis 2c. " The number of moves in the Af rmative' condition will be fever than in the Negative' 
condition. 
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The effects of model type are predicted to occur in the interactions with the different 
sources of task difficulty. These interactions occur because of differences in the 
reasoning process used to solve the task found in Chapter 3. A major difference 
between these two processes is that with shared mental models group members can 
draw conclusions independently whereas groups with distributed mental models cannot. 
The collaborative process used requires them to suggest possible conclusions and then 
other group members iteratively refine these. Thus in the collaborative process the rule 
is applied repeatedly by different group members at each stage of the iterative process. 
This means that over the course of each sequence the rule will have been applied several 
times. However, if using shared mental models means that group members find the 
solution independently, they can in principle apply the rule only once each and whilst all 
working at the same time. At least, they will not need to apply to the rule as many times 
as with distributed mental models. Thus any increase in time caused by a more difficult 
rule will be multiplied by the collaborative process in distributed mental models as each 
group member in the process adds to the time taken. However using shared mental 
models means that fewer group members will engage serially in the process and so there 
will be no multiplicative effect. Therefore there will be an interaction of rule difficulty 
with model type: 
Hypothesis 3a: The increase in time taken to complete the Negative problems in the Distributed 
condition compared to the Shared condition will be greater than for the Affirmative problems. 
Given the extra time taken and the compounded effect of the task difficulty it is also 
likely that there will be similar effects for the other performance indices. Therefore: 
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Hypothesis 3b: The increase in number of errors in the Negative problems in the Distributed condition 
compared to the Shared condition will be greater than for the Af rmative problems. 
Hypothesis 3c The increase in number of moves in the Negative problems in the Distributed condition 
compared to the Shared condition will be greater than for the Affirmative problems. 
The predicted main effect of the number of paths is more complex and so the 
interaction with model type will be described first as part of the explanation. As before, 
it is predicted that in the Shared condition participants will draw their conclusions largely 
independently. Therefore having many possible correct solutions will increase their 
chance of finding one quickly. So quicker, and as a result better, performance is 
predicted in the Shared condition solving Many paths problems. However in the 
Distributed condition it is predicted that the collaborative process will be used again. In 
the collaborative process possible solutions are proposed and their validity discussed. 
But the act of communicating and considering a large number of possibilities is time 
consuming and keeping them all in mind is demanding for an individual's limited 
working memory capacity. Therefore, in contrast to the Shared condition, slower and 
poorer performance is predicted in the Distributed condition solving Many paths 
problems. They will perform better when there are fewer possibilities to consider, that 
is in the Few paths condition. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 4a. " The time taken to complete the task in the Shared condition will be quicker when 
solving the Many pathr problems than the Few paths problems. However the time taken in the 
Distributed condition will be slower when solving the Many paths problems than the Few paths 
problems. 
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Hypothesis 4b: The number of errors made in the Shared condition will be less when solving the Many 
paths problems than the Few paths problems. However the number of error made in the Distributed 
condition urill be more when solving the Many paths problems than the Few paths problems. 
Hypothesis 4c: The number of moves made in the Shared condition will be less when solving the Many 
paths problems than the Few paths problems. However the number of moves made in the Distributed 
condition will be more when solving the Many paths problems than the Few paths problems. 
The direction of the effect of number of paths is dependent on whether the model is 
. shared or 
distributed. Therefore there is not predicted to be a main effect of this source 
of difficulty on group reasoning performance. 
Hjpothesis 5a: There will be no overall difference in the time taken to complete the Many paths and 
Few paths pmblems. 
H, ypothesis 5b: There will be no overall difference in the number of errors in the Many paths and Few 
paths problems. 
H, ypothesis 5c There will be no overall diference in the number of mover in the Many paths and Few 
paths problems. 
The effect of increasing the number of moves is to increase the amount of reasoning 
required to solve the task. Therefore the Three moves task will increase any existing 
effects in the Two moves task. This is partly because any effect is multiplied by 
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repeating the process again and partly because of the greater working memory load 
required to remember three steps. As a result of completing three moves the task will 
take longer and there is more opportunity for error, leading to worse performance. 
Hypothesis 6a: The time taken to complete the task in the Three moves condition will begreater than 
in the Two moves condition. 
Hypothesis 6b: The number of errors in the Three moves condition will be greater than in the Two 
moves condition. 
Hypothesis 6c The number of moves in the Three moves condition will be greater than in the Two 
moves condition. 
The coding scheme used in Experiment 2 will also be applied here. Analysis of these 
codes tests the process used by groups in their reasoning. It will help explain the 
performance of groups in different conditions by revealing variations in how the task 
was completed. 
The predictions concerning transfer of information between group members were 
supported in Experiment 2 and so the same predictions will be made here. In the 
Shared condition group members have all of the information they require to solve the 
task and so will not need to transfer information between them. Therefore there will be 
little communication of information. In the Distributed condition each group member 
has only one-third of the information and this is held uniquely. However it was found 
in Experiment 2 that groups with modular distributed mental models relied mostly on 
145 
the collaborative reasoning process which does not require the transfer of information 
between group members - it operates by refining conclusions only. Therefore there will 
be little communication of information in this condition too. These arguments apply to 
solving the problems with all of the different sources of difficulty, with the exception of 
number of moves which increases the amount of all communication, see Hypothesis 13. 
Therefore: 
Hjpothesis 7: The number of information and question-information statements in all of the conditions 
(except Two and Three moves) will be the same. 
The remaining hypotheses will now be ordered by manipulation, unlike the 
communication hypotheses in the previous chapter which were ordered by 
communication code. This is in the interests of economy of exposition as it will 
minimise the otherwise very large number of hypotheses generated by this multifactorial 
experiment. 
The effect of shared or distributed mental models on the frequency of propose and support 
statements was not accurately predicted in Experiment 2 and the final pattern of data 
was not completely explained. However it seems that the collaborative process used in 
the Distributed condition generates more propose and support statements than are found 
in the Shared conditions. The same reasons apply to question propose and question-support 
statements. 
The part of the collaborative process in which the possible islands are refined to reach a 
final conclusion involves hone, reject, widen, question-hone, question-reject and question-widen 
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statements. This is therefore an important stage as it is through these statements that 
the group can reach a solution despite each person knowing only part of the model. 
Use of these statements indicate a distributed cognitive process. In the Distributed 
condition groups have distributed mental models and so rely on the collaborative 
process. These statements would therefore be expected to be used. But in the Shared 
condition groups have shared mental models and so do not need to collaborate to find a 
solution. Therefore these statements would not be expected. 
Similarly the number of islands explicitly mentioned by group members is indicative of a 
distributed cognitive process. In the proposed collaborative process several possibilities 
are mentioned initially and these are then reduced to the final conclusions. In contrast, 
groups with shared mental models suggest final conclusions immediately and so do not 
discuss as wide a range of islands. There will therefore be more two, three, four, five, six 
and seven statements in the Distributed condition. In addition hone, reject and udden 
statements are coded as one if they refer to one island. As described above the 
Distributed condition will generate more than the Shared condition. So there will be 
more one statements in the Distributed condition as well. 
The collaborative process requires longer chains of reasoning as initial statements are 
refined leading to a final conclusion. In the Distributed condition different people hold 
different parts of the model and so each person contributes to the ongoing reasoning 
process. This will be indicated by di, fferent statements and so more of these are expected 
in the Distributed condition than in the Shared condition. 
147 
Hypothe ri r 8: There will be a greater number of each communication code (apart from information and 
question-information) in the Distributed condition than the Shared condition. 
The influence of increasing the difficulty of the rule has been predicted above to make 
each inference more difficult for the individual, however groups must still go through 
the same process in order to solve the task. It will not change the process, only the 
performance of the groups. It is therefore not predicted to influence the number of 
statements of each type. 
It is possible that as the manipulation affects the drawing of inferences and not the 
collaborative process as it has been described, they may talk about the inferences. 
However this would not be shown in the current coding scheme as it only focuses on 
the collaboration. Therefore any statement that is relevant to the task but is not within 
the remit of the current codes will be coded as `Other'. If groups were to discuss 
inferences more then this can be identified in the frequencies of these codes. But it is 
predicted that they will not discuss inferences and so the frequencies will not change. 
Hypothesis 9: The frequency of each communication code, including `Other' statements, will be the same 
in the Affirmative and Negative conditions. 
The effect of number of paths is predicted to influence the process of refining the 
suggested solutions, not the initial proposal or supporting of these solutions or their 
related questions. Thus there will not 
be any main effect of number of paths on the 
frequency of these statements. The frequencies of these statements will also not interact 
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with the model type either for the same reason that the proposal and support of 
solutions is not affected by number of paths. 
Hypothesis 70: The number ofpropose, support, question propose and question-support statements mill 
be the same in the Many paths and Feiv paths conditions and there will be no interaction of this 
condition with model type. 
The part of the collaborative process in which the possible islands are refined to the 
reach the final conclusions will be influenced by the number of paths. As there are 
more possible islands initially in the Many paths condition the number of possibilities 
will need to be reduced more to find the legal moves. 
Hone and reject statements are used to reduce the numbers of possible islands, so more of 
these will be expected in the Many paths condition. Widen statements are used to 
increase the number possibilities. The effect of Many paths is to create too many 
possibilities not too few. The manipulation is specifically to do with the reduction of 
possibilities and so no increase in widen statements will be expected. 
If there are more possible islands in the Many paths condition then there will be a 
greater number of multiple islands considered than in the Few paths condition. This will 
cause more two, three, four, five, s& and seven statements. But there will not be more one 
statements as both conditions will discuss these. 
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All of the above predictions suggest that more statements in the collaborative process 
will be used in the Many paths condition than the Few paths. Thus there will be longer 
chains of reasoning resulting in more different statements. 
Hypothesis 11: There will be a greater number of hone, rrject, question-hone, question-rrject, two, three, 
four, five, six, seven and different statements in the Few paths condition than the Many paths condition. 
But there will be equal numbers of widen, question-widen and one statements. 
The number of paths manipulation is predicted to interact with model type. In the 
Shared condition group members use the process predicted by SMMT and form 
conclusions independently and with less discussion. Therefore the number of legal 
moves is not predicted to influence the frequencies of codes in the collaborative process 
used to refine the possible conclusion because there is no refinement at the group level. 
However in the Distributed condition groups do use the collaborative process in order 
reduce the number of possible islands to the final set of legal moves. Thus in the Many 
paths condition where there are more possible islands initially the number of possibilities 
will need to be reduced more to find the legal moves. The predictions of Hypothesis 11 
apply to the Distributed condition. 
Hone and eject statements are used to reduce the numbers of possible islands, so more of 
these will be expected in the Distributed condition for Many paths problems. However 
U7lden statements are used to increase the number possibilities. The effect of the 
manipulation is specifically to do with the reduction of possibilities and so no increase in 
widen statements will be expected. 
150 
As there are more possible islands in the Many paths condition then there will be a 
greater number of multiple islands considered for these problems in the Distributed 
condition than for the Few paths problems. This will cause more two, thre, four, five, six 
and reven statements. But there will not be more one statements as both conditions will 
discuss these. 
As before, these predictions suggest that more statements in the collaborative process 
will be used in the Distributed condition for the Many paths problems than the Few 
paths problems. Thus there will be longer chains of reasoning, resulting in more difrent 
statements. 
Hjpothesis 12. " There will be a greater number of hone, rject, question-hone, question-reject, two, three, 
four, five, six, seven and dif rent statements in the Manj paths problems compared to the Few paths 
problems in the Distributed condition only, they will be the same in the Shared condition. But there will 
be no interaction of number of paths with model type for one statements. 
The effect of greater numbers of moves will not change the performance or the 
reasoning process. It simply requires that more reasoning takes place in order that the 
legal moves for three steps rather than two be calculated. Therefore the number of each 
type of statement is predicted to increase. 
Hypothesis 13: There sill begreater number of each communication code in the Three move than the 
Two move condition. 
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4.2.2 Method 
4.2.2.1 Participants 
The participants were 36 students at the University of Surrey who volunteered to take 
part in the study. There were 20 female and 16 male participants. Their mean age was 
24.7 years with a standard deviation of 7.5 years. 
4.2.2.2 Apparatus 
The task was essentially the same as that in Experiment 2, but some changes were made 
in order to test the current hypotheses and to improve the experiment. The number of 
islands in the task was increased to eight. This meant that more data could be collected 
in each game as groups visited two more islands. In addition this meant that the task 
was harder as more possibilities had to be considered for each move. The reason for 
making the task more difficult was to remove the floor effect which had potentially 
reduced the variation in errors and number of moves between conditions in Experiment 
2. 
The rules underpinning the modules in Experiment 2 were dissimilar and it was possible 
that this meant some modules were easier than others. If this was the case it might 
affect the group process, for example group members with non-equivalent modules 
could behave differently to each other. 
Therefore this potential confound was removed 
by altering the rules in order to make the modules equivalent. Each module now 
consisted of objects on the current island and objects on the destination island. For a 
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move to be legal a corresponding pair, which were determined by the rules, was needed 
in each module. On the current island there was one of two types of object, for 
example in the 'weather' module there could be an umbrella or a pair of sunglasses. On 
the destination island there was one of four types object, in the weather module these 
could be rain, fog, snow or sun. For each module there were two rules which linked the 
objects on the current island to their corresponding objects on the destination island. 
For example, in the Affirmative condition, the umbrella was linked with rain and fog and 
the sunglasses were linked with snow and sun. Therefore in this module if there was an 
umbrella on the current island it was necessary to have rain or fog on the destination 
island. If there was snow or sun the move was illegal. There were three modules and so 
there had to be corresponding pairs in all three modules for the move to be legal. This 
is explained in more detail in the Procedure Section 4.2.2.4. 
The participant's interface with the experimental program also changed. As before 
group members were in charge of one of the modules each, the control of these rotated 
after each trial. To indicate a choice group members had to click on the object they had 
chosen to take from the current island and the name of the island they had chosen to 
move to. This information was displayed on their screen and relayed to all of the other 
group members screens where it appeared in a text box. If they wanted to change a 
selection then they simply clicked the new choice. When they had all chosen they all 
clicked `Go' to register their consensus and move the boat. 
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4.2.2.3 Design 
A repeated measures design was used. The order of the games, the conditions and which 
module participants had the buttons for was initially randomised. This order was then 
rotated using a Latin square design in order to counterbalance order effects. There were 
two model type conditions, Shared and Distributed; two rule difficulty conditions, 
Affirmative and Negative; two number of paths conditions, Many paths and Few paths 
and two number of moves conditions, Two moves and Three moves. These were 
manipulated using a fully crossed design. Each game consisted of four Two move 
solutions and four Three move solutions. The permutations of the other three factors 
were presented in separate games. There were therefore eight games in order to present 
all sixteen possibilities, and four scrolls were collected in each. 
4.2.2.4 Procedure 
The procedure was similar to Experiment 2. Participants solved the task in groups of 
three. Prior to the experimental games they completed two four island practice games 
individually, one in the Affirmative condition and one in the Negative condition during 
which the experimenter answered queries. They then completed eight experimental 
games. Three of these were completed on the first day and five on the following day. 
Each of these sessions lasted approximately two and a half hours. 
In the Shared condition all of the information was presented on all of the participants' 
screens. In the Distributed condition each participant only had one of the three 
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modules. Each participant was given a different module. Therefore they each had a 
third of the model and there was no overlap of the information they were given. 
The difficulty of rules condition was manipulated by using different rules in the three 
modules. The three modules were weather, colours and food. In the affirmative 
condition the two weather rules were: `If and only if there is an umbrella on the current 
island and cloud or snow on the destination island then it is a legal move' and `If and 
only if there is a pair of sunglasses on the current island and sun or fire on the 
destination island then it is a legal move'. The two colour rules were: `If and only if 
there is aP on the current island and a blue or yellow square on the destination island 
then it is a legal move' and `If and only if there is an S on the current island and a pink 
or orange square on the destination island then it is a legal move'. P stood for primary 
colour and S for secondary colour. The two food rules were: `If and only if there is 
cheese on the current island and a mouse or hamster on the destination island then it is 
a legal move' and `If and only if there is a flower on the current island and a wasp or 
ladybird on the destination island then it is a legal move'. This information was 
summarised in the centre of the screen using the diagram presented in Figure 4.1. 
155 
ýý iiii 
El M0 
Figure 4.1 Representation of the rules display in the Affirmative condition. 
In the negative condition these rules were changed. The weather rules were: `If and only 
if there is a pair of sunglasses on the current island and snow or fire on the destination 
island then it is not a legal move' and `If and only if there is an umbrella on the current 
island and cloud or sun on the destination island then it is not a legal move'. the colour 
rules were: `If and only if there is aP on the current island and a blue or pink square on 
the destination island then it is not a legal move' and `If and only if there is an S on the 
current island and a yellow or orange square on the destination island then it is not a 
legal move'. The food rules were: `If and only if there is cheese on the current island 
and a wasp or hamster on the destination island then it is not a legal move' and `If and 
only if there is a flower on the current island and a mouse or ladybird on the destination 
island then it is not a legal move'. The summary display shown on screen is presented in 
Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2 Representation of the rules display in the Negative condition. 
Each island therefore had six objects in it. Along the bottom were the objects that 
participants could use if they were currently on that island, one for each module. Along 
the top were the other objects which participants could use if they were considering the 
island as a destination, again one for each module. The different objects were used 
equally in each game, as far as possible within the other constraints of the manipulations 
etc. The three modules concerned weather, colour and food. The objects and their 
correspondences varied in different conditions, so these will be described in detail with 
the conditions in the procedure. 
North Island 
f' rý 
South Island 
It 0 
nsý 
Figure 4.3 Represcntation of two typical islands. 
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Assuming that the islands presented in Figure 4.3 were in the Affirmative condition, 
Figure 4.2 can be used decide whether moving between them is legal. Moving from 
North island to South is legal because there is a flower and a wasp, aP and yellow and 
sunglasses and sun. However, if you were on South island attempting to move to North 
island the move would not be legal because there is S and blue which is contrary to the 
Affirmative rules. 
The number of paths condition was manipulated by calculating all the legal moves for 
different objects on the islands. Two arrangements were made. In one there were ten 
legal moves, this was the Few paths condition. In the other there were twenty-one legal 
moves, this was the Many paths condition. More than two games were required though 
in order to allow a fully crossed design. In Experiment 2 more games were created, but 
it is possible that these were not exactly equal and so the order had to be rotated 
independently of condition. To avoid this complication the extra games in this 
experiment were created by keeping all of the islands the same in terms of the 
combinations of objects but presenting them in different locations for different games. 
Following the experiment participants claimed to not recognise that this had taken place 
because of the amount of information on screen and so solved each task as a novel 
game. 
Finally the number of moves manipulation was created by positioning the scrolls which 
participants had to collect in specific locations. Each island had only one scroll on it and 
so there was a total of eight scrolls to collect. The minimum number of moves required 
to move from one scroll to the next was calculated in advance. The scrolls were 
positioned so that in each game the minimum number of steps between four of the 
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numbers was two moves and between the other four was three moves. The order of 
the two or three move steps was random and no two games were the same. 
As in Experiment 2 the timing of all button clicks and movements of the boat were 
recorded on a database. All of the verbal communication during the experiment was 
recorded, transcribed and coded according to the same coding scheme used in 
Experiment 2 in order to compare the communication in different conditions. The 
transcripts were coded by the experimenter. A second coder, naive to the aims of the 
study, coded one-quarter of the transcripts in order that the inter-coder reliability could 
be assessed. Cohen's Kappa (1960) was calculated to be 0.79. 
4.2.3 Results 
Hypotheses 1 to 6 dealt with the group reasoning performance in the different 
conditions, comparing shared with distributed mental models and comparing the effect 
of different sources of difficulty. Table 4.1 displays the mean time taken to complete 
the trials, the number of errors per trial and the number of moves per trial. 
Hypotheses la-c predicted that there would be no differences in the reasoning 
performance of the groups between the Shared and Distributed conditions. The times, 
number of errors and number of moves are shown in Table 4.1. These hypotheses were 
confirmed. There was no significant difference in the time taken (F(1,10) = 0.02, 
p>0.05), the number of errors (F(1,10) = 0.59, p>0.05) nor the number of moves 
(F(1,10) = 2.08, p>0.05) between these conditions. 
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Hypotheses 2a-c predicted the performance of the groups in the Negative condition would 
be worse than in the Affirmative condition. This was partially supported. The time 
taken was less in the Affirmative condition than the Negative condition (F(1,10) = 7.24, 
p<0.05) and there were fewer moves in the Affirmative condition (F(1,10) = 8.31, 
p<0.05). But there was no difference in the number of errors between these two 
conditions (F(1,10) = 0.59, p>0.05). 
Hypotheses 3a-c predicted that there would be an interaction of the model type with the 
difficulty of the rule. This prediction was not supported. There was no significant 
interaction of time taken (F(1,10) = 1.74, p>0.05), the number of errors (F(1,10) = 0.61, 
p>0.05) nor of number of moves (F(1,10) = 0.75, p>0.05). 
Hypothesis 4a-c predicted that there would be an interaction of number of paths with 
model type such that the Many paths problems will be solved quicker than in the Few 
paths problems in the Shared condition but that Few paths problems would be solved 
quicker than Many paths conditions in the Distributed condition. This prediction was 
not supported. There was no interaction of model type with number of paths in the 
time taken (F(1,10) = 0.29, p>0.05), the number of errors (F(1,10) = 0.25, p>0.05) nor 
the number of moves (F(1,10) = 0.01, p>0.05). 
Hypotheses 5a-c predicted that there would be no difference in group performance in the 
Many paths condition than in the Few paths condition. There was no significant effect 
of this on the time taken to complete the task (F(1,10) = 0.46, p>0.05) nor on the 
number of errors (F(1,10) = 0.50, p>0.05). But there was a significantly greater number 
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of moves in the Few paths condition than the Many paths condition (F(1,10) = 8.36, 
p<0.05). 
Hypotheses 6a-c predicted that reasoning performance would be worse in the Three move 
condition than the Two move condition. This hypothesis was mostly supported. The 
time taken was longer in the Three move condition than the Two move condition 
(F(1,10) = 104.01, p<0.0001) and the number of moves was greater (F(1,10) = 1239.71, 
p<0.0001). But there was no difference in the number of errors (F(1,10) = 1.2, p>0.05). 
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Hypotheses 7 to 13 concerned the effect of the different sources of task difficulty and 
shared and distributed mental models on the communication of the groups. The 
frequency of communication codes indicates what reasoning process is being used and 
the effect of the manipulations on the collaboration of the group will begin to explain 
the performance of the group. Table 4.2 shows the mean number of statements of each 
communication code. As this large table is difficult to interpret, the most theoretically 
important codes are presented graphically in Figure 4.3. As in Chapter 3, in order to 
reduce the number of codes being considered the implies codes were all treated using 
their implied meaning only. 
Hypothesis 7 predicted that there would be no difference in the number of information 
statements in all of the conditions. This was supported. There was no effect of model 
type (F(1,10) = 0.05, p>0.05), rule difficulty (F(1,10) = 0.31, p>0.05), number of paths 
(F(1,10) = 2.84, p>0.05) nor number of moves (F(1,10) = 4.45, p>0.05). It was also 
predicted that there would be no effect of question-information statements but it was not 
possible to test this hypothesis statistically as several conditions had no question-information 
statements. 
Hypothesis 8 predicted that there would be more of each communication type in the 
Distributed than the Shared condition. This was partially supported, there were more 
statements in the Distributed condition than the Shared condition for several 
communication codes, but some were the same. There was no code with more 
statements in the Shared condition. There was a significantly greater number of pmpare 
(F(1,6) = 6.05, p<0.05), support (F(1,6) =6.18, p<0.05) and question- upport statements 
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(F(1,6) = 10.56, p<0.05) in the distributed condition, but there was no significant 
difference in the number of question propose statements (F(1,6) = 1.22, p>0.05). There 
were significantly more hone statements in the Distributed than the Shared condition 
(F(1,6) = 6.64, p<0.05) but there was no difference in the number of eject statements 
(F(1,6) = 0.03, p>0.05) nor uwiden statements (F(1,6) = 0.16, p>0.05). Question-hone, 
question-reject and question-widen statements could not be analysed because there were some 
conditions in which these statements were not made at all. There was a marginally 
significant greater number of diferent statements in the Distributed condition than the 
Shared condition (F(1,6) = 4.86, p=0.07). There was no significant difference in the 
number of one statements (F(1,6) = 3.44, p>0.05) and two statements (F(1,6) = 1.41, 
p>0.05). However there were more three statements in the Distributed condition than 
the Shared condition (F(1,6) = 13.50, p<0.05). Four, five, six and seven statements could 
not be analysed because there were some conditions in which these statements were not 
made at all. 
Hypothesis 9 predicted that there would be no difference in the frequency of each 
communication code between the Affirmative and Negative conditions. This was 
supported. There was no significant difference in the number of propose statements 
(F(1,6) = 2.20, p>0.05), support statements (F(1,6) = 0.49, p>0.05), question propose 
statements (F(1,6) = 0.19, p>0.05), question-support statements (F(1,6) = 3.42, p>0.05), 
hone statements (F(1,6) = 1.28, p>0.05), reject statements (F(1,6) = 0.25, p>0.05), widen 
statements (F(1,6) = 4.2, p>0.05), different statements (F(1,6) = 2.5, p>0.05), one 
statements (F(1,6) = 0.02, p>0.05), two statements (F(1,6) = 1.00, p>0.05), three 
statements (F(1,6) = 0.49, p>0.05), fourstatements 
(F(1,6) = 1.06, p>0.05) or other 
statements (F(1,6) = 1.24, p>0.05). 
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As before, question-support, question-hone, question-reject, question-widen, five, six and seven 
statements could not be analysed because there were some conditions in which these 
statements were not made at all. 
Hypothesis 10 predicted that there would be no effect of number of paths on propose, 
pose and question-support statements. This prediction was supported. support, questionpro 
There was no significant difference in the number of propose statements (F(1,6) = 4.06, 
p>0.05), support statements (F(1,6) = 0.64, p>0.05), question propose statements (F(1,6) _ 
2.55, p>0.05) and question support statements (F(1,6) = 0.20, p>0.05). Further, these were 
predicted not to interact with model type. This was also supported. There was no 
significant interaction of propose statements (F(1,6) = 1.91, p>0.05), support statements 
(F(1,6) = 0.83, p>0.05), question propose statements (F(1,6) = 0.04, p>0.05) and question- 
support statements (F(1,6) = 3.38, p>0.05). 
Hypothesis 11 predicted that there would be a greater number of hone, reject, question-hone, 
question-reject two, three, four, five, six, seven and di erent statements in the Few paths than the 
Many paths condition. This was largely not supported. There was no significant 
difference in the number of hone statements (F(1,6) = 3.72, p>0.05), reject statements 
(F(1,6) =4.32, p>0.05), two statements (F(1,6) = 1.05, p>0.05), three statements (F(1,6) _ 
0.01, p>0.05) nor four statements (F(1,6) = 3.03, p>0.05). However there were 
significantly more diferent statements in the Many paths condition (F(1,6) = 5.57, 
p=0.05). 
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As predicted there was no significant difference in the number of widen statements 
(F(1,6) = 1.19, p>0.05) and one statements (F(1,6) = 4.47, p>0.05). Question-hone, question- 
reject, question-widen, five, six and seven statements could not be analysed because there were 
some conditions without any of these statements. 
Hypothesis 12 predicted that there would be a greater number hone, ree ect, question-hone, 
question-reject, two, three, four, five, six, seven and different statements in the Many paths 
problems than the Few paths problems in the Distributed condition but that they would 
be the same in the Shared condition. 
This was supported for hone statements only. There was a significant interaction of 
model type with number of paths in the hone condition (F(1,6) = 5.83, p=0.05). Planned 
comparisons using a Bonferroni adjustment was used to investigate this further. They 
showed that there were no significant differences in the number of hone statements 
between the Many and Few paths problems in the Distributed condition (t = 1.92, 
p>0.025) nor was there a significant difference in the Many and Few paths problems in 
the Shared condition (t = -0.12, p>0.025). There was no significant interaction for 
request statements (F(1,6) = 0.39, p>0.05), two statements (F(1,6) = 0.05, p>0.05), three 
statements (F(1,6) = 0.16, p>0.05), fourstatements (F(1,6) = 2.41, p>0.05) nor diferent 
statements (F(1,6) = 0.88, p>0.05). As predicted there was no equivalent interaction for 
one statements (F(1,6) = 0.50, p>0.05). Question-hone, question-reject, five, six and seven 
statements could not be analysed because there were some conditions in which these 
statements were not made at all. 
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Hypothesis 13 predicted that there would be more of each communication code in the 
three move than the two move condition. This was largely supported. There were 
significantly more propose statements (F(1,6) = 35.11, p<0.001), support statements (F(1,6) 
= 38.19, p<0.001), question propose statements (F(1,6) = 13.87 p<0.05), hone statements 
(F(1,6) = 21.37, p<0.01), reject statements (F(1,6) = 47.21, p<0.0001), widen statements 
(F(1,6) = 8.55, p<0.05), different statements (F(1,6) = 58.14, p<0.0001), one statements 
(F(1,6) = 49.05, p<0.0001), two statements (F(1,6) = 40.15, p<0.001) and three statements 
(F(1,6) = 15.34, p<0.01). 
There was no significant difference in the number of question-support statements (F(1,6) _ 
1.31, p<0.05) or four statements (F(1,6) = 4.96, p>0.05). As before, question-hone, question- 
reject, question-widen, five, six and seven statements could not be analysed because there were 
some conditions in which there were none of these statements. 
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4.2.4 Discussion 
The findings of this experiment replicated the results of Experiment 2 in that the 
performance of groups with shared and distributed mental models was largely the same 
despite a much greater use of the collaborative process by groups with distributed 
mental models. But tasks with different sources of difficulty were not found to create 
qualitative differences in performance for shared and distributed mental models and had 
little effect on the frequencies of communication codes. 
Hypotheses la-c, 7&8 concerned the comparison of the Shared and Distributed 
conditions and were largely supported, thus replicating Experiment 2. As before there 
was no difference in reasoning performance between the two conditions. This finding is 
even more striking than in Experiment 2 because here there was no sharing of the 
model at all. The lack of difference in the frequency of information and question-information 
statements between the two conditions was also replicated and the absolute number of 
information statements made in the Distributed condition was low, less than one per trial. 
This means that group members did not transfer information between themselves often 
despite being given only one-third of the total information. Thus group members in the 
distributed condition did not build up their models independently to form shared mental 
models, they relied on collaborating about conclusions. 
The frequencies of other codes used in the in the Distributed condition demonstrate 
this. There were more three statements. This suggests that larger numbers of islands 
were considered at once in the Distributed condition. There were more hone statements. 
This suggests that group members were reducing the number of islands under 
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consideration to find the legal moves. There were more different statements. This 
implies that group members used chains of reasoning, that is successive statements were 
related to each other in the process of selecting the island. This pattern provides more 
support that groups with distributed mental models use the collaborative process to 
solve the task whereas groups with shared mental models do not 
In addition to this there were more propose and support statements in the Distributed 
condition than in the Shared condition, as there were in Experiment 2. Although this is 
not part of the collaborative process it seems to occur in the Distributed condition. 
Possibly the purpose statements are the result of more false leads being suggested in error 
and the rapport statements are caused by the greater number of stages in the process, 
each of which can be supported. 
The lack of difference in reject statements does not fit the predicted pattern. As they are 
relevant to the collaborative process they would be predicted to be more frequent in the 
Distributed condition and this is what was found in Experiment 2. However they were 
not more frequent here and so the evidence about their role is equivocal. 
Similarly there was not the predicted greater frequency of one and two statements, unlike 
Experiment 2. However the greater frequency of three statements redeems this 
hypothesis as it suggests that groups do discuss larger numbers of islands at once which 
is the main point of the hypothesis. 
The lack of difference in the frequencies of widen statements in Experiment 2 was 
replicated here and the role of these statements can be questioned. Both experiments so 
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far have generated very low numbers of them and it seems that they are not required in 
this task. But they might be used by groups with distributed mental models engaged in 
different tasks. 
As in Experiment 2 groups in the Distributed condition perform as well as groups in the 
Shared condition but communicate more. Therefore, as before, the collaborative 
process must require less time thinking before each statement is made. Greater 
frequencies of most of the codes used in the collaborative process replicates the finding 
that distributed mental models encourages this approach to the task more than shared 
mental models. The remaining hypotheses test for differential effects of sources of task 
difficulty which were expected to occur because of the difference in process found 
between the two. 
Hypotheses 2a-c, 3a-c &9 concerned the manipulation of rule difficulty. Performance was 
worse in the more difficult Negative condition, the groups took longer and made more 
moves. But there was no difference in the number of errors, possibly due to a floor 
effect. This was found in Experiment 2 as well which prompted the introduction of 
more three step moves, but this has not eliminated the problem. Yet the participants 
reported that the task was difficult, in particular the Negative condition. Some excerpts 
from the transcripts confirm this: 
`F: I'm just trying to think. It's so confusing'. Group 6. 
`V: Oh no, it's the cross ones'. Group 3. 
Possibly low error rate simply reflects the common finding that groups perform well on 
tasks with objectively correct answers because it only requires one person to find the 
optimal solution and correct the mistakes of others (e. g. Shaw, 1932). 
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The findings concerning group performance cannot be further explained by the 
frequencies of communication codes as there were no differences. However this was 
predicted to be the case because the manipulation made each inference more difficult 
for the individual but groups must still go through the same process in order to solve 
the task. The increase in time taken is not attributable to the groups discussing issues 
other than those coded in the collaborative process though because there was no 
difference in the frequency of other statements. This finding supports the idea that it is 
the search through conclusions that is discussed in the group rather than the drawing of 
conclusions themselves. Making the inferences more difficult simply slows down the 
existing process, it does not change it. 
It was predicted that the decrease in performance for groups with distributed mental 
models would be greater than for those with shared mental models. However this 
interaction was not found, a result which is difficult to explain within the current theory. 
One possibility is that groups employed the collaborative process they used in the 
Distributed condition in the Shared condition as well. As a repeated measures design 
was used groups were practised in this and it would be quite feasible for them to decide 
to simply ignore some of the information and collaborate. As mentioned in Chapter 3 
the Shared condition allows group members to form shared mental models, but it does 
not necessitate it. However, if this were the case, it does not explain the greater 
frequencies of codes related to the collaborative process in the Distributed condition. 
A reasonable conclusion is that the role of the reasoning of individuals within the group 
is not fully understood. Quite probably the current theory does not fully explain it and 
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the current experiment does not test all aspects of it sufficiently. Perhaps other group 
interactions occur or there are subtle differences in the collaborative process when there 
are differences in individual reasoning. From these largely non-significant results it is 
impossible to draw a stronger conclusion. 
Hypotheses 4,5,10,11 & 12 concerned the number of legal paths manipulation. This 
manipulation was intended to affect the collaborative process that the group engages in. 
Overall it did not fulfil many of the predictions and raises questions about either the 
effectiveness of the manipulation or whether the current conceptualisation of the 
collaborative process is entirely accurate. 
The main effect of number of paths was not of great importance, no effect was 
predicted or found. But the predicted interaction in performance between number of 
paths and model type was not found. This implies that the manipulation was not 
affecting the collaborative process as it was thought to. Inspection of the 
communication codes will shed light on this. 
Generally there were no differences in the frequency of communication codes. This was 
expected for the propose and support statements, but the other communication codes 
relate to the collaborative process which this manipulation was intended to influence. 
Their similarity therefore suggests that the manipulation was not greatly effective. 
The exceptions were the greater numbers of different statements in the Many paths 
condition and the interaction in hone statements between number of paths and model 
type. These did fit the predicted pattern, in particular the interaction of hone statements 
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although the planned comparisons did not reveal the nature of this interaction, implying 
that it is a weak effect. It suggests that in the Distributed condition the final conclusion 
is being reached by refining possibilities more in the Many paths problems than in the 
Few paths problems, as predicted by the collaborative process. But this does not occur 
in Shared condition as the answer is reached independently by group members. 
Unfortunately this evidence is not supported by the interaction of the other statements 
relevant in collaboration though, so there is no overwhelming support for an interaction 
of number of paths with model type for the collaborative process in general. As the 
interaction in performance was predicted to be caused by the number of paths 
influencing the collaborative process more in the Distributed than the Shared conditions 
it is not surprising that there was no interaction in performance either. 
The lack of interaction could have occurred either because the proposed collaborative 
process is wrong and groups do not solve the task as described by it or because the 
manipulation did not affect the group as originally thought. The issues of why the 
number of paths manipulation did not affect the group as thought and what 
manipulations would affect the collaborative process are addressed in Chapter 5. If the 
lack of interaction can be explained as a failure of the manipulation and a more effective 
manipulation can be shown to produce the desired interactions, then the proposed 
collaborative process may yet be shown to be an accurate description of the behaviour 
of groups. If not, then the most plausible conclusion is that the proposed collaborative 
process is incorrect. 
Hypotheses 6a-c & 13 concerned the number of moves manipulation. As this was 
principally introduced to make the task more difficult and remove the floor effect the 
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findings are not of great theoretical significance. The results were as expected though, 
the time taken and the number of moves were greater. This is not surprising as more 
moves were required and these will inevitably take longer. The number of errors was 
the same between the two conditions though, so the manipulation did not succeed in its 
main purpose of increasing the variance in the number of errors. The frequency of 
almost all of the communication codes was greater, but again this is to be expected 
simply as a function of the fact there was more reasoning to do. Thus although this 
manipulation fitted the basic pattern of results expected, these were not of particular 
theoretical interest. Increasing the number of moves did not remove the floor effect in 
the error rate and so it served little purpose and will not be repeated in future 
experiments. 
Overall then this experiment replicates Experiment 2 by demonstrating that groups with 
distributed mental models use more statements indicative of a collaborative process. 
However the effect of different sources of difficulty was not as expected. There was a 
main effect of increasing rule difficulty but no interaction with type of model. There 
was no main effect of number of paths - this was predicted - but the expected 
interaction with type of model was also missing. Thus qualitative differences in 
reasoning performance between shared and distributed mental models were not found. 
Potentially this is severely limiting for the theory. If there are no differences between 
them to account for then comparisons will not be very fruitful and contrasting shared 
and distributed mental models may not be a productive line of research. 
In addition there were very few interactions of either rule difficulty or number of paths 
with model type for the communication codes used in the collaborative process. This 
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was expected for rule difficulty, but the number of paths manipulation was specifically 
designed to influence this yet only hone statements showed the predicted interaction. 
The pattern of results is therefore quite unclear. It is possible that the manipulation was 
not effective or that the proposed collaborative process is wrong. Chapter 5 will address 
this issue. 
Although no qualitative differences in performance were found between mental models 
in groups it is still possible that there are qualitative differences between individuals and 
groups. The second aim of the chapter was to explore this possibility. To test this the 
same task was completed by individuals in order that the results could 
be compared. 
4.3 Experiment 4 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Experiment 4 will explore whether there are qualitative differences between individual 
and group reasoning. The differences that will 
be investigated are in the effect of the 
difficulty manipulations on reasoning performance. Clearly there will be quantitative 
differences in the performances of individuals compared to groups. The group is 
required to discuss the problem which 
is time consuming and so it would be no surprise 
if groups took longer. Also fewer errors would 
be expected in the group because this 
task has an objectively correct solution and so only one group member need find the 
solution in order to correct and persuade the other group members 
(e. g. Shaw, 1932). 
These are notable features of group performance but are not surprising or novel ones. 
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In this experiment individuals will complete the same task as in Experiment 3 and the 
pattern of results will be compared to find more interesting, qualitative differences. 
Experiment 3 predicted and found that reasoning performance in groups would be 
worse if the rule which groups must apply to solve the task was made more difficult by 
negating it. Groups took longer and made more moves. However it was predicted that 
groups would not be affected by the number of legal paths which could be taken to 
solve the task. This result was also largely supported, this did not affect the time taken 
or the number of errors made. An interaction of model type was predicted here which 
would potentially confuse the group results, but actually this proved to be non- 
significant too. So groups were unaffected by the number of paths manipulation. 
Finally it was predicted and found that groups would perform less well if the minimum 
number of moves required was three rather than two. This was supported; groups took 
longer and made more moves. These findings will be compared to individuals to 
discover if they have a different pattern of reasoning performance. 
i, 
The three stages required to solve the task which were found in Experiment 1 are the 
same for individuals as for groups. The first stage was to work out what objects must be 
on the destination island for it to be a legal move. The next stage was to find the islands 
with those things on. If one of these was not the goal island, then the third stage was to 
go back to stage 1 and work out all the islands it is possible to move to in two steps. 
These stages were repeated until a route was found to the goal island. As before three 
sources of difficulty will be manipulated which will target each of these stages. These are 
rule difficulty, number of legal paths and number of moves. 
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Rule difficulty is predicted to influence the first stage, working out what objects must be 
on the destination island for it to be a legal move. In the `Negative' condition the rules 
will be negated. As explained above these are more difficult than in the `Affirmative' 
condition where the rules will not be negated because of the double negation effect 
(Evans, Clibbens & Rood, 1995; Schaeken & Schroyens, 2000). 
The number of legal moves is predicted to influence the second stage, finding an island 
with those objects on it. If there are more islands with the correct objects there will be 
more legal moves and so it will be easier to find one which is the correct path to the goal 
island. As in Experiment 3, in the `Many paths' condition there will be 21 legal moves. 
In the more difficult `Few paths' condition there will be only 10 legal moves. 
Finally, the number of moves affects how many times this process must be repeated. If 
there are fewer moves to reach the goal island then the process will be repeated less, and 
therefore be easier, than if there, if there are more. In addition the load on working 
memory will be a greater when there are more moves because there are more islands to 
recall. In the `Two moves' condition there will be a minimum of two moves from the 
current island to the goal island. In the `Three moves' condition there will be three. 
The experiment comprises exactly the same task that was completed by groups in 
Experiment 3 except that it will be adapted for completion by individuals. That is, they 
will control the selection of islands and all of the objects required 
for them. 
The predictions concern reasoning performance. Each of the stages found to be used 
by individuals in completing the task in Experiment 1 is expected to be used by 
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individuals here. So each of the manipulations are expected to influence reasoning 
performance. As before, performance will be assessed using three indices: time to 
complete the task, number of errors made and number of moves needed. 
Reasoning with a negated rule is predicted to be harder for individuals because of the 
double negation effect. Therefore: 
Hypothesis I a. The time taken to complete the task will be less in the Affirmative condition than the 
Negative condition. 
Hypothesis 1 b: The number of errors made will be less in the Affirmative condition than the Negative 
condition. 
Hypothesis 1r The number of moves required will be less in the Af rmative condition than the Negative 
condition. 
Solving the task with fewer legal moves is predicted to make it harder because it is less 
likely that they will find a path to the goal quickly. Therefore: 
Hypothesis 2a: The time taken to complete the task will be less in the Many paths condition than the 
Few paths condition. 
Hypothesis 2b: The number of errors made will be less in the Many paths condition than the Few paths 
condition. 
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Hypothesis 2c. " The number of moves required will be less in the Many paths condition than the Few 
paths condition. 
Increasing the minimum number of moves required to complete the task is also 
predicted to make the task harder because the process has to be repeated more and 
there is a greater working memory load in finding a longer path to the goal island 
because there are more islands to remember. 
Hypothesis 3a: The time taken to complete the task will be less in the Two moves condition than the 
Three moves condition. 
Hypothesis 3b: The number of errors made will be less in the Two moves condition than the Three 
moves condition. 
Hypothesis 3c: The number of moves required n ill be less in the Two moves condition than the Three 
moves condition. 
Hypotheses 2a-c clearly show where qualitative differences between groups and 
individuals are predicted to occur. In Experiment 3 above the number of paths 
manipulation was predicted not to affect the reasoning performance of the group, and it 
did not affect the time taken or the number of errors made. Here it is predicted to 
influence the performance of individuals. If this prediction is supported then it will 
demonstrate qualitative differences in the types of task difficulty which affect groups and 
individuals. This can be explained by the different reasoning processes they use. 
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4.3.2 Method 
4.3.2.1 Participants 
The participants were 16 students at the University of Surrey who volunteered to take 
part in the study. There were 11 female and 5 male participants. Their mean age was 
23.3 years with a standard deviation of 5.0 years. 
4.3.2.2 Apparatus 
The task was essentially the same as in Experiment 3 except that it was completed by 
individuals. This required two changes. Firstly, there was no longer a shared/distributed 
mental model type manipulation and so the number of trials required for a full crossed 
design was halved. Secondly, the participant's interface with the computer was slightly 
altered. Previously subjects had to click on the object they had chosen to take from the 
current island and the name of the island they had chosen to move to. Now they had to 
click on all three objects as well as the name of the island. This information was 
displayed at the bottom of the screen. When they were satisfied they clicked `Go'. If 
they wanted to change a selection then they simply clicked the new choice. 
4.3.2.3 Design 
A repeated measures design was used. Four trials were completed in total. The order of 
these was rotated using a Latin square design. There were two rule difficulty conditions, 
Affirmative and Negative; two number of paths conditions, Many paths and Few paths 
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and two number of moves conditions, Two moves and Three moves. These were 
manipulated using a fully crossed design. As before, there were four Two move and 
four Three move solutions in each trial, the remaining two factors required separate 
trials. There were therefore four trials in order to present all eight possibilities, and four 
scrolls were collected in each. 
4.3.2.4 Procedure 
The procedure was the same as Experiment 3 except that participants completed the 
task independently. The practice trial and four experimental trials were completed in 
one session. The timing of all button clicks and movements of the boat were recorded 
on a database. 
4.3.3 Results 
Hypotheses la-c predicted that reasoning performance in the Affirmative condition would 
be superior to that in the Negative condition. These were not supported. There was no 
significant difference in the time taken (F(1,14) = 1.88, p>0.05), the number of errors 
(F(1,14) = 0.19, p>0.05) nor the number of moves (F(1,14) = 0.04, p>0.05). 
Hypotheses 2a-c predicted that reasoning performance in the Many paths condition would 
be superior to that in the Few paths condition. This was supported for the time taken 
only. Task completion was significantly quicker in the Many paths condition (F(1,14) _ 
4.72, p<0.05). But there was no difference in the number of errors (F(1,14) = 0.06, 
p>0.05) nor the number of moves (F(1,14) = 0.02, p>0.05). 
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Hypotheses 3a-c predicted that reasoning performance in the Two moves condition would 
be superior to that in the Three moves condition. These were supported. The time 
taken to complete the task in the Two move condition was significantly less than in the 
Three move condition (F(1,14) = 69.92, p<0.0001), there were significantly fewer errors 
in the Two move condition (F(1,14) = 8.94, p<0.05) and there were significantly fewer 
moves (F(1,14) = 144.40, p<0.0001). 
Table 4.3 Mean time in seconds, mean number of moves and mean number of errors 
(standard deviations in parentheses) as a function of condition (Two moves & Three 
Moves, Affirmative & Negative, Many paths & Few paths). 
-- ----------------- - Two moves Three moves 
Affirmative Negative Affirmative Negative 
--------------------- Many Few Many Few Many Few Many Few 
paths paths paths paths paths paths paths paths 
Time 78.86 81.96 82.92 75.00 119.43 140.00 130.70 176.16 
(50.42) (59.02) (37.91) (36.25) (51.15) (77.34) 53.92 (78.62) 
Na of 0.36 0.48 0.20 0.23 0.59 0.59 0.65 0.72 
Errors (0.47) (0.84) (0.37) (0.50) (0.64) (0.43) (0.73) (0.85) 
Na of 2.25 2.19 2.20 2.00 3.05 3.19 3.23 3.31 
Moves (0.76) (0.40) (0.33) (0.00) (0.19) (0.47) (0.76) (0.60) 
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4.3.4 Discussion 
The predictions about the effect of the different sources of task difficulty on 
performance were mostly as expected. Number of paths and number of moves 
influenced performance as predicted. There was no effect of rule negation however. 
Hypotheses la-c concerned the effect of negation of the rule on reasoning performance. 
The predictions were not supported - negating the rules did not result in worse 
performance. This is surprising as the effect of negation has been shown to make 
reasoning more difficult for individuals to draw affirmative conclusions (Evans, Clibbens 
& Rood, 1995; Schaeken & Schroyens, 2000). The implication of this finding is that the 
process individuals use to decide which objects are required for a move to be legal is not 
influenced by negation. However it is equally possible that this finding is an artefact of 
the task. The rules were presented pictorially, quite different to a standard written 
format. Perhaps this display facilitates negative inferences. Ideally the experiment 
should be repeated using a more sensitive task in order to find if the results are 
replicated before a conclusion can be drawn. 
Hypotheses 2a-c concerned the effect of the number of legal paths on reasoning 
performance. The effect on the time taken was as predicted, the task was completed 
more quickly when there were more legal moves. This supports the finding of 
Experiment 1 that participants search through all of the islands to find the legal moves 
and move when they have found one. 
The more legal moves there are then the quicker 
they will find a solution. 
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Hypotheses 3a-c concerned the minimum number of moves required to reach the goal. As 
predicted more moves resulted in poorer performance on all of the indices; the 
participants were slower, made more errors and needed more moves. These findings are 
not of great theoretical interest though - it is only reasonable that making more moves 
takes longer, there are more opportunities for error and naturally it requires more 
moves. This manipulation was implemented to remove the floor effect of errors in the 
other conditions by making the task more difficult. Therefore it is not possible to 
conclude much from these findings. 
Overall Experiment 4 presents an interesting picture of the reasoning performance of 
individuals on the task. The results were not entirely as predicted, there was no effect of 
rule negation, but together these findings can be constructively compared with the 
group results from Experiment 3. Section 4.4 will address this. 
4.4 General Discussion 
Independently the findings of Experiments 3 and 4 do not allow many conclusions to be 
drawn, but together they reveal some interesting points about the effect of different 
reasoning processes on reasoning performance. In particular the number of paths 
manipulation produced intriguing findings. However the rule difficulty manipulation 
was less interpretable and the number of moves manipulation was not theoretically 
interesting. 
A comparison of the effects of the number of paths manipulation on groups and 
individuals indicates a difference in reasoning performance. In Experiment 3 groups 
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showed no main effect of number of paths or interaction with model type. However in 
Experiment 4 individuals were quicker if there were more legal paths. This suggests that 
whereas groups are not influenced by the number of legal moves, individuals are. 
This manipulation was intended to affect the collaborative process that groups use to 
solve the task and as individuals do not use a collaborative process it is likely that the 
explanation for the differences lies with it. Whereas individuals were found in 
Experiment 1 to search for an island with the necessary objects and then move there, 
groups are predicted to discuss several possibilities before finalising the solution. This 
difference in process could account for the differential effect of number of paths. 
However these processes cannot be compared in great depth because the support for 
the proposed group collaborative process in Experiment 3 was equivocal. It is not clear 
what the groups are doing in response to this manipulation so the differences in 
reasoning process between groups and individuals cannot be used to explain in detail the 
differences in performance. Nonetheless it is notable that these differences exist. 
The effect of the rule difficulty manipulation also generated differences between groups 
and individuals, but the explanation for them is even less clear and so it is difficult to 
draw any firm conclusions. In Experiment 3 there was a main effect of rule difficulty in 
groups as predicted, but no interaction with model type. However in Experiment 4 
individuals were not affected by negating the rules. 
Given the process that is hypothesised for groups with distributed mental models an 
interaction with model type would be expected. Its absence makes it difficult to 
understand what groups are actually doing with these problems. Similarly there is no 
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effect of rule difficulty in individuals, contrary to established findings of the affect of 
negation on reasoning performance. So it is not clear what individuals are doing in these 
problems too. These effects could simply be the result of a methodological artefact or 
they could be a genuine finding that negation is not found to be more difficult. Either 
way, with little evidence as to what process is being used in the two experiments it is 
difficult to be confident in any explanation of the difference between groups and 
individuals. Again though, the fact that differences have arisen is of interest. 
The number of moves manipulation was largely effective in both group and individual 
reasoning. Thus there are no differential effects to account for, as would be expected of 
a manipulation which does not alter the reasoning process qualitatively. Therefore no 
individual and group comparisons will be drawn here. 
The pattern of results for both the number of paths manipulation and the rule difficulty 
manipulation together suggest that there are qualitative differences in reasoning 
performance between groups and individuals. Groups are affected by rule difficulty but 
individuals are not whereas groups are not influenced by number of paths yet individuals 
are. The selective pattern of these effects implies that the influence of the manipulations 
on groups and individuals are not simply a matter of degree, they are differentially 
impacting on reasoning in groups compared to individuals. 
As no interactions were found between shared and distributed mental models in the 
group task it is impossible to distinguish between them and the comparison to 
individuals can only be made with groups. This is an interesting finding, but not a 
satisfying one because it does not differentiate whether sharing or distributing mental 
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models genuinely has no effect from the possibility that the manipulations here were 
flawed. Chapter 5 will continue to explore the possibility that there are qualitative 
differences between shared and distributed mental models. 
4.5 Conclusion 
These results are not conclusive but they show that individuals are affected by different 
sources of reasoning difficulty than groups. This is attributed to differences in their 
reasoning process. However no differences between shared and distributed mental 
models were found. In addition, there was more support for the collaborative process 
used by groups with distributed mental models. 
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Chapter 5 
The Effect of Number of Islands on Group Reasoning Process and 
Performance: A Qualitative Difference Between Shared and 
Distributed Mental Models 
5.1 Introduction 
The major question to arise from Chapter 4 concerned the exact nature of the 
collaborative process used by groups with distributed mental models. Experiment 2 had 
shown some support for the collaborative process that was initially proposed. 
Experiment 3 largely replicated this finding, yet no supplementary support for the 
process was found whilst attempting to further distinguish shared and distributed mental 
models through the differential impact of various sources of difficulty. Of the three 
sources of difficulty manipulated, number of paths was expected to be the factor which 
influenced the collaborative process. However it did not, nor did it show an interaction 
with model type. There are two possible explanations for this, either the manipulation 
was not effective or the current conceptualisation of the collaborative process is not 
accurate. This chapter will argue that 
it is the former and attempts to test a more 
effective manipulation. This is important 
because not only will it provide a critical test 
of the collaborative process but 
it might also demonstrate differences in performance 
between shared and distributed mental models caused by the differences in process. 
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The number of paths manipulation in Experiment 3 compared two sorts of problems. 
The many paths problems were designed so that from each island there were on average 
roughly twice as many possible moves that could be made than in the few paths 
problems. Experiment 1 had found that a large component of the process used by 
individuals in solving the task was searching for an island with the correct objects on for 
a legal move. Therefore it was predicted that if there were more islands with the correct 
objects on then one would be found faster and the task would be easier. This was 
confirmed in Experiment 4 which found that individuals were quicker at the problems 
with more possible moves. 
The process which groups were expected to use in the Shared condition was quite 
similar to this. SMMT predicts that group members use their complete mental models 
to solve the task independently and so generate similar expectations about the solution. 
Therefore they would perform essentially as individuals during the problem solving stage 
and only then confirm the answer with each other. However, the process which groups 
with distributed mental models were predicted to use is completely different and so they 
were expected to perform differently as a result. As participants do not have all of the 
information they cannot work out all the objects that are required and terminate their 
search when an appropriate island has been found. Instead each group member has a 
different set of possible islands based on the module which they hold but whether they 
are actually legal or not depends on the other modules too. They must find the islands 
which each agrees with in order to add all of the modules together. The largest 
component of this process is not the search for the island because group members 
cannot know independently which islands are legal moves. The major part is the 
discussion and elimination of possible islands to find the legal moves. 
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It was therefore predicted that the number of possibilities would have the opposite 
effect in groups using the collaborative process compared to groups solving the task 
more independently. Each possibility had to be discussed, so the more possibilities 
there are then the more discussion there must be and the greater the load on working 
memory required to keep track of them all. However this proved not to be the case. 
There was no interaction of number of paths with model type. 
On the other hand, it may be that this was not because groups with shared and 
distributed mental models do not solve the task as described above. The manipulation 
may have been flawed. The key factor in it was thought to be the number of possible 
moves as this is what the groups discuss. However, further consideration of the process 
suggests that this is not the case. The key factor is actually the difference in the number 
of possible islands and number of legal islands. This is because the purpose of 
collaboration is to reduce the set of possible islands to those that all group members 
agree with. The more reduction is required the longer and more involved the 
collaborative process must be. It is true that in this condition an individual solving the 
Many paths problems with one module will have more possibilities than in the Few 
paths problems. But there are also more legal moves. So the difference, the amount of 
reduction of possibilities, is in fact quite similar for both conditions. Therefore the use 
of the collaborative process will also 
be quite similar for both conditions. 
This suggestion is a plausible post hoc explanation of Experiment 3, but another 
experiment is needed to test it specifically. In order to 
differentially influence the 
collaborative process a manipulation must be used which allows problems with a large 
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difference in the number of possible and legal moves to be compared with a problem 
with a small difference. Thus possible moves must be manipulated independently of 
which moves are legal. 
One way of achieving this is to compare problems with the same number of legal moves 
but different numbers of possible moves. The absolute number of islands determines 
how many possibilities there are to discuss initially, so this factor could be altered whilst 
ensuring that there were always the same number of legal moves from each island in all 
of the problems. 
Groups with shared mental models will be influenced by the number of islands to some 
extent. If each group member solves the task independently then the search for the 
islands with the appropriate objects on will be slightly longer if there are eight islands 
than if there are five because it will be less likely that they will find the correct one 
immediately. However this effect will be minimal compared to the effect on groups 
with distributed mental models. They will have to discuss more in order to reduce the 
set of possible islands to the legal islands 
if there are more possible islands in the first 
place. This will take longer and the demand on working memory will be greater, making 
the many islands problems more difficult specifically because of the influence on the 
collaborative process. 
If this manipulation does cause an interaction with model type the above description of 
the processes used by groups with shared and distributed mental models will be 
supported. The lack of interaction 
in Experiment 3 can be attributed to a flawed 
manipulation. In addition it will demonstrate 
differences in performance between 
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shared and distributed mental models are attributable to the different processes they use. 
This kind of differential effect would begin to justify the study of distributed mental 
models as a distinct cognitive system rather than simply a sub-optimal one, as SMMT 
would suggest. 
This experiment will have two manipulations. As before there will be a manipulation of 
model. In the `Shared' condition each of the group members will have all of the task 
information. This allows them to develop fully shared mental models. In the 
`Distributed' condition each of the group members will have one-third of the 
information. This is the same Distributed manipulation as was used in Experiment 3, in 
that each group member holds one of the three modules uniquely but has no other 
information. The same manipulation is used partly for the reasons given in that 
experiment. As the model is entirely distributed there is no sharing at all, so any effects 
cannot be attributed to a partial sharing of mental models and as the most extreme form 
of distribution any benefits, problems or effects of distribution will be most evident. An 
added reason is that this experiment is an extension of the findings of that experiment 
which concerned distributed mental models and so the distribution should be replicated 
as far as possible. 
The second manipulation will be the number of islands. There will be two conditions. 
In one the problems will consist of five islands, the `Five island' condition, and in the 
other the problems will consist of eight islands, the `Eight island' condition. However 
they will both have the same number of legal moves from each island. These will test 
the hypothesis that it is the difference in the number of possible and legal moves which 
199 
influences the extent to which the collaborative process is used by groups with 
distributed mental models. 
The usual performance indices of time, number of errors and number of moves will be 
recorded and the group communication will be coded using the usual coding scheme. In 
addition a questionnaire will be used to measure group members subjective perceptions 
of the extent to which the group used the proposed collaborative process. 
The questionnaire consists of nine items which were developed to measure different 
parts of the collaborative process. The purpose of this questionnaire was to provide 
alternative evidence for the use of a distributed cognitive process in the groups. 
Hitherto the frequencies of communication codes indicative of the collaborative process 
have been used to test for a distributed cognitive process. This evidence is useful as it is 
based in the behaviour of the group. However it does presuppose that the theory on 
which the communication codes are based is valid. It is possible that groups are using 
those statements intending different meanings to those assumed by the theoretical 
framework. It is also possible that the participant's intended meaning is different from 
that interpreted by the coder. A questionnaire provides subjective evidence about 
whether the participants consider themselves to have acted using a distributed cognitive 
process. This new line of evidence will allow a triangulation of measurement methods. 
Each item refers to a different part of the collaborative process, for example suggesting 
possible conclusions in the knowledge that they would be refined and refining the 
possible conclusions of other group members. An example item is: `Did you offer initial 
ideas knowing that other members of the group would develop them? ' The measure is 
fully explained in the Method Section 5.2. 
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The number of islands manipulation is predicted to influence the collaborative process 
used by the groups and therefore the performance of the groups. Increasing the 
number of islands is intended to increase the number of possibilities that groups must 
consider. The more islands they reason about then the harder the task will be and the 
worse performance will be. As in the previous experiments three indices of 
performance will be used: time taken to complete the task, number of errors and 
number of moves required to complete the task. 
Hypothesis 1 a: The time taken to complete the task in the Five island condition will be quicker than in 
the Eight island condition. 
1 b: The number of errors in the Five island condition will be fewer than in the Eight island Hy 
condition. 
Hypothesis 1 c. The number of moves in the Five island condition will be fewer than in the Eight island 
condition. 
Experiments 2 and 3 both demonstrated that reasoning performance with modular 
distributed mental models is as effective as reasoning with shared mental models. 
Therefore no difference between these two model types is expected here. 
Hypothesis 2a: There will be no overall difference in the time taken to complete the task between the 
Shared and Distributed conditions. 
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Hypothesis 2b: There wild be no overall difference in the number of errors made between the Shared and 
Distributed conditions. 
Hypothesis 2c: There will be no overall difference in the number of mover required between the Shared 
and Distributed conditions. 
The number of islands manipulation is predicted to influence the collaborative process. 
The number of legal moves from each island is the same in both problems, but the 
number of possible moves is greater in the Eight island problem. Therefore more 
collaboration is necessary to reduce the set of possible islands to only the legal ones. 
Experiments 2 and 3 have shown that the Distributed condition requires more 
collaboration than the Shared condition, in line with the theory of distributed mental 
models. Therefore the effect of increasing island number will be greater in the 
Distributed condition than the Shared condition. 
Hypothesis 3a: There will be agreaterincreare in time taken to complete the Eight island than the 
Five island problems in the Distributed condition than the Shared condition. 
Given the extra time taken and the greater load on working memory caused by more 
collaboration it is predicted that there will 
be similar effects for the other performance 
indices. Hence: 
Hypothesis 3b: There will be a greater increase in the number of ermn in the Eight island than the Five 
island problems in the Distributed condition than the Shared condition. 
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Hypothesis 3c: There will be a greater increase in the number of moves made in the Eight island than 
the Five island problems in the Distributed condition than the Shared condition. 
The predictions concerning transfer of information between group members were 
supported in Experiments 2 and 3 so the same predictions will be made here. In the 
Shared condition group members have all of the information they require to solve the 
task and will not need to transfer information between them. Therefore there will be 
little communication of information. In the Distributed condition each group member 
has only one-third of the information and this is held uniquely. However it was found 
in Experiments 2 and 3 that groups with modular distributed mental models relied 
mostly on the collaborative reasoning process which does not require the transfer of 
information between group members - it operates by refining conclusions only. 
Therefore there will be little communication of information in this condition too. 
Hypothesis 4: The number of information and question-information statements in all of the conditions 
will be the same. 
The effect of number of islands is predicted to influence specifically the collaborative 
process by varying the number of possible islands under discussion and therefore 
specifically how much refining of suggested solutions is required. It does not influence 
the initial proposal or supporting of these solutions or their related questions. Thus 
there will not be any main effect of number of islands on the frequency of these 
statements. 
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Hypothesis S: The number of propose, support, quertion propo re and question-support statements will be 
the same in the Five island and Eight island conditions. 
The number of islands will, however, influence the refining of the proposed possible 
islands down to the final conclusions. If there are more islands then there are more 
possibilities to discuss. Therefore the higher number codes such as the and fourwill be 
more frequent in the Eight island condition than in the Five island condition. Although 
there might be number codes greater than four in the Eight island condition there 
cannot be any in the Five island condition, so the number codes greater than four will 
not be compared. The greater numbers of islands considered at once will provide more 
opportunities for reducing the numbers through hone statements and reject statements. 
So these are expected to be more frequent in the Eight island condition. Due to the 
greater number of possible islands in the Eight island condition it may be more 
common to increase the number under consideration, so widen statements are predicted 
to be more frequent as well. Finally, this increased amount of collaboration is likely to 
require longer chains of connected reasoning from different group members, so different 
statements are predicted to be more frequent. In addition, the question forms of each 
of these statements are predicted to be more frequent for the same reasons given for 
their non-question forms. 
Hypothesis 6: There will be agreater number of hone, eject, widen, question-bone, question-reject, 
question-widen, two, three, four and different statements in the Eight island condition than the Five 
island condition. 
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The model type manipulation in this experiment is the same as in Experiment 3 and 
similar to that in Experiment 2. It is therefore predicted to have the same effects on the 
frequency of communication codes in this experiment as in the previous ones, namely 
that there will be more of each communication code in the Distributed condition than 
the Shared condition with the exception of information statements which will be the same. 
The reasons for the increase in the Distributed condition are detailed in Chapter 4 and 
remain unchanged here so they will not be repeated in full. More prnpose statements are 
predicted because different group members have different information which leads them 
to have different ideas to suggest to the group. More support statements are predicted 
because there are more steps in the process and so more opportunity to provide 
support. More of the higher number statements such as two, three and fourare predicted 
because groups cannot directly state the final solution but must initially consider several 
alternatives as the partial information they each 
have provides evidence for several 
possibilities. More hone and reject statements are predicted because they are used to 
reduce the greater number of possible conclusions to the smaller number of certain 
conclusions. More widen statements are predicted because there are more likely to be 
possibilities unmentioned initially which are added 
by a group member in the 
Distributed condition because they have different information. Therefore more one 
statements are expected as these statements include hone, eject and widen statements 
referring to a single island. More 
different statements are predicted because the use of 
hone and reject statements imply that there are chains of related statements made by 
different people. In addition, the question forms of each of these statements are 
predicted to be more frequent 
for the same reasons given for their non-question forms. 
205 
Hypothesis 7: There will be greater number of each communication code (apart from information and 
question-information) in the Distributed condition than the Shared condition. 
The model type manipulation is predicted to affect the collaborative process such that it 
is used in the Distributed condition and not in the Shared condition. The number of 
islands manipulation is predicted to increase the amount of collaboration required. 
Therefore where there is collaboration, i. e. in the Distributed condition, this will be 
greater in the Eight island problems than the Five island problems. Where there is little 
collaboration, i. e. in the Shared condition, this manipulation will not have a great effect. 
In other words, there will be an interaction of model type with number of islands. This 
effect will be limited to those statements in the collaborative process that are affected by 
the number of islands manipulation. 
Hjpothesis 8: The numbers of hone, reject, widen, question-hone, question reject, question-widen, two, 
three, four and dif rent statements in the Distributed condition will be greater in the Eight island 
problems than the Five island problems. The frequencies of these statements in the Shared condition will 
be the same in the Eight island problems than the Five island problems. 
The questionnaire will measure participant's subjective impression of how much they 
used the collaborative process. Its findings are predicted to be in line with those of the 
communication codes. That is, the collaborative process will be used more with larger 
numbers of islands as there are more possibilities to discuss. 
Hypothesis 9: Scores on the questionnaire mid indicate greater collaboration in the Eight island than the 
Five inland pmblems. 
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Similarly, the collaborative process is predicted to be used more in the Distributed than 
the Shared condition because groups with distributed mental models rely on this process 
whereas groups with shared mental models are predicted not to. 
Hypothesis 10: Scores on the questionnaire will indicate greater collaboration in the Distributed than the 
Shared condition. 
Finally, because the Eight island problems require more collaboration than the Five 
island problems, but the Shared condition does not require the collaborative process 
whereas the Distributed condition does, there will be an interaction of number of islands 
with model type. 
Hypothesis 11: The scores indicating a collaborative process in the Distributed condition will be greater 
in the Eight island problems compared the Five islandemblems. But in the Shared condition they will 
be the same for Eight island and Five island problems. 
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Participants 
The participants were 48 students at the University of Surrey who volunteered to take 
part in the study. There were 33 female and 15 male participants. Their mean age was 
26.7 years with a standard deviation of 8.1 years. 
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5.2.2 Apparatus 
The task used was essentially the same as that in the previous experiments. Again it was 
altered slightly in order to test the specific hypotheses of the experiment and to 
incorporate some general improvements to the task. The alteration to test the 
hypotheses of this experiment was the creation of two five island problems. These 
consisted of the same three modules as used in Experiment 3, the same rules and objects 
on the islands and the same balanced mix of all the objects. There were five scrolls to 
be collected in each trial, one from each island. 
An improved feature of these tasks over those used previously was greater control over 
the possible moves. It was necessary to control the number of legal moves in order to 
test the hypothesis that it is the difference between the number of possible moves and 
the number of legal moves that is influential. From each island it was only possible to 
go to two islands (a different two depending on which island the group were situated at). 
Neither of these was ever the island with the scroll on. From one and only one of these 
intermediary islands it was possible to go to the goal island. Thus the problems were 
always solved in a minimum of two steps and there was only one optimal route. 
In addition to allowing the experimental hypotheses to be effectively tested, these 
constraints ensured the comparability of the problems and minimised the problem 
solving aspect of the task. With only one optimal legal route the scope for searching 
through alternative routes is reduced. Working out the legal routes alone was sufficient 
to unequivocally find the optimal solution. Therefore this potential confound was 
reduced. In addition to these problems two eight island problems were created. These 
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also had a minimum route of two moves and two possible intermediary islands even 
though there were more islands in total. Similarly only five scrolls were collected in the 
Eight island problems so that they were comparable to the Five island problems. The 
remaining three islands were treated as normal islands that could be used as intermediary 
points but did not have scrolls on them. 
The interface with computer was also improved. Participants were no longer required to 
enter any object they wished to take with them. All that was required was for them to 
click a button above the island indicating their destination. This information was not 
relayed to the other participant's monitors. They were merely informed if they had 
selected different islands. There were several reasons for this change. Firstly, allocating 
each participant with a particular module to attend to may implicitly give them a role and 
artefactually encourage a collaborative division by role. This was a particular concern in 
the Shared condition where it might cause groups to use a collaborative process and 
could have accounted for the similarity in performance between these the Shared and 
Distributed conditions. With the roles removed they would not be encouraged to do 
this and differences between the Shared and Distributed condition may emerge. 
Secondly, with less interaction with the computer participants are less likely to produce 
errors through use of the computers or spend extra time operating the computer. A 
source of noise should be removed from the data and measurements become more 
accurate. Finally, it allowed a simpler computer program which, in addition to extensive 
reprogramming of the task, improved the speed of the computer and so also removed 
noise. 
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The questionnaire that was developed to measure the subjective impressions of using the 
collaborative process consisted of nine items. These were created by the experimenter 
based on the theory outlined so far. They were intended to measure all aspects of the 
task. The items were: 
`Did you develop other group members' initial ideas? ' 
`Did any other group members only suggest completely correct solutions? ' R 
`Did you prefer to work out the solution as a group? ' 
Was collaboration a hindrance to solving the problem? ' R 
`Did you offer initial ideas knowing that other members of the group would develop 
them? ' 
`Did you sometimes suggest a solution using part of the information available to you 
knowing that another group member could check it using different parts of the task 
information? 
`Did other group members improve your ideas for a solution? ' 
`Did other group members offer ideas knowing that you could improve upon them? ' 
`Did you work out the solution yourself before discussing it with the other members of 
your group? ' R 
Beside each of these statements was a five point Likert scale from 1 to 5. At the top of 
the page these were labelled 1= Very true, 2= True, 3= Neither true nor untrue, 4= 
untrue, 5= Very untrue. The three items labelled 'R' above were reversed. They were 
included to prevent participants responding unthinkingly to the items. 
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5.2.3 Design 
A mixed design was used. There were two island number conditions, Five island and 
Eight island, and these were completed within subjects. There were two model type 
conditions, Shared and Distributed. These were completed between subjects. The 
conditions were manipulated using a fully crossed design. The order of the conditions 
consisted of alternating Five and Eight island problems. This order was then rotated 
using a Latin square design in order to counterbalance any order effects. 
5.2.4 Procedure 
The procedure was similar to Experiment 3. Initially participants completed one 
practice game as a group which consisted of four islands. During this they could ask 
questions and learn the rules of the task. They then completed four experimental trials. 
Two of these were Five island problems and two were Eight island problems. At the 
end of each trial they completed the questionnaire with reference to the trial they had 
just completed. In total the experimental session lasted three quarters of an hour. 
As before, in the Shared condition each of the participants had all of the information. 
In the Distributed condition each of the participants had only one-third of the 
information. The information they had comprised a complete module. The modules 
and rules were the same as in the `Affirmative' condition in Experiment 3. 
As in previous experiments the timing of all button clicks and movements of the boat 
were recorded on a database. All of the verbal communication during the experiment 
211 
was recorded, transcribed and coded according to the same coding scheme used 
throughout in order to compare the communication in different conditions. The 
transcripts were coded by the experimenter. A second coder, naive to the aims of the 
experiment, coded one-quarter of the transcripts in order that inter-coder reliability 
could be assessed. Cohen's Kappa (1960) was calculated to be 0.47. 
5.3 Results 
Hypotheses la-c predicted that increasing the number of islands would reduce the 
reasoning performance of the group. This was partially supported. Table 5.1 displays 
the mean time taken to complete the trials, the number of errors per trial and the 
number of moves per trial. Figure 5.1 presents the most interesting performance 
finding, the mean time taken. The time taken in the Eight island problems was 
significantly longer than in the Five island problems (F(1,14) = 17.08, p<0.01). There 
were significantly more errors (F(1,14) = 4.13, p<0.05, one-tailed) but there was no 
difference in the number of moves (F(1,14) = 0.66, p>0.05). 
Hypotheses 2a-c predicted that there would be no difference in reasoning performance 
between the Shared and Distributed conditions. This was supported. There was no 
significant difference in the time taken (F(1,14) = 0.31, p>0.05), the number of errors 
(F(1,14) = 0.32, p>0.05) nor the number of moves (F(1,14) = 1.58, p>0.05). 
Hypotheses 3a-c predicted that there would be an interaction of model type with number 
of islands. This was partially supported. There was a significant interaction in time 
taken (F(1,14) = 3.18, p<0.05, one-tailed). Planned comparisons using a Bonferroni 
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adjustment was used to investigate this further. They showed that the 8 island problems 
took significantly longer than the 5 island problems in the Distributed condition 
(t = -3.39, p<0.025) but there was no significant 
difference in the 8 and 5 island 
problems in the Shared condition (t = -2.41, p>0.025). There was no interaction in the 
number of errors (F(1,14) = 0.08, p>0.05) or of number of moves (F(1,14) = 1.48, 
p>0.05). 
Table 5.1 Mean time in seconds, mean number of moves and mean number of errors 
(standard deviations in parentheses) as a function of condition (Shared & Distributed, 
Five island & Eight island). 
Shared Distributed 
Five islands Eight islands Five islands Eight islands 
M (S. D. ) M (S. D. ) M (S. D) M (S. D. ) 
Time 39.49 49.82 35.29 61.29 
(9.73) (17.09) (8.04) (23.42) 
N4 of Errors 0.10 0.18 0.16 0.26 
(0.14) (0.24) (0.35) (0.34) 
N9 of Moves 2.00 2.13 2.14 2.11 
(0.00) (0.21) (0.16) (0.17) 
213 
70 
60 
5u 
40 
30 
20 
10 
U 
islands islands 
  Sh, lred 
0 Distnlnutcd 
Figure 5.1 Mean time to complete the task as a function of condition (Shared 
Distributed, live island & Fight island). 
I lypotheses 4 to 8 concerned the frequencies of the communication codes. 'fahle 5.2 
shows the mean number of statements of each communication code. Figure 7.2 displ; ºvvs 
the most theoretically interesting codes graphically. As in preVi()us chapters, in e, rdcr to 
reduce the number of codes being considered the implies codes were all treated using 
their implied meaning only. 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that there would be no differences in the numl, cr of in/önnfulmn 
and question-information statements. This was partially supported. 't'here was no 
significant difference between the Five island problems and the Iý: i ht islands problems 
for information statements (F(1,14) = 0.06, p>0.05) nor querlion-inföYnralion statt nicnts 
(F(1,14) = 0.23, p>O. 05). "1'herc was no significant difference in the freyucncy of 
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question-information statements between the Shared and Distributed conditions (F(1,14) = 
0.80, p>0.05) but there were more information statements in the Shared condition than 
the Distributed condition (F(1,14) = 12.93, p<0.01). 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that there would be no effect of number of islands on the number 
of propose, support, question propose and question-support statements. This was supported. 
There was no significant difference between Five and Eight island problems for propose 
statements (F(1,14) = 3.25, p>0.05), rapport statements (F(1,14) = 0.04, p>0.05), question- 
propose statements (F(1,14) = 2.98, p>0.05) nor question-support statements (F(1,14) = 0.06, 
p>0.05). 
Hjpothesis 6 predicted that there would be a greater number of hone, reject, widen, question- 
hone, question-reject, question-widen, two, three, four and different statements in the Eight island 
than the Five island problems. This received some support. In the Eight island 
problems compared to the Five island problems there were greater numbers of hone 
statements (F(1,14) = 16.46, p<0.01), rrject statements (F(1,14) = 3.85, p<0.05, one- 
tailed), widen statements (F(1,14) = 3.19, p<0.05, one-tailed) and different statements 
(F(1,14) = 4.63, p<0.05). But there was no significant difference in the frequency of 
question-hone statements (F(1,14) = 0.93, p>0.05), question-reject statements (F(1,14) = 1.00, 
p>0.05) or question-widen statements 
(F(1,14) = 1.00, p>0.05). There were significantly 
more two statements in the Five island problems than the Eight island problems, 
contrary to the prediction (F(1,14) = 
5.93, p<0.05). Three and four statements could not 
be analysed because there was no data in one of the conditions. 
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Hypothesis 7 predicted that there would be a greater number of each communication 
codes in the Distributed condition than the Shared condition, apart from information 
and question-information. This was mostly supported. There were significantly more 
propose statements (F(1,14) = 4.97, p<0.05), reject statements (F(1,14) = 17.40, p<0.01), 
hone statements (F(1,14) = 19.65, p<0.01), support statements (F(1,14) = 5.67, p<0.05), 
different statements (F(1,14) = 24.22, p<0.0001), one statements (F(1,14) = 11.47, p<0.01) 
and two statements (F(1,14) = 7.00, p<0.05). 
There were no significant differences in the frequencies of widen statements (F(1,14) = 
0.02, p>0.05), question propose statements (F(1,14) = 2.59, p>0.05), question-reject statements 
(F(1,14) = 1.00, p>0.05), question-hone statements (F(1,14) = 1.81, p>0.05), question-ssgpont 
statements (F(1,14) = 0.20, p>0.05) and question-widen statements (F(1,14) = 0.00, 
p>0.05). Three and four statements could not be analysed because there was no data in 
one of the conditions. 
Hjpothesis 8 predicted that there would be an interaction of model type with number of 
islands' for hone, reject, widen, question-hone, question-r ject, question-widen, two, three, four and 
different statements. This was mostly not supported. There was a significant interaction 
of hone statements (F(1,14) = 4.56, p=0.05). Planned comparisons using a Bonferroni 
adjustment was used to investigate this further. They showed that there were 
significantly more hone statements in the 8 island problems than the 5 island problems in 
the Distributed condition (t = -3.45, p<0.025) but there was no significant difference in 
the 8 and 5 island problems in the Shared condition (t = -2.18, p>0.025). There was no 
significant interaction in the frequency of reject statements (F(1,14) = 2.03, p>0.05), widen 
statements (F(1,14) = 0.02, p>0.05), question-hone statements (F(1,14) = 0.00, p>0.05), 
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question-rject statements (F(1,14) = 1.00, p>0.05), question-widen statements (F(1,14) _ 
0.00, p>0.05), two statements (F(1,14) = 1.72, p>0.05), nor different statements (F(1,14) _ 
0.73, p>0.05). Three and four statements could not be analysed because there was no data 
in one of the conditions. 
Table 5.2 Mean number of statements by communication code (standard deviations in 
parentheses) as a function of condition (Shared & Distributed, Five island & Eight 
island). 
Shared Distributed 
Five island Eight island Five island Eight island 
M (S. D. ) M (S. D. ) M (S. D. ) M (S. D. ) 
Information 3.38 3.69 1.00 0.38 
(1.90) (3.16) (1.53) (0.69) 
Question- 0.25 0.06 0.13 0.50 
information (0.38) (0.18) (0.35) (0.89) 
Propose 9.06 10.38 12.38 16.56 
(2.53) (4.51) (5.79) (7.05) 
Reject 2.13 2.94 7.81 12.94 
(1.16) (2.01) (3.01) (8.88) 
Hone 1.19 1.75 3.63 5.44 
(1.16) (1.36) (1.43) (1.94) 
Support 14.06 11.00 16.44 20.13 
(5.92) (3.16) (5.11) (8.14) 
Widen 0.56 1.00 0.63 1.00 
(0.68) (0.46) (0.74) (0.70) 
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Table 5.2 continued. 
Five island 
M (S. D. ) 
Shared 
Eight island 
M (S. D. ) 
Distributed 
Five island Eight island 
M (S. D. ) M (S. D. ) 
Question- 3.13 3.81 4.69 7.19 
propose (1.46) (2.66) (3.45) (5.49) 
Question-reject 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.13 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.18) (0.35) 
Question-hone 0.38 0.25 0.63 0.50 
(0.35) (0.38) (0.52) (0.53) 
Question- 0.50 0.25 0.50 0.63 
support (1.22) (0.53) (0.89) (1.16) 
Question widen 0.00 0.13 0.06 0.06 
(0.00) (0.23) (0.18) (0.18) 
Different 13.56 15.00 26.25 35.56 
(5.49) (4.03) (7.69) (13.31) 
One 25.56 29.69 41.69 57.69 
(6.87) (9.62) (14.04) (26.94) 
Two 2.19 1.69 4.69 3.00 
(1.73) (1.36) (2.46) (0.85) 
Three 0.00 0.13 0.44 2.56 
(0.00) (0.23) (0.42) (1.15) 
Four 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.31 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.88) 
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Figure 5.2 Communication codes (Information, Propose, Rejcct, I Ione, Support, 
Widen) as a function of condition (Shared & Distributed, Five island & ? fight island). 
The remaining data concerns the questionnaire. Before addressing the hypotheses it is 
necessary to assess the psychometric properties of the measure. Two features of the 
questionnaire will be assessed, its 
factor structure and its relial)ility. 
Before analysis the three reversed items were recoded so that they could he interpreted 
in the same direction as the other items, i. e. 5 was receded as 1,4 as 2 etc. 'I he. data 
from all of the conditions was analysed together. Principal components analysis was 
then used to extract a single factor. The component matrix coefficients are clispldyc, l in 
Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3 Component matrix coefficients for the questionnaire. 
Item Factor I 
......... ...... .................... .......... ..................... ..... ........................... . _.... .................. _.. . . _. _.. . `Did you develop other group members' initial ideas ?'0.81 ............... . .... 
`Did any other group members only suggest completely correct 0.30 
solutions? ' 
`Did you prefer to work out the solution as a group? ' 0.70 
Was collaboration a hindrance to solving the problem? ' 0.52 
`Did you offer initial ideas knowing that other members of the 0.73 
group would develop them? ' 
`Did you sometimes suggest a solution using part of the 0.70 
information available to you knowing that another group 
member could check it using different parts of the task 
information? ' 
`Did other group members improve your ideas for a solution? ' 0.79 
`Did other group members offer ideas knowing that you could 0.80 
improve upon them? ' 
`Did you work out the solution yourself before discussing it with 0.34 
the other members of your group? ' 
All of these coefficients are above 0.3 and seven of them are above 0.4. This suggests 
that they each load strongly onto this factor and support the single factor interpretation 
of the structure of this questionnaire. This factor can be labelled `collaborative process' 
in line with the theory from which it was developed. Notably the three lowest 
coefficients are the three reversed items suggesting perhaps that it is the opposite 
meaning of these items which caused them to load less strongly onto the single factor. 
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However the benefits of this type of item outweigh their relatively weaker loading on to 
the factor. The reliability of the scale was also calculated. Cronbach's alpha was found 
to be 0.80 which suggests a reliable scale. 
Having established that the psychometric properties of this questionnaire are acceptable 
as a reliable measure of a single factor the remaining hypotheses can be tested. The 
mean scores are displayed in Table 5.4. 
Hypothesis 9 predicted that scores on the questionnaire will indicate greater collaboration 
in the Eight island than the Five island problems. This was supported. Questionnaire 
scores were significantly lower in the Eight island problems than the Five island 
problems (F(1,46) = 5.12, p<0.05). A low score indicates greater use of the collaborative 
process. 
Hypothesis 10 predicted that scores on the questionnaire would indicate greater 
collaboration in the Distributed condition than the Shared condition. This was also 
supported. The scores were significantly lower in the Distributed than the Shared 
condition (F(1,46) = 1115.98, p<0.0001). 
Hypothesis 11 predicted that there would be an interaction of the number of islands with 
model type in the questionnaire scores. This was not supported. There was no 
significant interaction of model type with number of islands (F(1,46) = 0.52, p>0.05). 
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Table 5.4 Questionnaire scores as a function of condition (Shared & Distributed, Five 
island & Eight island). 
Shared Distributed 
Five island Eight island Five island Eight island 
M (S. D. ) M (S. D. ) M (S. D. ) M (S. D. ) 
Questionnaire 22.50 21.88 18.58 17.38 
Scores (4.65) (4.68) (4.31) (3.89) 
N. B. A low score indicates greater use of the collaborative process. 
5.4 Discussion 
The findings of this experiment replicate and develop those in Chapter 4. They do not 
fully support the theory of mental models in groups, but they do present an 
interpretable picture which also goes some way towards explaining the findings of 
previous experiments. Together they suggest the current position and conceptualisation 
of the task is overly simplistic and a more elaborate explanation is required. 
Hypotheses 1 to 3 considered the effect of number of islands and model type on group 
reasoning performance. Greater numbers of islands resulted in slower reasoning with 
more errors. This implies that the manipulation was effective in influencing the 
reasoning of groups, and possibly this occurred as predicted because the difference 
between the number of possible conclusions and the number of valid ones influences 
the collaborative process. This will be confirmed by examining the frequencies of 
communication codes and the questionnaire data below. 
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As in all of the previous studies there was no effect of model type on reasoning 
performance. This replication again confirms that modular distributed mental models 
are as effective as shared mental models when used by groups. The use of a between 
subjects design for this factor removes the possible confound that participants may learn 
the collaborative process in the Distributed condition and apply it in the Shared 
condition regardless of the information presented. This replication therefore provides 
stronger evidence for the equivalence of shared and modular distributed mental models 
than previous experiments. 
The interaction between number of islands and model type was weak but nonetheless 
present in the time taken to complete the task. This provides further support for the 
current description of the process used in the Shared condition and the collaboration in 
the Distributed condition. As this effect is interpreted as the specific influence of the 
manipulation on the collaborative process, it also implies that distributed mental models 
can be fruitfully studied as a qualitatively different system to shared mental models 
because of the different process used in reasoning. The support however is not strong 
and the frequencies of communication codes and questionnaire data indicate that these 
findings must be qualified. A more complex picture of group performance in the task 
emerges from this as will be highlighted below. 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 address communication codes but not those predicted to be 
influenced by the number of islands. They therefore do not reveal much about the lack 
of interaction between number of islands and model type. The similarity of propose and 
support statements along with their questions in all of the conditions is as expected. 
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However the greater number of information statements in the Shared condition and 
Distributed condition is in itself a surprising finding. Why would participants who know 
all of the information tell the group about it more than participants which were each 
lacking the majority of the relevant information? It seems most likely that this is a 
chance result. Perhaps participants offered information to provide evidence for their 
suggestions in the Shared condition and coincidentally they did this more than in the 
Distributed condition. This is a possibility, but there is no clear indication what exactly 
the reason for this result might be. The frequencies of these codes is low in both 
conditions so it does not seem that this is a large effect. It also contrasts with the 
findings of Experiments 2 and 3. Therefore it will be treated as a one off and not as a 
significant finding requiring the alteration of the current theory. 
Hypothesis 6 predicted that the communication codes used most in the collaborative 
process, hone, rrject, widen, diferent and the numbers above one, would be more frequent in 
the Eight island problems than the Five island problems. This received support, the 
hone, reject, widen and diferent statements were significantly more frequent. In comparison 
to the number of legal paths manipulation in Experiment 3 this is successful and it is 
interesting to note that the difference between the number of possible islands and the 
number of legal islands influences the collaborative process whereas the number of legal 
paths does not. This suggests that the lack of effects in Experiment 3 were due to a 
flawed manipulation rather than an incorrect description of the collaborative process. 
Not all of the communication codes are significantly different. The question statements 
can perhaps be attributed to a floor effect as the frequencies are all very low, with the 
exception of question propose. The greater number of two statements in the Five islands 
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problems is surprising. It is possible that as there were more islands in the Eight island 
problems the number of islands mentioned could more easily take a wider range of 
values, so the frequencies were spread out. In the Five island problems they were less 
likely to use three and fouras there were less possibilities, so the statements were all 
concentrated into the two category. Thus the statements which did not fit the predicted 
pattern are explainable and do not detract from the support for the effect of the 
number of islands manipulation on the collaborative process. 
Hypothesis 7 predicted that there would be more communication in the Distributed than 
the Shared condition. The results were largely as has been found in the previous 
experiments in which model type was manipulated. The exceptions to the predicted 
effects were widen statements and some question statements, as has also been found 
previously. The most likely explanation is again a floor effect and it seems that either 
this particular task does not encourage their use or they are generally not useful. But the 
more common communication codes are more frequent in the Distributed condition. 
This replication of Experiments 2 and 3 provides further evidence that groups in the 
Distributed condition use the collaborative process more than groups in the Shared 
condition. 
Hypothesis 8 predicted that there would be an interaction of the statements used in the 
collaborative process: hone, reject, widen, question-hone, question-reject, question-widen, two, three, 
four and diferent statements such that in the Distributed condition there would be more in 
the Eight island problems than the Five island problems, but in the Shared condition 
there would be no differences in frequency. However there was very little interaction 
between these two factors. Only the hone statements interacted, although the three and 
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four statements show the predicted pattern of interaction but could not be analysed as 
the statements were not used at all for the Five island problems in the Shared condition. 
The lack of interactions is a surprising result and suggests that the processes used in this 
task are not entirely as predicted. This issue will be returned to after the questionnaire 
data has been considered in order that all of the evidence can be brought to bear on the 
problem. 
Hypothesis 9 predicted that participants would report using the collaborative process 
more in the Eight island problems than the Five island problems. This was the case. 
Hypothesis 10 predicted that participants would report using the collaborative process 
more in the Distributed condition than the Shared condition. This was also the case. 
These findings corroborate the conclusions drawn from the communication code 
frequencies. Together they suggest that the collaborative process is used more by 
groups with distributed mental models compared to groups with shared mental models, 
as well as in problems with more islands. Questionnaire evidence has not been used in 
previous experiments and so this new source of data provides another line of evidence 
to support the argument that groups with distributed mental models rely on a 
collaborative process. As the questionnaire was based specifically on the proposed 
collaborative process, there is support for the current conceptualisation of it. It also 
provides more evidence that the number of islands manipulation was effective. 
Hypothesis 11 predicted that there would be an interaction of number of islands with 
model type such that in the Distributed condition the collaborative process would be 
reported more in the Eight island problems than the Five island problems, but in the 
Shared condition the process would be reported equally in the two problems. This was 
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not supported, a finding in line with the general lack of interactions of these factors in 
the communication codes. 
The overall pattern of the results indicates an effect of the number of islands on groups 
process and performance and an effect of model type on group process but not 
performance. This is as expected. The evidence for an interaction of these two factors 
is mixed however. There is an interaction in the time taken suggesting an influence on 
performance. There was an interaction in the number of hone statements which are 
central to the collaborative process, but not the other statements which are predicted to 
be important in it. There was no interaction in the questionnaire data. 
Together these results suggest that the manipulation was effective in influencing the 
collaborative process, unlike the number of paths manipulation in Experiment 3. There 
is further support for groups using a collaborative process to solve the task. But 
differences between the Shared and Distributed condition are not entirely as expected. 
It was predicted that groups in the Distributed condition would use the collaborative 
process and so require more collaboration to find the legal moves in the Eight island 
than the Five island problems. The frequencies of the relevant communication codes 
and the questionnaire data suggest this does occur. However the process predicted by 
SMMT suggests that the task would be solved largely independently, without 
collaboration. Sometimes this has occurred, for example the transcripts show that the 
first statement made by a group is sometimes the correct solution. However it does not 
seem always to have been the case. In this task, unlike previous experiments, there has 
been only one optimal solution so any group member working independently can 
unequivocally find the solution and so have the same expectations about it as the other 
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group members. If this was the process used then there would be no bone, reject, two or 
three statements. Yet there were. The most likely explanation is that a collaborative 
process was used in the Shared condition as well. 
It is possible to account for main effects of model type and number of islands but the 
lack of interaction if it is assumed that groups in the Shared condition collaborate to 
some extent, but less so than in the Distributed condition. They would have a lower 
frequency of the relevant communication codes and report less collaboration in the 
questionnaire than in the Distributed condition. In the Eight island problems when 
more collaboration is required, groups in the Shared condition also engage in more 
collaboration. But this is still at a lower level than groups in the Distributed condition. 
Therefore there are main effects of both factors, but no interaction. 
However some interactions were found, in particular the interaction of hone statements. 
In both Experiment 3 and this experiment it is the only communication code which was 
found to have a significant interaction of model type and problem. The implication is 
that this code is unique to the Distributed condition but the other codes are not. 
Therefore it interacted strongly whereas the other codes did not. Perhaps the 
interaction of hone frequencies, and what appears from the data to be a weak trend 
towards similar interactions in the other statements, contributed to the interaction in 
time taken. 
This explanation weakens the conclusions which can be drawn from these experiments. 
It is possible that the non-significant differences in reasoning performance between the 
Shared and Distributed condition are the result of groups in the Shared condition using 
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a collaborative process similar to the Distributed condition. Therefore there are not two 
separate processes used by shared mental models and distributed mental models 
respectively that lead to similar reasoning performance. But this conclusion cannot be 
entirely justified as it is also consistently found that the groups in the Distributed 
condition use the collaborative process more. So although the manipulation may not 
lead to completely different processes, it does result in significantly different amounts of 
collaboration and it is interesting that this does not then lead to differences in reasoning 
performance. 
Perversely this finding is quite supportive of the general argument of the thesis that 
group reasoning can typically be characterised as a 
distributed cognitive process. 
Groups in the Shared condition can easily form shared mental models but they do not. 
So although this explanation weakens the specific manipulations of the experiment it 
actually lends some weight to the argument that groups spontaneously collaborate as 
described, thus relying on a distributed cognitive process. In this case collaboration is 
used even when there is opportunity to avoid 
it. 
Another factor which adds interest to the differences between the Shared and 
Distributed condition is the significant interaction of hone statements. This implies that 
whereas the other communication codes may 
be used to a lesser extent in the Shared 
condition, this code is not. In other words, the collaborative processes used 
in the two 
conditions are not the same. Both may rely on reject statements, 
for example, but bone is 
unique to the Distributed condition. 
It is possible to see that this code is influenced by 
modular distribution in particular. 
Modularity allows certain conclusions to be drawn 
not all of which can be supported. In other words there 
is a tendency to propose a 
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wider set of possibilities and narrow these down. The three and four statements could not 
be analysed, but their means suggest an interaction which would support this analysis. 
They imply more suggestions are made which can be honed in the Eight island 
problems in the Distributed condition. Seemingly there is not the same tendency to use 
hone statements in collaboration in the Shared condition. 
The picture which emerges in this explanation is not a simple as that originally painted. 
The question is not to what extent groups use the collaborative process, but which 
collaborative process they use. There are apparently some similarities between that used 
in the Shared condition and the Distributed condition, but also some differences - 
specifically the hone statements. These differences may be caused by the modular nature 
of the distribution in the Distributed condition. It is reasonable now to ask how other 
types of distribution could affect the collaborative process and the resulting group 
performance. 
It is also not clear what collaboration is being used in the Shared condition. Groups 
have all of the information to form shared mental models, but they apparently do not 
use them. Yet they collaborate less than in the Distributed condition. Therefore they 
must be using a slightly different process to those suggested so far for either of the 
information sharing conditions. In order to correctly interpret the experiments in this 
thesis which have used the Shared manipulation this question must be answered. 
Chapter 6 will address the issue. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
There are two main conclusions which can be drawn from this experiment. Firstly, 
groups are influenced by the difference between the number of islands and the number 
of legal moves. This affects both reasoning performance and process and provides 
some support for the proposed collaborative process. It also showed some interaction 
with model type, indicating that it differentially affects shared and distributed mental 
models. Secondly, evidence was found suggesting that groups in the Shared condition 
used a collaborative process as well as groups in the Distributed condition. Although 
this weakens the argument about similarity of reasoning performance in groups with 
shared and distributed mental models, it still carries some weight as there is significantly 
more collaboration in the Distributed condition. The findings also suggest that modular 
distributed mental models generate a different collaborative process to that used in the 
Shared condition. Therefore it is more appropriate to consider not simply the extent of 
collaboration, but what differences there are in the process resulting from which aspects 
of the distribution. 
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Chapter 6 
Shared and Partial Information in Groups: Testing the Shared Process 
6.1 Introduction 
The final experiment in this thesis will test the process used to solve the task in the 
Shared condition. The main focus of the experiments so far has been the Distributed 
condition in which groups have distributed mental models. The collaborative process 
used by groups in this condition has been studied and understanding of it has developed. 
These conditions have been constructively compared with Shared conditions in which 
all of the group members have all of the information. Therefore in these conditions 
they can, in principle, form shared mental models and reason independently. SMMT 
predicts that groups with shared mental models will complete the task with little 
communication, relying instead on their mental models to form expectations of the task 
and each other. However previous chapters have noted that simply allowing groups the 
opportunity to form shared mental models does not ensure that they do so. If in fact 
they do not then the interpretation of some of the findings of previous experiments 
could be altered. 
All of the previous experiments have shown no difference in the reasoning performance 
of groups in the Shared and Distributed conditions. This has been interpreted as 
surprising evidence for the effectiveness of the collaborative process used by groups in 
the Distributed condition because it refutes the SMMT prediction that fully shared 
information will be superior to distributed information. If the similarity occurs because 
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both conditions are using similar collaborative processes though then the result will not 
be as important. Experiments 3 and 5 found weak and non-existent interactions 
between problems and model type where the problem was predicted to affect the 
collaborative process and therefore exclusively the Distributed condition. These might 
have been missing because groups in the Shared condition also relied on collaboration. 
Therefore inferences about the collaborative process used by groups with distributed 
mental models that are based on these findings may be wrong. If these results are to be 
correctly understood then it is necessary to test the Shared process to discover what 
groups actually do in the Shared condition. 
The current conceptualisation of the process used in the Shared condition is based on 
the tenets of SMMT. These state that if group members have compatible mental 
models they will be able to form common expectations of the task. As a result the 
group members are aware of each others' needs and intentions in completing the task, 
so behaviour will be coordinated with little communication. In the Shared condition of 
the experiments in this thesis all group members have all of the information available to 
them. This allows them to form shared mental models. Therefore they can 
independently complete all of the reasoning and solve the task without collaborating 
with other group members. This can be done effectively in this experiment because the 
task used is the same as in Experiment 5; there is only one optimal solution and so there 
are no alternatives to discuss. They will each do this and so form common expectations 
about the solution and the behaviour required to implement it. In principle very little 
communication is required in the Shared process - this is the reason that shared mental 
models are considered beneficial. 
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This experiment will test whether groups use the Shared process or not. In order to do 
this a representation of information in the group will be employed that has not been 
used in previous experiments. Previously Shared and Distributed conditions have been 
tested. In the Shared condition there are actually several shared models because the rule 
is applied separately for each pair of islands to discover if it is legal to move from one to 
the other and so different models are formed for each. This enables group members in 
principle to find the optimal route, which depends on several moves, independently. In 
the Distributed condition each of these models is distributed. Therefore they 
collaborate to discover if moves are legal and find the optimal route. However it is 
possible to give group members all of the model on only some of the islands. In other 
words some of the islands would have all of the 
information and some of the islands 
would have none. This situation will be referred to as `Partial information'. It is a 
contrived situation as it is neither Shared nor Distributed in the sense intended by either 
theory, but it does allow the Shared process to be tested. 
With Partial information it is possible to firmly conclude that a move is legal between 
two islands if there is information present about them but impossible to draw even a 
tentative conclusion if information is missing on one or both of the islands. Therefore 
it is possible for a group member to find a whole two step route if information about 
the current, correct intermediary and goal island is represented. If information about 
one or more of those islands 
is missing then it will not be possible to solve the whole 
problem independently. Problems of these two types will be used in this task. 
Problems in which a group member can find the whole correct route are referred to as 
`Within' problems and problems in which it is not possible for an individual to 
independently find the whole route are referred to as Between' problems. If group 
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members do seek to find the whole solution independently as predicted by the Shared 
process then they will perform better on the Within problems than the Between 
problems. If they do not then there will be no difference. 
Based on the collaborative processes used by groups with shared and distributed mental 
models it is possible to predict how groups with Partial information will collaborate. 
Participants will consider the information they have initially and discover some legal 
moves if they know about the current island and some other islands. According to 
SMMT group members seek to solve the task independently. Thus if it is a Within 
problem they know about the current, intermediary and goal island and will be able to 
find the optimal solution and propose this to the group. They can do this with 
confidence because they know about all three modules on the islands and so can, in 
principle, firmly conclude whether the move is legal. The other group members will see 
the validity of the solution if they have some of the relevant islands and so support it. 
The process used in these problems is therefore predicted to be the same as in the 
Shared condition, if group members seek to perform as SMMT predicts. 
If the group has a Between problem no individual will be able to find the whole solution 
independently. But they will still be able to consider the information they have initially 
and discover some legal moves if they 
know about the current island and some other 
islands. These they can propose to the group having concluded they are legal based on 
all three modules. However individual participants do not know about all of the islands 
so it is quite possible that some of the other 
islands are also legal moves. The other 
group members will therefore collaborate by adding these other islands to those under 
consideration until a combination of islands is found which is an optimal route. 
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Statements which add islands are coded as widen. Therefore, unlike the Shared and 
Distributed conditions of previous experiments, widen statements are predicted to be 
common in groups with Partial information solving Between problems. This distinctive 
feature of the collaborative process will indicate if it is being used. Having established 
the legal moves in this way a search through the task's small problem space is required to 
find the optimal solution, as in previous Distributed conditions. 
There are two manipulations in this experiment. One manipulation concerns the 
sharing of information. In the `Shared' condition each of the group members has all of 
the information, as in previous experiments. In the `Partial' condition each of the group 
members has information on only five of the eight islands. But they are given 
information about all three modules on those islands as described above. They are given 
no information at all about the remaining three islands apart from the fact that they 
exist. Each of the group members knows about a different set of islands so information 
about each of the islands is known by at least one group member. As well as these 
conditions there are two problem types. The same problems are completed in the 
Shared and Partial conditions, but the manipulation is only effective in the Partial 
condition because it relies on the division of information to influence whether group 
members can reason independently. In the Within' problems the solutions are arranged 
so that one person has information about the current island, intermediary island and 
goal island. Therefore, in principle, they can 
find the optimum solution independently. 
In the `Between' problems the solutions are arranged so that no person can find the 
optimal solution on the basis of the 
knowledge they are given. One person is given 
information about the current island and intermediary island. A second person has 
information about the intermediary island and goal island. Between them they can find 
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the optimal solution. The third group member knows only about the current island and 
the goal island and therefore cannot solve the problem. 
These manipulations are predicted to affect the process and performance of the groups. 
If groups do seek to solve the task with minimal collaboration as SMMT suggests then 
there will be critical differences between the Within and Between problems in the Partial 
condition. Groups solving the Within problems will be able to rely on the Shared 
process to some extent whereas groups solving the Between problems will not. These 
results can be compared with the Shared condition to discover if there are similarities. 
The process used in the Partial condition is largely the same as that in the Shared 
condition for the Within problems and differs only for the Between problems. It is 
predicted that more communication is required in the Between problems and so these 
problems will take longer than the Within problems in the Partial condition. However 
the Between and Within problems are only distinguishable in the Partial condition. In 
the Shared condition the same problems are used but as each group member has all of 
the information then all the problems are effectively Within. Therefore both Within 
and Between problems will take less time in the Shared condition than Between 
problems in the Partial condition. 
With this increase in time and communication there is more scope for other errors as 
more has to be remembered by the group. Therefore an interaction is predicted in 
reasoning performance between information sharing type, Shared or Partial, with 
problem type, Within or Between. 
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Hypothesis 1 a: The time taken to complete the Between problems will begreater than the Within 
problems in the Partial condition. There will be no difference in time between Within and Between 
problems in the Shared condition. 
Hypothesis 1 b: The number of errors made in the Between problems will be greater than the Within 
problems in the Partial condition. There will be no difference in the number of errorr made between 
Within and Between problems in the Shared condition. 
Hypothesis 1 c: The number of moves required in the Between problems will be greater than the Within 
problems in the Partial condition. There will be no dif erence in the number of mover required between 
Within and Between problems in the Shared condition. 
However the collaborative process in the Partial condition only differs from the Shared 
condition for Between problems, not Within problems. Therefore there is not 
predicted to be an overall difference in reasoning performance between the Shared and 
Partial conditions. 
Hypothesis 2a: There will be no diference in the time taken to complete the task in the Shared and 
Partial conditions. 
Hypothesis 2b: There will be no diference in the number of errors made in the Shared and Partial 
conditions. 
Hypothesis 2c. " There wild be no diTeerence in the number of moves required in the Shared and Partial 
conditions. 
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As Between and Within problems are only distinguishable in the Partial condition it is 
not meaningful to analyse these problems as an independent factor because the 
problems are only Within and Between in one of the information sharing conditions 
In the Shared condition group members have all of the information they require to solve 
the task and so will not need to transfer information between them. Therefore there 
will be little communication of information. Similarly in the Partial information 
condition group members have all of the information they require to calculate whether 
any particular move is legal, so it is unlikely that they will transfer much information. It 
is possible that they could communicate all that is known about an island to another 
group member who knew nothing about that island, but given the lack of information 
transfer in previous experiments this does not seem to be a desirable strategy and so is 
not predicted to be useful in this experiment either. The changes to the process in the 
Partial condition for Between and Within problems are not predicted to affect the 
transfer information, so there is no predicted interaction of information sharing with 
problem type either. 
Hypothesis 3: The number of information and question-information statements in the Shared and 
Partial conditions mill be the same. There will be no interaction of information sharing with problem 
type. 
There will however be differences in the propose, support, widen, question propose, question- 
support and question-widen statements. In the Shared condition these are expected to be 
used infrequently. The problem is solved independently and proposed to the group, the 
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group supports it and there is little other communication. Thus the numbers of propose 
and support statements and their related questions are low and there is no need for widen 
statements at all. In the Partial condition the process used to solve the Within problems 
is predicted to be similar. All group members will try and solve the problem and the 
one with the islands necessary to find the solution will do so independently and propose 
the answer, it will then be supported and the move made. Again all of these codes are 
needed only infrequently. 
Groups in the Partial condition solving the Between problems are expected to use a 
different collaborative process though. Individual group members will be able to 
propose some islands, as in the other conditions. However they do not have all of the 
information and so cannot find the solution independently. Therefore other group 
members will suggest different islands as possible moves in the attempt to find the 
solution. This means that the number of widen statements and question-widen statements 
will increase. As these statements follow earlier ones there will be longer chains of 
related statements about the reasoning. Therefore it is expected that there will be more 
different statements. 
The solution is not proposed in one statement, there are proposals for each step of the 
process. So there will be greater use of propose and question ptnpose statements. Similarly 
there will be more support and question-support statements as these proposals can be 
supported by other group members. 
The number of islands discussed will also be greater in the Partial condition for Between 
problems. There will be more one statements because of the increased number of all of 
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the above codes. There will also be more two statements because groups will not find 
the correct solution directly but will consider the legal moves before finding the 
solution. 
All of these statements will be more common in the Partial condition than the Shared 
condition when groups solve Between problems, but not when they solve Within 
problems. Therefore there will be an interaction between information sharing and 
problem type. 
Hypothesis 4: The number of propose, support, widen, dfferent, one, two, question propose, question- 
support and question-widen statements will be greater in the Between problems than the Within 
problems in the Partial condition. There will be no diference in the frequencies of these statements 
between Within and Between problems in the Shared condition. 
However as the difference in collaborative process only arises in the Partial condition 
with Between problems there is not predicted to be an overall difference in the 
frequency of these communication codes between the Shared and Partial conditions. 
Hypothesis 5: There will be no diference in the frequency ofpmpose, support, widen, diferent, one, two, 
question propose, question-support and question-widen statements in the Shared and Partial conditions. 
Hone and reject statements and their predictions have been found to be used in the 
Distributed condition of previous experiments. In these conditions group members 
have only part of the information required to conclude whether a move is legal and so 
they suggest possible conclusions which are eliminated or supported leaving only firm 
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conclusions. However in both the Shared and Partial conditions of this experiment the 
group members have all of the information required to confidently conclude whether an 
individual move is legal or not. They will therefore not need to eliminate tentative 
conclusions and so will not use hone or reject statements. Also the number codes above 
two are not predicted to be used in this task. Group members are able to work out the 
legal moves independently. From each island there are two legal moves and so there will 
not be a situation in which a number more than two will be required. Therefore it is 
predicted that these statements will not be used in any of the conditions and so there 
will be no differences in the conditions or interactions between them. 
Hjpothesis 6: The number of hone, r ject, the numbers three and above question-hone and question-reject 
statements in the Shared and Partial conditions will be the same. There ill be no interaction of 
information sharing with pmblem type. 
In addition to measures of performance and frequencies of communication code the 
questionnaire that was developed in Chapter 5 will be used. This measures each group 
member's subjective opinion about how much they relied on a collaborative process in 
order to complete the task. Previous hypotheses predicted that in the Partial condition 
solving the Between problems there will be more collaboration than in the other 
conditions. This is expected to be reflected in the questionnaire scores as well. 
Hypothesis 7: Scores on the questionnaire will indicate greater collaboration in the Between problems 
than the IVithin problems in the Partial condition. There will be no dif rence in the scones between 
Within and Between problems in the Shared condition. 
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However as before, the difference in collaborative process only arises in the Partial 
condition with Between problems there is not predicted to be an overall difference in 
the scores between the Shared and Partial conditions. 
Hypothesis 8: There will be no difference in the scores between Shared and Partial conditions. 
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Participants 
The participants were 48 students at the University of Surrey who volunteered to take 
part in the study. There were 32 female and 16 male participants. Their mean age was 
25.1 years with a standard deviation of 6.3 years. 
6.2.2 Apparatus 
The same basic task was used as in previous experiments, with some alteration to the 
display of the information and the position of the scrolls in order to test the exact 
hypotheses. The task used the same eight island problem as was used in Experiment 5. 
As before, the position of the islands were changed to create trials of equal difficulty. In 
total four trials were made by using different locations for each of the six scrolls. As the 
problem from Experiment 5 was used it was only possible to go to two other islands 
from any particular island, one of which allowed a legal move to the next scroll. 
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The manipulation of the problems exclusively involved the Partial condition. In the 
Partial condition each group member was given information about five of the eight 
islands. The remaining three islands were blank so that the participant knew they existed 
but nothing further. As each participant knew about a different five islands all of the 
information was represented in the group. 
As described above, each solution required two steps - from the current island to an 
intermediary island and from the intermediary island to the goal island. So to find the 
optimal solution independently a participant must have information about all of these 
three islands. In the Within' problems one person could work out the optimal solution 
independently but the other two could not. There were six scrolls to pick up and the 
distribution of the information was such that each person could work out the optimal 
move on two occasions. There was no particular order to this so participants could not 
learn whose `turn' it was to solve the problem. In the Between' problems no individual 
could ever independently solve the problem on the basis of the information initially 
given. Instead one person knew information about the current island and the 
intermediary island, one person knew about the intermediary island and the goal island 
and the third person knew about the current island and the goal island. So between 
person one and two they could work out the optimal move. Again there were six scrolls 
so the pairs were given the relevant information twice in all combinations, in no 
particular order. 
The same problems were used in the Shared condition, but each participant had all of 
the information which meant that they were not distinguishable as Within and Between. 
In effect they all became Within as they could all, in principle, be solved independently. 
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6.2.3 Design 
A mixed design was used. There were two problem type conditions, Within and 
Between. These were completed within subjects. There were two model type 
conditions, Shared and Partial. These were completed between subjects. The 
conditions were manipulated using a fully crossed design. The order of the conditions 
consisted of alternating Within and Between problems. This order was then rotated 
using a Latin square design in order to counterbalance any order effects. 
6.2.4 Procedure 
The procedure was similar to Experiment 5. Initially groups completed two practice 
game which consisted of four islands. During these they could ask questions and learn 
the rules of the task. They then completed four experimental trials with six scrolls in 
each. Two of these were Within problems and two were Between problems. At the 
end of each trial they completed the questionnaire with reference to the trial they had 
just completed. In total the experimental session lasted three quarters of an hour. 
As before, in the Shared condition each of the participants had all of the information. 
In the Partial condition each of the participants had all of the information about only 
five of the eight islands. They had no information about the remaining three islands, 
they only knew that they existed. The modules and rules were the same as in 
Experiment 5. 
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As in previous experiments the timing of all button clicks and movements of the boat 
were recorded on a database. All of the verbal communication during the experiment 
was recorded, transcribed and coded according to the same coding scheme used 
throughout in order to compare the communication in different conditions. The 
transcripts were coded by the experimenter. A second coder, naive to the aims of the 
experiment, coded one-quarter of the transcripts in order that inter-coder reliability 
could be assessed. Cohen's Kappa (1960) was calculated to be 0.83. 
6.3 Results 
Hypotheses la-c predicted that there would be an interaction between information sharing 
and problem type affecting reasoning performance. This was not supported. Table 6.1 
displays the mean time taken to complete the trials, the number of errors per trial and 
the number of moves per trial. There was no interaction in the time taken (F(1,14) = 
0.08, p>0.05), the number of errors (F(1,14) = 1.34, p>0.05) nor the number of moves 
(F(1,14) = 1.10, p>0.05). 
Hypotheses 2a-c predicted that there would be no effect of information sharing on the 
performance of the group. This was partially supported. There was no difference in the 
time taken between conditions (F(1,14) = 0.22, p>0.05) nor the number of moves 
(F(1,14) = 0.19, p>0.05). But there were significantly more errors made in the Shared 
condition than the Partial condition (F(1,14) = 6.47, p<0.05). 
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Table 6.1 Mean time in seconds, mean number of moves and mean number of errors 
(standard deviations in parentheses) as a function of condition (Shared & Partial, Within 
& Between). 
Shared Partial 
Within Between Within Between 
M (S. D. ) M (S. D. ) M (S. D. ) M (S. D. ) 
Time 49.84 44.56 45.79 42.32 
(17.72) (11.26) (14.56) (13.87) 
N4 of Errors 0.18 0.11 0.03 0.03 
(0.16) (0.12) (0.04) (0.04) 
N4 of Moves 2.17 2.02 2.08 2.04 
(0.31) (0.06) (0.09) (0.12) 
Hypotheses 3 to 6 concerned the communication codes. Table 6.2 shows the mean 
number of statements of each communication code. Figure 6.1 presents the most 
theoretically important codes graphically. As in previous chapters, in order to reduce the 
number of codes being considered the implies codes were all treated using their implied 
meaning only. 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that there would be no effect of information sharing on the 
number of information and question-information statements and no interaction with problem 
type. This was partially supported. There were more information statements in the 
Shared than the Partial condition (F(1,14) = 16.81, p<0.01) but there was no interaction 
with problem type (F(1,14) = 0.24, p>0.05). 
Question-informatzon statements could not be 
analysed because there was no 
data in one of the conditions. 
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Hypothesis 4 predicted that there would be an interaction between information sharing 
and problem type affecting the frequency of propose, sußport, widen, dierent, one, two, 
questionprompose, question-support and question widen statements. This was mostly not 
supported. There was no significant interaction in propose statements (F(1,14) = 0.52, 
p>0.05), support statements (F(1,14) = 0.47, p>0.05), widen statements (F(1,14) = 2.36, 
p>0.05), di, fferent statements (F(1,14) = 0.73, p>0.05), one statements (F(1,14) = 0.82, 
p>0.05) nor question propose statements (F(1,14) = 0.01, p>0.05). There was however the 
predicted interaction of two statements (F(1,14) = 11.34, p<0.01). Planned comparisons 
using a Bonferroni adjustment was used to investigate this further. They showed that 
there were no significant differences in the number of two statements between the 8 
island problems and the 5 island problems in the Distributed condition (t = -1.08, 
p>0.025) nor were there significant difference in the 8 and 5 island problems in the 
Shared condition (t = -1.66, p>0.025). Question-support and question-widen statements 
could not be analysed because there was no data in one of the conditions. 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that there would be no effect of information sharing on the 
number of purpose, support, widen, dieren one, two, question propose, question-support and 
question-widen statements. This was supported. There was no difference in the frequency 
of propose statements (F(1,14) = 2.09, p>0.05), support statements (F(1,14) = 1.60, 
p>0.05), widen statements (F(1,14) = 0.38, p>0.05), dfferent statements (F(1,14) = 1.46, 
p>0.05), one statements (F(1,14) = 2.03, p>0.05), two statements (P(1,14) = 0.00, p>0.05) 
nor question propose statements (F(1,14) = 0.14, p>0.05). As before question-support and 
question-widen statements could not be analysed because there was no data in one of the 
conditions. 
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Hypothesis 6 predicted that there would be no effect of information sharing on the 
number of hone, reject, question-hone and question-reject statements and no interaction with 
problem type. This was mostly supported. There was no difference in the frequency of 
hone statements (F(1,14) = 0.47, p>0.05) but there were significantly more reject 
statements in the Shared condition than the Partial condition (F(1,14) = 5.59, p<0.05). 
Question-bone and question-reject statements and the numbers three and above could not be 
analysed because there was no data in some of the conditions. 
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Table 6.2 Mean number of statements by communication code (standard deviations in 
parentheses) as a function of condition (Shared & Partial, Within & Between). 
Shared Partial 
Within Between Within Between 
M (S. D. ) M (S. D. ) M (S. D. ) M (S. D. ) 
Information 2.19 2.19 6.75 7.44 
(2.64) (2.33) (3.00) (3.04) 
Question- 0.13 0.00 2.81 2.88 
information (0.35) (0.00) (2.15) (1.89) 
Propose 14.75 15.38 13.19 12.06 
(5.32) (4.57) (3.88) (2.15) 
Reject 5.31 4.50 2.88 1.63 
(4.12) (2.36) (1.94) (1.25) 
Hone 2.81 2.31 1.56 2.38 
(2.12) (2.48) (1.47) (1.03) 
Support 12.50 11.63 10.25 7.81 
(6.93) (5.90) (4.28) (3.39) 
Widen 1.44 1.06 2.31 1.00 
(1.27) (1.68) (1.77) (0.93) 
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Table 6.2 continued. 
Within 
M (S. D. ) 
Shared 
Between 
M (S. D. ) 
Within 
M (S. D. ) 
Partial 
Between 
M (S. D. ) 
Question- 3.56 3.94 3.13 3.38 
propose (3.34) (2.48) (2.46) (3.22) 
Question-reject 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.18) (0.00) (0.00) 
Question-hone 0.31 0.06 0.00 0.13 
(0.37) (0.18) (0.00) (0.23) 
Question- 0.31 0.38 0.44 0.44 
support (0.46) (0.58) (0.82) (0.82) 
Question- 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 
widen (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) , 
(0.18) 
Different 18.19 17.00 15.13 11.38 
(9.52) (8.90) (7.42) (4.32) 
One 38.69 36.88 32.94 25.69 
(17.26) (12.94) (12.95) (8.81) 
Two 1.94 1.94 0.81 3.06 
(2.35) (2.11) (0.84) (1.45) 
Three 0.38 0.50 0.00 0.13 
(0.88) (1.22) (0.00) (0.35) 
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Figure 6.1 Communication codes (Information, Propose, Reject, I cone, Support, 
Widen) as a function of condition (Shared & Partial, Within & Between). 
IHypothesis 7 predicted that there would be an interaction between information sharing 
and problem type affecting the questionnaire scores. This was not supported. There 
was no interaction in the questionnaire scores 
(1, (1,14) = 0.54, j)>U. OS). 
I Hypothesis 8 predicted that there would be no effect of information sharing on the 
questionnaire scores. This was not supported. 
There was greater coll, ihorati"n, 
indicated by lower scores on the questionnaire, in the Shared condition than the 
condition (F(1,14) = 4.20, p<0.05). 
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Table 6.3 Questionnaire scores as a function of condition (Shared & Partial, Within & 
Between). 
Shared Partial 
Within Between Within Between 
M (S. D. ) M (S. D. ) M (S. D. ) M (S. D. ) 
Questionnaire 21.38 20.50 18.77 18.48 
Scores (3.95) (3.81) - (4.21) (4.56) 
6.4 Discussion 
The findings of this experiment provide almost no support that the Shared process 
predicted by SMMT is actually used in the Shared condition. Most of these results 
showed non-significant differences where significant differences were expected, but 
some showed significant differences in the opposite direction to that predicted. From 
this it is possible to conclude that a different process is used in the Shared condition to 
that expected and the findings suggest one alternative explanation. 
Hypotheses 1 a-c concerned the reasoning performance of the groups, predicting that in 
the Shared condition and the Within problems in the Partial condition the task would be 
solved independently as SMMT suggests. However this would not occur in Partial 
condition with Between problems because no individual had all of the relevant 
information. As a result an interaction between information sharing and problem type 
was expected. However, no interaction was found. This implies that groups did not 
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illf 
take the opportunity to solve the task independently when it was possible to do so and 
therefore the shared process predicted by SMMT was not used in these conditions. 
Hypotheses 2a-c predicted that there would be no effect of information sharing because 
the differences in process only arises in the Partial condition for Between problems, not 
in the Within problems. So no overall differences were expected. This was mostly 
supported; there were no differences in the time taken nor the number of moves, but 
there were more errors in the Shared condition. This result is not readily interpretable. 
It is contrary to the predictions of SMMT and also to the conceptualisation of the 
collaborative processes used by groups that have been developed in this thesis. It is 
possible that the reduced amount of information that group members in the Partial 
condition were presented with made the task easier. It is also possible that this is a 
chance result and that it would be found again if the experiment were repeated. No firm 
conclusions can be drawn. 
Hypothesis 3 also produced an unpredicted finding. As groups in all conditions were 
given information about all three modules on any particular island they did not, in 
principle, need to transfer any information between them. It was therefore surprising to 
find more information statements in Partial condition. This is particularly unusual in the 
context of the results in the Distributed conditions of previous experiments. These 
groups were never given all of the information about any particular island that was 
required to conclude if a move was legal independently. Yet they used equal numbers of 
information statements to groups in the Shared conditions. 
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One possible explanation is that because modules are independent group members in 
previous experiments were able to draw possible conclusions based on the modules they 
knew and share these, as has been suggested to be the case. In the Partial condition 
group members have information about some islands but not others. Therefore if they 
wish to find out if a move is legal from one island to another and they only know 
information about one of the islands, they are left with incomplete modules. In fact the 
task has been designed such that there will always be another person who can draw this 
conclusion, but they do not know this. Thus in these situations the partial information 
is a less efficient division of the information than whole modules because group 
members can draw no conclusions at all about some islands. Rather than wait for 
another person to draw the conclusion they may seek the information in order to do it 
themselves. 
This idea is supported by the much higher frequency of question-information statements in 
the partial than the Shared condition. It is unfortunate that this data could not be 
analysed, but the means do present a fairly clear picture. This finding does not support 
the process that was predicted to occur in the Partial condition but it is a reasonable 
explanation of the data. Comparing the mean number of information and question- 
information statements in this experiment with Experiment 5 it is notable that there are 
more in this experiment. This provides an unexpected indication of the efficiency of 
modular distributed mental models compared to the Partial condition here, although it 
has not been explicitly tested. In terms of the aims of this experiment though, this 
finding suggests that the process predicted for the Partial condition was not used and so 
it is difficult to draw strong conclusions based on this manipulation as it is not fully 
understood. 
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Hypothesis 4 concerned the statements which were predicted to be more common if the 
groups collaborated, namely propore, support, widen, different, one, two, question purpose, question. 
support and question-widen statements. On the basis of the conceptualisation of the 
collaborative processes used in the task they were expected to be frequent in the Partial 
condition for the Between problems. They would not be expected to be common in 
the other conditions where the Shared process is used though, because SMMT predicts 
that the task would be solved independently. 
Only one of these codes demonstrated the predicted interaction between information 
sharing and problem type, providing only very weak support for the theory. However 
the planned comparisons did not reveal the nature of the interaction, implying that it is a 
small effect. This finding is not corroborated by the frequencies of the other 
communication codes. None of these showed a significant interaction. Given these 
results it is impossible to conclude that the process used when the task can be solved 
independently, especially in the Shared condition, is exactly as predicted by SMMT. 
Possibly there are some aspects that are similar causing group members not to consider 
multiple islands at once, but these are clearly rare and so the overall support for the 
Shared process is weak. 
Hypothesis 5 predicted that the statements discussed in Hypothesis 4 would not differ 
between the Shared and Partial conditions because it was only in the Between problems 
that differences should arise. This was supported, but predicting a non-significant effect 
is weak and so this finding does not provide much support for the theory. It merely 
fails to disconfirm it. 
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Hypothesis 6 concerned the statements which have been found to be used in the 
Distributed conditions of previous experiments, namely hone, reject, the numbers three and 
above, question-hone and question-reject statements. They have been found to eliminate 
possible conclusions using these statements in order to reach the final conclusion. 
However, as none of the groups had distributed mental models it was predicted that this 
sort of collaboration would not occur. As expected there were no differences, apart 
from reject statements. This supports the idea that groups in the Partial condition do not 
rely on this type of collaboration greatly in comparison to the Shared condition, despite 
group members not having all of the information. 
This implies that collaboration using 
those statements that was found in previous experiments is not a universal response to 
missing information, some of them might 
be unique to modular distributed mental 
models. 
The greater number of eject statements in the Shared condition is not readily 
interpretable. As group members had all of the information in this condition there 
would be no need, in principle, to use these statements. 
Again the reason for this 
finding are not obvious and may or may not reflect an important difference between the 
conditions. It is not possible to 
draw a conclusion on this finding alone. The main 
conclusion of this hypothesis though 
is that the collaborative process used by groups 
with distributed mental models was not used 
here. 
Hypothesis 7 sought to mirror in the participants' reported degree of collaboration the 
interaction of information sharing and problem type that was predicted to occur in 
performance and collaboration. However, as in these other results, there was no 
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interaction. These findings combine to convey the clear impression that the theory used 
in developing this particular experiment which led to the prediction of an interaction 
leading is false. 
Hypothesis 8 concerned the reported degree of collaboration in the Shared and Partial 
conditions. There were some differences between these for performance and 
communication, but not many and no clear pattern emerged. It is therefore surprising 
that groups report more collaboration in the Partial condition than the Shared 
condition. This might be caused by some form of bias in the subjective reports, but it is 
also plausible that the subjective measure is a more sensitive indicator than analysis of 
communication codes. These frequencies may not differ greatly, but it is possible that 
where they do differ, for example information and question-information statements, groups 
consider them to be of greater significance than the other codes. In other words they 
do not attribute the same importance to the different statements as the theory does. A 
single response may in the context of that piece of collaboration be particularly 
meaningful but it will only register as one more statement in a frequency count as they 
are all treated equally. Returning to the aims of this experiment this finding does not 
falsify the prediction that groups in the Shared condition solve the task independently 
and so this finding lends some support to the experimental hypotheses. Nonetheless 
the result is not entirely as predicted and so there is some uncertainty as to the strength 
of support it lends. 
Overall these findings do not paint a clear picture. Few of the hypotheses were 
supported and several contradictory results were found. Therefore the only reasonable 
conclusion that can be drawn is that groups in the Shared and Partial conditions do not 
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use the process predicted by SMMT. There are two possible alternatives. Either groups 
do not form shared mental models in the Shared condition or groups do have shared 
mental models but do not use the predicted collaborative process. On the basis of this 
data it is impossible to distinguish between these two. However, given the great 
similarity of the results one suggestion as to the behaviour of groups in the Shared 
condition does present itself. Possibly groups in the Shared condition of this and 
previous experiments in effect treat the information in the same way as the manipulation 
in the Partial condition explicitly causes them to. That is, they may be presented with all 
of the information but they do not use every island. However when they do seek to 
discover if a move is legal between two islands they use information from all three 
modules on both current and destination island. So they essentially reason using all of 
the information but only on some of the islands. Other group members can consider 
the remaining islands. 
This is a form of independent reasoning in that group members do not collaborate 
through suggesting possible islands as they do in the Distributed conditions of previous 
experiments. Therefore the comparison of shared and 
distributed mental models as 
independent and distributed reasoning is still useful. But conversely they do not find all 
of the legal moves and the final solution 
independently as predicted by SMMT. They 
only find some of the legal moves and allow other group members to find the rest. So 
there will be an element of collaboration, but not as much as in the Distributed 
conditions. 
This suggestion is supported by the lack of interactions caused by the Between and 
Within problems. Again, the reason for predicting that Within problems would be 
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superior in the Partial condition was because group members would be able to reason 
independently. There was no difference in reasoning, suggesting that groups solving the 
Within problems did not reason independently. Instead they may have behaved 
similarly to groups solving the Between problems. That is, they worked out the optimal 
two moves of the solution through some collaboration rather than independently. 
So the aim of the experiment is fulfilled to some extent. Groups in the Shared 
condition do not use the process predicted. Instead it seems possible that they form 
models using only some islands, but these are complete islands. Therefore, in previous 
experiments group members in the Shared conditions can be understood to effectively 
have models similar to the Partial condition here rather than fully shared mental models. 
This suggestion would ideally need explicitly testing again, but the great similarity 
between conditions in the current experiment does seem to provide some support for 
the idea. The results of all the experiments using the Distributed condition can now be 
interpreted more confidently as the process group members in the Shared condition use 
is somewhat clearer. In Chapter 7 all of the experiments will be discussed in this light as 
they are evaluated in the process of answering the questions asked in the introduction to 
this thesis. 
6.5 Conclusion 
Few conclusions can be drawn from this experiment. It seems that groups in the Shared 
condition do not solve the whole problem independently as proposed by SMAMT. But it 
is plausible that when considering a move between two island they look at all of the 
information on them both and draw a firm conclusion. In other words, they reason 
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independently about individual moves rather than all of the moves at once. As this is 
still a form of independent reasoning the comparison with distributed mental models is 
still informative, if not quite as originally predicted. 
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Chapter 7 
Discussion 
7.1 Introduction 
This thesis applied the distributed cognition framework to mental model theory in order 
to provide a general account of reasoning in groups. A task was developed to test 
questions which arose from this. The discussion will summarise and evaluate the results 
that were found. Largely these results vindicate the approach adopted although they by 
no means provide unequivocal answers. Rather they suggest an appealing account but 
the processes involved require clarification and further specification before they can bear 
much weight. After a summary of the work so far, an attempt to answer the questions 
posed in the introduction will be made using the empirical findings presented here. The 
conclusions will then be related to existing theory. The success of the task in testing the 
hypotheses in this thesis will be assessed. Finally future research questions are 
considered. 
7.2 Summary of the Major Points in the Thesis 
Several approaches have emerged recently which extend the unit of analysis used in 
cognitive science beyond the individual. They seek to study the cognitive processes of 
groups, organisations and their interactions with cognitive artefacts. The approach 
adopted in this thesis was Distributed cognition (e. g. Hutchins, 1995a). This advocates a 
study of the propagation of representational states through all representational media, 
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including people and cognitive artefacts. It was applied to mental models in order to 
develop a cognitive theory of group reasoning. 
The area of reasoning studied here is conditional inference. The mental model account 
of conditional inference was presented along with rival theories. The evidence suggests 
that the mental model theory provides a better explanation of the empirical data (e. g. 
Johnson-Laird, Byrne & Schaeken, 1992). 
All the major theories of mental models were then reviewed in order to discover what 
the necessary features of a mental model applicable to the understanding of group 
reasoning are. These were Craik (1943), Johnson-Laird (1983), Moray (1999) and 
Holland, Holyoak, Nisbett & Thagard (1986). It was argued that the common element 
in all of the theories was simply that a model is a mapping from the target system to the 
cognitive system. Thus reasoning occurs because the properties of the model are 
analogous to the properties of the target system. In order for this to occur the 
minimum requirement is to maintain a mapping between the target system and the 
cognitive system. 
Shared mental models were then reviewed. This is the largest single area of mental 
model application to groups and teams and so is important (e. g. Cannon-Bowers, Salas 
& Converse, 1993). Essentially SMMT states that the optimal representation of mental 
models in groups is for all group members to have compatible mental models. This 
allows each group member to independently form common expectations of the task and 
each other thus promoting high quality communication and coordination. In practice 
the evidence for this is equivocal though. This theory relies on an independent, that is a 
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non-distributed, process for reasoning in groups. It was studied throughout the thesis 
to allow a constructive comparison with the distributed cognition approach developed 
here. 
Distributed cognition is not new to the mental model literature (e. g. Bauer & Johnson- 
Laird, 1993; Green, 2000 and O'Malley & Draper, 1992). However work using this 
approach to date offers specific theories rather than a general account of all mental 
models across all varieties of distributed cognitive systems. In contrast, the theory 
proposed here conceptualises mental models simply as a mapping and is thus applicable 
to all models. It adopts an approach to distributed cognition described above that 
accommodates representations instantiated in any media and so it applies to all cognitive 
systems. Based on the idea of a model as a mapping, it is clear that models are not 
exclusive to individuals, they could take many 
forms e. g. mathematical models. In terms 
of the processing that occurs, the relevant unit of analysis is therefore the model itself. 
Within the distributed cognition approach the cognitive system which the model is 
mapped onto need not be an individual, as long as the representational states are able to 
propagate between the representational media. Thus as long as the relations between 
tokens in the mapping are maintained, the model can be treated as a unit of analysis, 
even if it is divided amongst a group. These models are referred to as `distributed 
mental models' in order to distinguish them from shared mental models. 
In order to test the issues which arose from this theory a task was required which 
involves the use of mental models by individuals and in which it is possible to 
manipulate sharing and distribution of the information required to create the models. A 
review of existing tasks used to study shared mental models suggested that they would 
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be impractical for manipulating the distribution of the model. Moreover the paradigm 
did not specifically tap mental models and so was not sufficiently rigorous for 
experimental work. Deductive reasoning tasks on the other hand are underpinned by a 
more thorough mental model explanation and have been extensively studied. The task 
therefore employed conditional inference to exploit this. However conditional inference 
tasks typically require only a small amount of information and so it would be impractical 
to manipulate this such that the information was distributed. Group members would 
rapidly learn the missing parts. Therefore the task designed for use with groups had 
several conjunctions thereby increasing the amount of information required in any one 
model. Also the reasoning was couched in a simple problem solving task which enabled 
group members to focus on different parts of the reasoning at different times. These 
two factors together enabled an effective manipulation of sharing and distribution of 
information. 
The task involved route finding through a series of islands. Participants had to move 
around the islands from their current destination to a goal island in the minimum 
number of moves. However only certain moves were legal. This was determined by 
rules concerning the pairings of objects on the current and destination islands. 
Participants inferred which moves were legal by applying the conditional rule to decide 
which objects must be on the islands. As this inference requires conditional reasoning it 
is reasonable to suggest that participants use mental models to complete it. 
As this task was novel it was necessary to begin by finding out about how participants 
completed it. In Experiment 1 individuals completed the task whilst thinking aloud. 
The verbal protocols were then analysed. The main finding of this experiment was that 
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if individuals have to find a route with more than one step, as the majority are, they 
initially infer which objects must be on the islands for the move to be legal then they 
search the islands for one with the correct combination. They repeat this process until a 
route is found to the goal island. This insight into the performance of individuals 
facilitated interpretation of the interactions of individuals when they are in groups. 
The next experiment, Experiment 2, compared shared with distributed mental models. 
It was predicted that the differences in mental model structure would cause differences 
in the process that groups use in collaborating to find the solution to the task. In turn 
these would cause quantitative differences in reasoning performance. The process that 
SMMT predicts groups will use is simply that group members will solve the task 
independently leading them to form common expectations about the solution. This 
should in principle enable them to communicate about the solution and to thus 
coordinate their behaviour. 
With distributed mental models an individual group member has only part of a model 
and so cannot find the whole solution independently. Therefore a collaborative process 
that groups might use in this situation was proposed and tested. Although group 
members cannot solve the whole task independently, they might see a possible solution 
based on partial information. It was predicted that they would suggest these possible 
solutions to the group. Other group members would then be able to further consider 
these based on other parts of the model which they have. They would add their own 
conclusions to these, suggesting other possibilities or eliminating some invalid 
suggestions. This iterative process was expected to continue until the only possibilities 
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left are supported by all group members and are therefore conclusions based on all parts 
of the model. 
Three different types of model structure were tested to discover if the predicted 
processes were found. Groups in the Shared condition had all of the information and 
so could form shared mental models. There were two types of distributed mental 
models, varying in modularity. Modularity is beneficial for distributed systems and refers 
to the way in which information is divided. A module is a relatively autonomous part of 
the whole model. Therefore if an individual has a whole module it is possible to do 
more computation independently and the whole process will be more efficient than if 
individuals do not have whole modules. If modules are divided between people it will be 
necessary to communicate much more as the individuals cannot operate independently. 
Thus in one distributed mental model condition groups had whole modules and in 
another they had partial modules. The degree of sharing in these two was the same, 
each group member had two-thirds of the whole model. 
The results showed that the Non-modular condition performed poorly compared to the 
other two conditions, but contrary to SMMT groups with modular distributed mental 
models performed as well as groups with shared mental models. With modular 
distributed mental models groups did not transfer any more information about the 
model than with shared mental models, indicating that they did not simply build shared 
mental models. They used the proposed collaborative process more than groups with 
shared mental models. This suggests that the proposed collaborative process is an 
accurate description of the process used by groups with modular distributed mental 
models and that although it is a different process to that used by groups with shared 
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mental models it is just as efficient. In short, changes in mental model structure affects 
the collaboration of groups and causes some quantitative differences in performance. 
Having established that mental model structure can affect the collaborative process of a 
group which in turn may cause some quantitative differences in performance, the 
following three experiments sought to discover if qualitative differences in process could 
cause qualitative differences in performance. If the collaborative process is qualitatively 
different then it was predicted that influencing the process could cause qualitative 
differences in performance between groups with shared mental models, distributed 
mental models and individuals. Experiment 3 manipulated sources of difficulty which 
were selected in order to target specific stages of the process which differed in shared 
and distributed mental models. 
These were rule negation which was predicted to make the inference of which objects 
were required more difficult, number of legal paths which was predicted to make the 
search for a legal move more difficult and number of moves which was predicted to 
compound these previous effects. Groups with distributed mental models were 
predicted to be affected more by rule negation than groups with shared mental models 
because more inferences were required as a result of the iterative process. This was not 
found, although there was a main effect of rule difficulty. Groups with distributed 
mental models were predicted to be more affected by more legal paths than groups with 
shared mental models. This is because the extra discussion in the collaborative process 
when there are many islands outweighs the benefits individuals have of finding an island 
with the correct objects on it quickly. This was not found, nor was there a main effect 
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of the manipulation. There was an effect of number of moves, but this is not as 
theoretically interesting. 
These results are inconsistent with some of the predictions. Although there was greater 
use of the collaborative process with shared than distributed mental models, there was 
little interaction between the sharing of information and the sources of task difficulty in 
the collaborative process and none in performance. This was particularly surprising with 
the number of paths manipulation as it was intended to influence the collaborative 
process and, as this was used more in the Distributed condition, it was predicted to 
interact with information sharing. The conclusion of this experiment was that there 
were no sources of difficulty which specifically affected either shared or distributed 
mental models. That is, no qualitative differences between the types of information 
sharing were found. 
The experiment was repeated with participants completing the task independently rather 
than in groups. This was Experiment 4. A different pattern of results was found. 
Individuals were not affected by rule negation, which was surprising. But they were 
quicker when there were many legal paths. This was consistent with the predictions and 
suggests a qualitative difference between the reasoning of individuals and groups because 
of differences in process. Individuals are quicker if there are more islands that are legal 
moves because they are more likely to find one early in their search. Groups however 
have a completely different process in which they must collaborate to find a solution. 
The time taken to do this is far greater than the search time and so it is possible that this 
is why groups were not affected by the number of paths. 
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Having established a qualitative difference between individual and group reasoning, 
Experiment 5 sought to find a difference between shared and distributed mental models. 
As SMMT theory predicts that groups with shared mental models use a largely 
independent process it was thought that such a difference could well exist. One 
explanation for the lack of effects of the number of paths manipulation was that the 
reasoning behind it was flawed. In this chapter it was argued that it is the difference 
between the number of possible moves and the number of legal moves which 
determines the amount of collaboration required. A bigger difference means that the set 
of possible islands would need to be reduced further to reach the set of legal islands and 
so more collaboration would be required, affecting group process and performance. 
However groups with shared mental models are predicted to reach the solution 
independently and so would not be greatly influenced by this effect. The manipulation 
was operationalised by comparing problems with five and eight islands but both with 
only two legal moves from each island. Thus the eight island problems would have 
potentially seven possibilities which must be reduced to two legal moves whereas the 
five island problems would only need to reduce four possibilities to two legal moves. 
This manipulation did affect group process and performance and again there was more 
collaboration when groups have distributed mental models. This finding was repeated in 
participants' scores on a questionnaire measuring perceptions of the degree to which 
they collaborated. Although there was a weak interaction in the time to complete the 
task and an interaction of some communication codes there was not the predicted 
interaction in all of the codes used in collaboration or in the questionnaire data. Thus 
the aim of finding a qualitative difference in performance between shared and 
distributed mental models because of the influence of a manipulation specifically on the 
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collaborative process was fulfilled, though not very convincingly. A possible explanation 
for this was that groups in the Shared condition also collaborated to some extent, 
although perhaps less so and using a different process. 
The final experiment sought to test the process used by groups in the Shared condition. 
It had been predicted that group members in the Shared condition solved the task 
largely independently before communicating as assumed by SMMT. This was tested by 
comparing groups in the Shared condition, that is with all of the information about all of 
the islands, with groups in which each member had all of the information about only 
five of the islands and none about the other three. This was referred to as the Partial 
condition. There were two types of problem. Within problems could be solved 
independently by a group member in the Partial condition, that is one person had the 
current island, intermediary island and goal 
island amongst their five islands. Between 
problems could not be solved independently 
by any group member in the Partial 
condition as no individual had all three 
islands required for a whole solution. I iowever 
they could be solved independently in the Shared condition. Therefore it was predicted 
that groups in the Partial condition would collaborate less and perform better in the 
Within than the Between problems because they would be able to solve the task 
independently. No differences were expected in the Shared condition however because 
all of the problems could be solved 
independently. 
The results showed very few significant differences in any of the tests of collaborative 
process and performance. 
This suggests that groups do not attempt to solve the task 
independently as proposed by SMMT. However the interpretations of previous 
experiments cannot be completely rejected 
because groups in the Shared condition seem 
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to use a different collaborative process and to a lesser extent than in the Distributed 
condition. Given the similarities in results between the two conditions in this 
experiment it is quite plausible that groups in the Shared condition use the information 
as groups in the Partial condition do. That is, they only look at some of the islands to 
find out if a move is legal, but when they do they consider all of the information on it. 
This is a form of independent reasoning and so when the experiments are evaluated it is 
reasonable to take the comparison of the Shared and Distributed conditions as an 
effective manipulation of shared and distributed mental models. 
7.3 Evaluation of Empirical Findings 
The introduction culminated in asking six questions about distributed mental models 
which were addressed in the thesis. 
These covered a range of issues which arose from 
the novel theory such as what the reasoning process was and what effects it gives rise to. 
The experiments were designed to assemble a body of evidence with which these 
questions could be answered. Having summarised the main results 
it is now possible to 
suggest some solutions to the questions and evaluate the persuasiveness of the answers 
the thesis offers. 
The first question which will be addressed is 'What is the collaborative process uscd by 
groups with distributed mental models? 
' There are two lines of evidence here. The 
most important one is the 
frequencies of the statements coded into the categories 
relevant to the predicted process. 
But the questionnaire testing participants' perceptions 
of the extent to which they 
followed the predicted process is also relevant. A proposal 
about the collaborative process used 
by groups was made in Chapter 3. Essentially this 
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involved the suggestion of possible conclusions by some group members and the 
subsequent support, elimination or addition to this list by other group members. 
Eventually all of the group should in principle be satisfied that the conclusion was valid. 
This process was tested in all of the group experiments. 
Two types of distributed mental model were tested, non-modular and modular. The 
former did not show great support for the proposed process whereas the latter did. 
Non-modular distributed mental models seemed to rely more on proposing one island 
at a time, rejecting these until one is found that all agree with. This is a slightly different 
process to the proposed one in which many islands are considered simultaneously, but it 
still distributed as the solution is not found independently. 
There was also more transfer 
of information suggesting that individuals 
did to a certain extent build up their models 
independently. This is inevitable with a non-modular distribution because of the very 
fact that group members do not have whole modules. In this task half of a module does 
not allow an individual to add or eliminate a conclusion that has been proposed. Thus 
the collaborative process cannot work unless groups make an effort to build whole 
modules. 
In contrast groups with modular distributed mental models did not transfer any more 
information about the task than groups in the Shared condition. They proposed more 
islands at once and they reduced these numbers to find the moves that all agree with. 
Group members also report in the questionnaires that they use this kind of process 
more in the Distributed conditions than the 
Shared conditions. These findings arc 
consistent across Experiments 2,3 and 
5 providing ample evidence and replication that 
the proposed collaborative process is used 
by groups with modular distributed mental 
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models. The only missing aspects were the lack of reject statements in Experiment 3, 
although these were found in Experiments 2 and 5 so possibly the omission was a low 
power effect. Also widen statements were not used frequently in any of the conditions, 
suggesting that groups do not increase the number of possibilities considered. This may 
be a function of the task - for a move to be legal it must be legal with all of the modules, 
so if you only have one module then it must include all the legal moves as well as some 
which will prove to be illegal. It is not possible to have a move which is legal without all 
group -members being able to make that inference. So the original proposals may be 
comprehensive, leaving nothing to add. 
These results indicate that the proposed collaborative process is well supported for 
modular distributed mental models. It is likely that groups with non-modular distributed 
mental models do not use the process as efficiently 
because more information must be 
transferred between people and fewer possibilities are considered at once. They 
therefore use a slightly different collaborative process, albeit one that relies on the same 
basic idea of collaboration of suggesting possibilities and other group members agreeing 
or disagreeing with these. Given this 
it is perhaps more sensible to ask in future which 
collaborative process is being used rather than simply whether a group uses the process 
or not. 
The use of collaboration by the groups with distributed mental models is an important 
finding because if groups collaborate then they are distributing the reasoning between 
themselves, that is, using a distributed cognitive process. No single individual complctcs 
the reasoning but possibilities are propagated between them. Different individuals 
transform these and suggest them to the group again. This iterative process continucs 
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until a group answer is found. The process requires the interactions between people as 
much as the reasoning within individuals, justifying the distributed cognition approach 
used in this thesis to describe the phenomena. 
The second question was `How is the collaborative process affected by different mental 
model structures? ' This has been partly answered in the discussion of modularity whilst 
addressing the first question. The analysis above suggests that modularity affects the 
collaborative process used. Modular distributed mental models are more efficient 
because the division of information maximises the amount of reasoning that can occur 
within individuals whereas non-modular distributed mental models requires more 
frequent interactions between group members which takes time and effort. 
The effect of a shared mental model structure has not been described though. SMMT 
predicts that groups with shared mental models will solve the problem independently, 
minimising communication and improving coordination. In line with this, groups used 
statements required for the collaborative process less in the Shared conditions than the 
Distributed conditions in Experiments 2,3 and 5. Their questionnaire scores also report 
less collaboration than the Distributed condition in Experiment 5. However although 
they collaborated less, they still collaborated to some degree as the lack of interactions in 
Experiments 3 and 5 indicate. The manipulation used made it possible for the group to 
form shared mental models, but it seems that they did not behave entirely as SMMT 
predicts. 
Experiment 6 investigated this specifically and concluded that it is most likely that the 
groups did not solve the whole problem, but focused on only some of the islands. 
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However when they did try and infer if a move between two islands was legal they 
would use all of the information about that pair of islands. So, in effect, this reasoning 
was still independent in terms of the model constructed about each move. Thus it can 
be argued that there are differences in the collaborative process between shared and 
distributed mental models. Distributed mental models rely on possible conclusions 
which are subject to other group members' support whereas individuals are more 
confident about conclusions because they use all of the information required to firmly 
conclude whether a move is legal. 
Only two structural factors in mental models in groups were studied but both were 
found to affect the collaborative process that groups use. The Shared manipulation did 
not influence groups entirely as predicted by SMMT, but it nonetheless caused 
independent reasoning and less collaboration in general than the Distributed conditions. 
Modular distribution greatly improved the efficiency of collaboration in distributed 
mental models compared to non-modular distribution. These results suggest then that 
the structure of mental models in a group does affect the collaborative process in 
various ways. 
Having established that the collaborative process can vary it is natural to ask if this in 
turn affects reasoning performance. Hence the next question posed was `How do 
shared and distributed mental models compare in reasoning performance? ' The main 
effects will be examined here, that is, the quantitative differences in performance. The 
qualitative differences will be addressed below by looking at the interactions with other 
manipulations. The most interesting result is that there was no difference in 
performance between groups with shared mental models and groups with modular 
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distributed mental models in terms of the time taken, number of errors or the number 
of moves. This was found in all of the experiments; 2,3 and 5. Thus although it is a 
non-significant finding it has been replicated with two-thirds sharing, no sharing at all, 
within subjects and between subjects designs and variations in the rules used. So it 
appears to be a fairly robust effect of this task. 
Significantly it is contrary to SMMT which strongly predicts that sharing mental models 
is the optimal mental model structure for performance. Therefore the finding suggests 
that SMMT does not apply to all groups and teams. Quite possibly the greater 
complexity of this task in terms of the amount of information and the difficulty of the 
reasoning provided a benefit of distribution which balanced the benefits of sharing. It is 
particularly notable that more collaboration was used to achieve this with distributed 
mental models. Therefore the collaboration may have reduced the amount of time 
individuals needed to think about the problem in order that there be no overall 
difference. It is likely that the fact that they had much less information each with 
distributed mental models enabled this quicker reasoning to take place. This is the 
advantage of a division of labour. With shared mental models each group member is 
replicating all of the reasoning which is time consuming and effortful. This finding 
suggests that shared mental models are by no means the optimal group mental model 
structure for performance, contrary to SMMT. 
It is possible that the lack of differences in performance are due to an artefact of the 
task which makes differences hard to achieve or they do not occur because groups in the 
Shared condition also collaborate. The first objection is partly countered by the 
performance of Non-modular distributed mental models in Experiment 2. This was 
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worse than either shared or modular distributed mental models. Two conclusions can 
be drawn from this. Firstly, this structure of mental models in groups and the resulting 
collaborative process results in poor performance. Secondly, it is quite possible for a 
group to perform poorly on the task. Thus the similarity between shared and modular 
distributed mental models is unlikely to have resulted from an artefact of the task which 
prevents differences. If they had then there would have been no differences for groups 
with non-modular distributed mental models as well. 
The second objection is also impossible to dismiss outright, but there is evidence to 
suggest that the collaboration in the Shared condition is not as extensive as in the 
Distributed condition. Experiments 2,3 and 5 all showed more of the codes used in the 
collaborative process in the Distributed condition than the Shared condition. So even if 
there is some collaboration there is still significantly less of it and so it cannot fully 
account for the similarities. " 
There were differences in reasoning performance between shared and non-modular 
distributed mental models. Experiment 2 showed that groups with non-modular 
distributed mental models were much slower. This was attributed to their greater need 
for communication in order to counteract the effect of non-modularity. So shared 
mental models can be superior to distributed mental models if the distribution is 
inefficient, as in this case. 
The comparison of shared and distributed mental models then indicates that thcrc is no 
quantitative difference in reasoning performance. Modular distributed mcntal models 
perform as well as shared mental models. However reasoning with non-modular 
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distributed mental models is slower than shared or modular distributed mental models. 
Therefore the differences in shared and distributed mental models depends on the typc 
of distribution of the mental model. 
Although there are no overall differences in performance between shared and modular 
distributed mental models it is possible that the qualitative differences in process might 
lead to qualitative differences in performance in situations which specifically targeted 
process differences. The question asked was `Do shared and distributed mental models 
have qualitative differences in performance? ' Experiment 3 initially addressed this with 
task difficulty manipulations which were intended to target the inferences of individuals 
and the collaborative process. These were not successful, groups with shared and 
distributed mental models did not perform differently when solving these problems. 
The attempt to specifically influence the collaborative process was followed up in 
Experiment 5 arguably using a more effective manipulation. Here there was some 
success, the time taken and some parts of the collaborative process interacted as 
expected, however there was not the full pattern of results expected. Nonetheless this 
final result presents some indication that differences in process between shared and 
modular distributed mental models can lead to qualitative differences in performance. 
Thus distributed mental models are not merely suboptimal structures of mental models 
in groups. Their different collaborative process leads to a characteristic pattern of 
performance which is interesting in its own right. The evidence here is equivocal, the 
effects are quite weak and there is not a wide range of differences to consider. But the 
findings do hint that these differences may exist if the issue were to be pursued. 
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Finally individuals were considered too. They do not collaborate and so also use a 
different process to groups in order to solve the task. The last question asked `Do 
individuals and groups have qualitative differences in performance? ' Experiments 3 and 
4 were compared to answer this question. The opposite pattern of the influence of the 
difficulty manipulations was found in individuals compared to groups. However the 
results of Experiment 3 were not as predicted so it is difficult to be confident in the 
interpretation of this finding. They can be plausibly explained by differences in process 
found to be used by individuals in Experiment 1 and groups in Experiments 2,3 and 5, 
but further empirical work on individuals is required before strong conclusions can be 
drawn. 
Overall it has been possible to answer many of the questions that were posed in the 
Introduction. There is evidence for a collaborative process, but it now clear that there 
are many different processes. These are all influenced by different structures of mental 
models in groups. Interestingly groups with modular distributed mental models 
performed as well as groups with shared mental models, but the inefficiency of non- 
modular distributed mental models hindered the performance of groups with these. 
There were indications of qualitative differences in performance between individuals and 
groups with shared and distributed mental models but the evidence here was weak. 
Mostly the answers to the questions asked about group reasoning were interesting. 111ey 
imply that studying reasoning in groups is a useful area of research and that the 
distributed cognition approach adopted in this thesis has been productive. 
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7.4 Relevance of the Findings for Existing Work 
The findings of this thesis have implications for SMMT and the theory of mental 
models in general but few links with existing conditional inference work can be made 
because of the unusual task employed. This section will consider each of these in turn. 
The evidence supporting SMMT in previous work has been weak, as was shown in the 
introduction, and the findings of this thesis further question its validity. SNiNIT 
proposes that groups with shared mental models will use the models independently to 
form common expectations and minimise communication. However the results of all 
the experiments here show that groups do communicate more than is necessary. 
Experiment 6 in particular demonstrated that group members do not solve the task 
independently when they have the opportunity to. Further, the benefit of shared mental 
models is said to be superior group performance. But groups with shared mental 
models did not perform better than groups with modular distributed mental models, 
even those with no overlap in the mental models at all. On the face of it these findings 
suggest that sharing mental models does not have the effects on groups that the theory 
predicts. 
There are some objections to the use of these particular experiments to dismiss smnr 
theory though. Although groups with modular distributed mental models performed as 
well as groups with shared mental models, groups with non-modular distributed mental 
models were slower. There were no differences between these two in the number of 
errors or move made, but it is possible that this is attributable to a floor effect. So it is 
not reasonable to say that the type of sharing makes no difference at all. In some 
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instances shared mental models are superior to distributed mental models. The 
differences depend on whether it is possible for the model to be efficiently distributed 
or not. 
Secondly, it could be argued that the experiments conducted were not in the spirit of the 
intended domain of shared mental models. Clearly the theory was originally conceived 
of as applicable to highly time pressured tasks requiring high quality coordination such as 
flying an aeroplane in combat. In this situation there is no opportunity to discuss issues. 
In contrast the experiments in this thesis had little time pressure and the requirement to 
discuss was much higher. In an aeroplane it is possible to act without coordination, it is 
just not effective. In the tasks described here it was essential that all group members 
agreed to move to the same island or they would not move at all. So it was nearly 
impossible to rely solely on common expectations worked out independently. This 
argument is a reasonable defence of shared mental models in high pressure situations, 
but it is notable that more recently the theory has been applied to low pressure 
situations which do require a great deal of cognitive work, such as software 
programming teams (e. g. Carley, 1997; Levesque, Wilson & Wholey, 2001). The task 
studied here is more relevant to these teams and so it is possible that the findings could 
be generalised to them. There is no empirical work suggesting that shared mental 
models are applicable here, it has been assumed from the military work. The 
experiments in this thesis highlight the possibility that shared mental models are not 
appropriate for all teams. In particular those with low time pressure and ample 
opportunity and requirement for discussion may be better served by distributed mental 
models. This can only be established by empirically testing the domain of interest, in 
particular using a more naturalistic task. 
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The final criticism is a concern that has run through this thesis, whether the groups in 
the Shared condition actually formed shared mental models. It seems most likely that 
they did not have fully shared mental models, but did engage in more independent 
reasoning than groups in the Distributed condition. This is clearly not ideal, but there 
are two reasons why it is still appropriate to draw some conclusions about the results. 
They may not have had fully shared mental models, but they did have more sharing of 
their models than in the Distributed condition. Therefore it is still an effective 
comparison of high and low sharing, if not as complete as intended. Also, it is notable 
that whilst group members had the opportunity to form fully shared mental models they 
did not choose to. If it had been easier for them to use shared mental models it is 
reasonable to assume that they would have done so. So the fact that they did not 
suggests that sharing mental models, at least of the type used in this task, does not 
facilitate task performance. The natural tendency may therefore be to distribute the 
model. 
In conclusion, there is evidence that sharing mental models is superior to inefficient 
distributions of a mental model such as non-modular distributions, but other 
arrangements such as modular distributions may be as efficient. This unpredicted lack 
of differences may have arisen from the low pressure and high cognitive work necessary 
for the task, but nonetheless it still stands. This suggests that shared mental models may 
not be appropriate for these sorts of task. The use of shared mental models in military 
teams cannot be strongly challenged by these results, but the application of the theory to 
non-military settings without explicit evidence is questioned. 
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The relevance of the thesis for existing work on conditional inference is less specific. 
The task relied on conditional inferences made by participants and the explanation was 
based on the mental model account. However the task was not designed to test 
conditional inference and, in order to investigate groups, changes had to be introduced 
which meant that the findings could not be directly compared with previous 
experiments. The information was displayed differently, several conjunctions were used 
in each inference and all of the deduction was couched in a problem solving task. These 
factors potentially confound any comparisons that could have been made. This is 
disappointing because some findings were of interest, such as the lack of effect of 
negation on individual reasoning performance in Experiment 4. This is contrary to 
previous findings such as Evans, Clibbens & Rood (1995) and Schaeken & Schroyens 
(2000). Yet the effect was found in groups. However pursuing this anomaly with this 
task would not have been productive because the effects were always potentially 
attributable to task differences. 
The experiments were designed to make a more general contribution to mental model 
theory. The ambition to present and test a general distributed cognition theory of 
mental models which would account for reasoning in groups was by no means fully 
realised. The experiments conducted were too limited in their scope and too imprecise 
in their manipulations to draw any strong conclusions. They do nonetheless provide a 
demonstration of further ways in which distributed cognition could be applied to mental 
models. They have produced some results which suggest that the approach is not trivial 
and promises that future work will continue to be fruitful. 
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Firstly, the thesis has provided more evidence that distributed cognition can be usefully 
!I; 
applied to our understanding of mental models. Previous such as Green ,g papers (2000) 
and O'Malley & Draper (1995) have already made this point, but it is reinforced by the 
theoretical and empirical work presented here. Theoretically, the adoption of the model 
itself as the unit of analysis be it in a group or other cognitive system develops the 
previous theories, in particular Green which adopted the argument and by extension the 
argument model as a level of representation. This approach here incorporates other 
representations in addition to arguments. Other representations are considered by 
O'Malley and Draper but only within a narrow Human-Computer system in which the 
individual is considered primary. Thus a more general framework is proposed here. 
Empirical evidence is found suggesting that groups use a distributed cognitive process to 
complete the task. They do not rely solely on an independent process as proposed by 
SMMT. The lack of information that is transferred between group members in the 
Distributed condition and the collaborative process they use as well as their reports in 
the questionnaire all indicate this to be so. This is perhaps the most important finding 
because it suggests that the study of mental models solely as an individual construct is 
omitting a large area of potentially important cognitive processes. This finding strongly 
suggests that groups do use a distributed cognitive process in reasoning. 
The other findings are all based on the same task and, as will be discussed in the next 
section, this has various strengths and weaknesses which influence their interpretation. 
The effect of different structures of mental models, that is shared, distributed, modular 
and non-modular, on the reasoning process and performance was found. If a mental 
model is only considered within an individual then these factors cannot exist. They are 
285 
exclusively an issue to do with mental models in groups and other cognitive systems in 
which the model is divided between different cognitive agents. Other structures no 
doubt exist and the ones studied here can perhaps be studied more rigorously in the 
future. So this thesis does not exhaustively study this issue. It merely demonstrates that 
structural differences can occur and influence reasoning. 
It was also found that groups use a range of collaborative processes in order to combine 
their individual reasoning to find a group answer. In particular a process in which group 
members suggest possible conclusions and other group members refine these 
suggestions until firm conclusions were found was studied in groups with modular 
distributed mental models. It became clear over the course of the experiments however 
that different mental model structures gave rise to different collaborative processes. So 
although the processes discussed here may prove to be common to a range of different 
tasks it is quite possible that they will not generalise beyond this one. The contribution 
to mental model theory is therefore not specifically the collaborative process which 
groups use, but the concept that they exist and that there are variations. That is, rather 
than looking solely within individuals for the processes used to solve the task, it is also 
necessary to look at the interactions between individuals. These too may be ordered and 
follow specific processes. 
An attempt was made to find qualitative differences in performance arising from the 
qualitative differences in the processes used to solve the task by groups with different 
mental model structures. The results of this were mixed, Experiment 5 demonstrating 
some effects. The weakness of these findings do not clearly demonstrate that mental 
models can give rise to different phenomena because of varying structures and 
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processes. But there are some indications that this could occur and it may be a fruitful 
area of research. 
Overall then this thesis challenges the application of SMMT to all groups and teams. 
Where discussion is possible and the cognitive workload is high shared mental models 
may not be as beneficial as they are in military settings. Experiments with more 
naturalistic tasks will establish this. The experiments have less direct relevance for other 
conditional inference work because the task used here differed in several important 
aspects which confound comparisons. However some issues are relevant for mental 
model theory in general. The thesis found support for a distributed cognition approach 
for reasoning in groups and the mental model as a unit of analysis in the group. The 
importance of mental model structures, the various collaborative processes used by 
groups and qualitative differences in reasoning which result from these were highlighted. 
These findings do not represent a definitive study of the topic, far from it. There are 
many problems and qualifications which are necessary. However they do suggest that 
these are useful areas for future work. 
7.5 Benefits and Limitations of the Methodology 
A secondary aim of this thesis was to develop a task with which the suggestions laid out 
in the introduction could be tested. In a review of the existing methods presented in 
Chapter 2 none were found which both exclusively required reasoning for their 
completion and would enable information to be effectively distributed amongst a group. 
Therefore a task was developed which fulfilled both of these criteria. This task was 
developed throughout the subsequent experiments, removing possible confounds. 
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However there are still some reservations about even the final incarnation of the task 
that limit the strength of the conclusions which can be drawn from it. Despite this 
though the task has given rise to some provocative findings with some strong theoretical 
implications. The method used has influenced the theory developed as much as the 
theory has influenced the form of the task. Serendipitous findings arising from it led to 
possibilities which may be tested more effectively in future in order to confirm their 
validity. 
The original task involved route finding through a series of islands. To decide if a 
particular move from one island to the next was legal required conditional inference. 
The rule which governed this consisted of several conjunctions and concerned the 
objects which were on the different islands. In the first and second experiments there 
were variations between different parts of the rules, some had negations whereas others 
did not, some had different numbers of objects and the rules were not presented in a 
clear format on the computer screen. In addition several games had been created to 
allow repeated trials and these may not have been equal. 
In Experiments 3 and 4 these aspects were all improved. All parts of the rule were made 
equivalent, the rules were all presented together in the centre of the screen and new 
games were created by moving the islands to different locations so they could more 
confidently said to be equivalent. However there were still some problems with the task. 
The possible moves from each island varied, so the equivalence of different moves could 
not be guaranteed. A within subjects design was used which allowed the possibility of 
transfer between Shared and Distributed conditions. The operation of the computer 
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was cumbersome as information was entered and relayed to all screens which took time 
but was not essential. 
In Experiments 5 and 6 these problems were solved. Every island was created with two 
possible moves from it, one of which went to the goal island. A between subjects 
design was used to remove transfer between conditions. The information entered was 
limited to the chosen island and this was not relayed to other participants' screens to 
increase the speed of operation of the computer. Thus the degree of control over what 
participants must do in the task increased and the number of confounding and 
extraneous variables were reduced as it was developed through the course of 
experimentation. 
The major advantage of the task used was that it was successful in manipulating the 
distribution of information. As this was the principle issue being tested in the thesis and 
also the reason for rejecting most of the existing methods, the success of the task in 
manipulating this factor was very important. The use of conjunctions and the problem 
solving element in the task were to some extent justified by their utility. As a result of 
the manipulation groups did use a distributed cognitive process to solve the task and this 
lead to some interesting findings. 
The task does have some flaws though which means that the findings do need to be 
qualified and future work should use a different task which will allow for greater 
generalisation of results and stronger links with existing work. In particular the use of 
conjunctions and problem solving which were necessary and effective in allowing 
distribution of a conditional inference task limit the generalisability of the results. The 
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resulting task was fairly contrived, it was not a normal reasoning problem that is met in 
everyday life. It is therefore quite plausible to suggest that the results were artefactual 
and derived from the unique features of the task, and so are not representative of typical 
behaviour. Using this task alone then, it is difficult to generalise the results to all or even 
some other group reasoning situations. Further empirical work in other domains is 
required in order to establish if there is any generality to the findings. 
A second consequence of this particular task is noted above; the findings cannot be 
related to existing work on conditional inference even though the task is based on it. 
There are so many other differences in the display of information, the form of the 
conditionals and the additional problem solving aspects that any findings cannot be 
unambiguously attributed to the role of the group. 
It seems that the very factors which were successfully introduced to allow distribution of 
the model prevent any strong conclusions about group reasoning in general being drawn 
from it. This presents an awkward dilemma for future work. Either the measures to 
allow manipulation of distribution can be implemented thereby weakening the 
conclusions which can be drawn or more common reasoning tasks can be adopted in 
which it may be difficult to manipulate distribution of the model. 
Fortunately this dilemma can be resolved. The problem lies in the intractability of the 
conditional inferences chosen for studying distributed mental models. Therefore 
distributed mental models should be studied using reasoning other than conditional 
inference. At least, the simple biconditionals employed here should not be used. It is 
essential to find a domain which naturally lends itself to distributing cognition without 
290 
contriving means of generating it. If these domains cannot be found then it must be 
accepted that the division of information in group reasoning is not an important area of 
research. There are some areas which show potential though. It was found in this 
thesis that models with more information could be effectively distributed. Therefore 
more complex reasoning tasks are likely to encourage distributed cognition. One such 
area is reasoning about complex causal systems. Many causal systems are very large and 
can have complex interactions between elements in the model. The nuclear power 
stations described by Moray (1997) are a good example of this, although many other 
physical, biological or chemical systems could be studied. This may involve a shift in the 
area of reasoning studied, but if that is required in order to investigate distributed mental 
models as they typically occur then it is acceptable. When more has been found out it 
may be possible to apply this knowledge to create better ways of studying conditional 
inference, or it may lead to a better understanding of the issues that require 
investigation, allowing the problems to be avoided. 
Overall, the task was a mixed success. It enabled effective manipulation of distribution 
which gave rise to some interesting findings and theoretical points about distributed 
cognition in reasoning. But the extent to which these could be generalised or related to 
previous work is limited. 
7.6 Future Work 
There are two types of research which can fruitfully be conducted in the future. The 
current findings must be clarified and replicated in order to strengthen the conclusions 
and there are new areas which can be explored. 
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As described above, the task used limits the generality of the conclusions drawn in this 
thesis. There were interesting findings about the effect of mental model structure on 
group reasoning performance and the process used by groups. Different collaborative 
processes are found to be used by groups. Qualitative differences in performance seem 
to arise from these qualitative differences in group process. These must all be 
investigated in different reasoning domains in order to corroborate their existence and 
further specify their form. In particular complex causal systems may lend themselves to 
distributed cognition. It is possible that the influential mental model structures in this 
form of reasoning are different to the conditional inference task used here. It is likely 
that the collaborative processes used by groups are different. If so, it is likely that any 
qualitative differences that may arise between individuals and various group or other 
distributed cognitive systems will take a different form. The findings of this thesis must 
be taken as hypotheses which require testing and further specification before they are 
fully accepted. 
In addition there are many other areas of research that can be opened up. Some have 
already been mentioned. A distributed cognition approach to group reasoning could be 
applied to any area of reasoning, in principle. This includes different deductive 
reasoning tasks such as syllogistic reasoning and other forms of propositional reasoning 
such as reasoning with disjunctions. It also includes other types of reasoning, for 
example inductive, abductive and causal reasoning. Essentially anything that has been 
studied in individuals could be explored in groups. The collaborative processes and 
effects of mental model structures are likely to be different in different areas and so 
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there is ample scope for discovering how groups behave differently in these tasks and 
for finding common themes. 
As well as different tasks it is also possible to study different cognitive systems. The 
various mental model structures studied here affected the reasoning process and 
performance. Clearly the nature of the distribution and the collaborative process used 
by groups are inextricably linked. Therefore different structures and distributions of 
mental models in group could be studied. These are likely to change both the process 
groups use and their performance. Examples of such factors include the role of 
cognitive artefacts, the effect of influencing communication between group members or 
different types of model structures for example if the mental models held by group 
members vary in the extent to which they are homomorphisms of each other. 
The important point though is to begin by studying those areas which lend themselves 
to group reasoning. By choosing areas which will be most fruitful a more general 
understanding about reasoning in groups can be developed. This may lead to overall 
principles about the relations between individual and group reasoning, thereby guiding 
constructive future research. 
All of the possibilities listed above are extensions of the ideas already addressed. There 
are many issues which have not been studied though. Of particular interest is the 
dynamic process which groups use in the course of collaboration. Clearly the comments 
made by group members are not random but are typically influenced by previous 
comments. It would be interesting to discover what factors are influential in this 
dynamic process. It is also clear that group members are aware that their aim is to 
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ensure other group members understand their point. The extent to which they 
represent other group members and the influence this has on their comments is a 
problem general to all communication, but relevant here too. They may seek to 
introduce redundancy into a system or avoid overcommitting to a position if they are 
aware that they only have partial information. Principles may exist which guide effective 
collaboration across a range of situations. The act of discussion itself is possibly 
influential. Solving a problem is difficult if another group member is talking because it 
interferes with other group members' attention towards the task itself. This could lead 
individuals to only look at small parts of the task which can be solved in between 
statements. The task is then completed piecemeal rather than in as a whole. 
It is possible to speculate at length about different factors which may lead to interesting 
findings. The most pressing concern though is to replicate the main findings of this 
thesis, the effect of mental model structure on reasoning process and performance, the 
various collaborative processes that were used and the qualitative differences that 
resulted from them, in a different reasoning domain. This will add to the generality of 
the findings and add to the strength of the conclusions drawn. 
7.7 Conclusion 
The theoretical and empirical work in this thesis justify the attention paid to group 
reasoning. The distributed cognition approach adopted led to a plausible theory of a 
mental model as the unit of analysis in groups. The experiments in this thesis 
demonstrated the importance of different structures of mental models in groups and the 
collaborative processes which characterise the interactions between group members. 
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These factors are exclusive to groups and so they indicate areas which have been 
omitted in previous work by the focus on individual reasoning. Some evidence was also 
found to indicate that these factors can give rise to quantitative and qualitative 
differences in reasoning performance, implying that these factors do have interesting 
implications. The details in each of these areas are limited and more specificity is 
required. There are many gaps and quite possibly flaws in both the theoretical and 
empirical work. Nonetheless the idea of a distributed cognition approach to mental 
models as a theory of group reasoning is enhanced by this thesis and group reasoning 
further established as an important topic for research. 
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Appendix 
Details of the Experimental Task 
The arrangement of the objects on the islands for all of the games in each experiment 
are presented below. 
Experiments 1&2 
Practice 
North island: Blue, Vegetarians, Fish, Heads, Fire, 3. 
East island: Green, Headhunters, Devils, Pumpkins, 1, Start. 
South island: Blue, Priests, Heads, Pumpkins, 4. 
West island: Green, Trolls, Devils, Fish, 2. 
Experimental Trials 
North island: Blue, Headhunters, Devils, Pumpkins, Love, 4. 
East island: Blue, Trolls, Heads, Pumpkins, Fire, 3. 
Fourth island: Green, Priests, Fish, Devils, War, 5, Start. 
South island: Green, Vegetarians, Fish, Heads, Peace, 6. 
Peppermint island: Red, Headhunters, Fish, Devils, 1. 
West island: Red, Trolls, Heads, Pumpkins, Fire, 2. 
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North island: Blue, Trolls, Pumpkins, Heads, Fire, 2. 
East island: Green, Headhunters, Devils, Fish, 6, Start. 
Fourth island: Red, Priests, Fish, Pumpkins, War, 3. 
South island: Blue, Vegetarians, Devils, Fish, Love, 5. 
Peppermint island: Green, Priests, Devils, Pumpkins, War, 4. 
West island: Red, Vegetarians, Heads, Heads, Fire, 1. 
North island: Blue, Priests, Fish, Heads, Peace, 5, Start. 
East island: Green, Trolls, Devils, Pumpkins, Fire, 2. 
Fourth island: Red, Priests, Heads, Fish, War, 6. 
South island: Blue, Headhunters, Pumpkins, Devils, Love, 1. 
Peppermint island: Red, Vegetarians, Devils, Fish, Love, 3. 
West island: Green, Headhunters, Pumpkins, Heads, Fire, 4. 
North island: Green, Vegetarians, Heads, Pumpkins, War, 4. 
East island: Red, Priests, Fish, Pumpkins, Peace, 1. 
Fourth island: Red, Headhunters, Pumpkins, Fish, Love, 2. 
South island: Blue, Trolls, Devils, Heads, Fire, 6. 
Peppermint island: Green, Vegetarians, Fish, Devils, War, 3, Start. 
West island: Blue, Trolls, Devils, Heads, Peace, 5. 
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North island: Green, Headhunters, Pumpkins, Fish, Love, 3, Start. 
East island: Red, Vegetarians, Devils, Heads, Peace, 5. 
Fourth island: Blue, Priests, Pumpkins, Heads, Fire, 4. 
South island: Blue, Trolls, Heads, Fish, Love, 6. 
Peppermint island: Red, Headhunters, Fish, Devils, War, 1. 
West island: Green, Vegetarians, Devils, Pumpkins, Peace, 2. 
North island: Green, Vegetarians, Heads, Pumpkins, Fire, 2. 
East island: Blue, Headhunters, Devils, Fish, Love, 1. 
Fourth island: Red, Priests, Pumpkins, Heads, Peace, 6, Start. 
South island: Blue, Trolls, Devils, Heads, Love, 3. 
Peppermint island: Green, Trolls, Fish, Pumpkins, War, 4. 
West island: Red, Priests, Fish, Devils, War, 5. 
North island: Red, Priests, Pumpkins, Heads, Peace, 6. 
East island: Blue, Vegetarians, Devils, Pumpkins, War, 4, Start. 
Fourth island: Blue, Headhunters, Devils, Fish, Love, 2. 
South island: Red, Trolls, Pumpkins, Devils, Peace, 1. 
Peppermint island: Green, Priests, Heads, Fish, Fire, 5. 
West island: Green, Vegetarians, Heads, Fish, War, 3. 
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North island: Red, Trolls, Devils, Heads, War, 3. 
East island: Green, Priests, Heads, Pumpkins, Fire, 2. 
Fourth island: Red, Vegetarians, Fish, Devils, Peace, 6. 
South island: Blue, Headhunters, Pumpkins, Heads, Fire, 1. 
Peppermint island: Green, Vegetarians, Pumpkins, Fish, Love, 4. 
West island: Blue, War, Trolls, Devils, Fish, War, 5, Start. 
North island: Red, Headhunters, Devils, Heads, Love, 3, Start. 
East island: Red, Vegetarians, Heads, Devils, Peace, 2. 
Fourth island: Green, Priests, Fish, Pumpkins, War, 6. 
South island: Blue, Trolls, Devils, Fish, War, 1. 
Peppermint island: Blue, Headhunters, Pumpkins, Fish, Peace, 5. 
West island: Green, Trolls, Heads, Pumpkins, Fire, 4. 
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Experiments 3&4 
Practice game, Affirmative condition 
North island: Ladybird, Blue, Sun, Flower, S, Umbrella 4, Start. 
East island: Wasp, Orange, Cloud, Cheese, P, Sunglasses, 2. 
South island: Hamster, Yellow, Fire, Flower, S, Umbrella, 3. 
West island: Ladybird, Pink, Snow, Flower, P, Sunglasses, 1. 
Practice game, Negative condition 
North island: Hamster, Yellow, Cloud, Flower, S, Umbrella, 4. 
East island: Mouse, Orange, Sun, Flower, S, Umbrella, 3. 
South island: Wasp, Blue, Snow, Cheese, P, Sunglasses, 2, Start. 
West island: Hamster, Pink, Fire, Flower, P, Sunglasses, 1. 
Twenty-one move game, Many paths condition 
A: Wasp, Orange, Snow, Cheese, P, Sunglasses. 
B: Hamster, Blue, Fire, Cheese, S, Sunglasses. 
C: Mouse, Pink, Sun, Flower, S, Umbrella. 
D: Mouse, Pink, Fire, Flower, S, Umbrella. 
E: Hamster, Orange, Sun, Flower, S, Umbrella. 
F: Mouse, Yellow, Fire, Cheese, S, Sunglasses. 
G: Ladybird, Pink, Cloud, Cheese, P, Sunglasses. 
H: Hamster, Yellow, Sun, Cheese, S, Sunglasses. 
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Ten move game, Few paths condition 
A: Wasp, Blue, Sun, Cheese, S, Sunglasses. 
B: Hamster, Yellow, Sun, Cheese, S, Umbrella. 
C: Ladybird, Pink, Snow, Flower, P, Umbrella. 
D: Hamster, Orange, Cloud, Flower, P, Sunglasses. 
E: Wasp, Pink, Snow, Flower, P, Umbrella. 
F: Mouse, Yellow, Fire, Cheese, S, Sunglasses. 
G: Ladybird, Blue, Cloud, Cheese, P, Sunglasses. 
H: Mouse, Orange, Fire, Flower, S, Umbrella. 
N. B. This same game was used with the islands in different positions for the other 
conditions. As it was not possible to use all of the objects equally, half of the rearranged 
games used the opposite of each object indicated by the rules, e. g. Cheese was replaced 
by Flower etc. for each object. These inversed games ensured that participants were 
exposed equally to each rule. 
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Table Al: Scroll number, island, start position and condition for each game in 
Experiments 3&4. 
Island Shared Shared Shared Shared Distrib- Distrib- Distrib- Distrib- 
position Affirm Affirm Negative Negative uted uted uted uted 
Many Few Many Few Affirm Affirm Negative Negative 
Many Few Many Few 
North 6 6 2 8 3 1 2 5 
island Start c C Start G C A B 
B B 
East 4 4 4 4 5 8 3 3 
island F E E F C Start C Start 
A G 
Last 8 2 5 2 1 4 6 2 
island A H H A H E E D 
Third 5 5 1 7 8 3 5 7 
island H A A H E B B A 
South 7 1 7 1 2 7 4 4 
island E G G E A H F H 
Pepper 1 8 6 6 6 6 7 6 
-mint G 
Start Start G Start G Start E 
island D D F H 
Left 3 7 8 3 7 2 1 1 
island C F F C B F D F 
West 2 3 3 5 4 5 8 8 
island D B B D D D G C 
Only the Shared condition games were used in Experiment 4. 
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Experiment 5 
Practice game 
North island: Flower, S, Umbrella, Ladybird, B, Sun, 3, Start. 
East island: Cheese, P, Sunglasses, Wasp, Orange, Cloud 2. 
South island: Flower, S, Umbrella, Hamster, Yellow, Snow, 4. 
West island: Flower, P, Sunglasses, Ladybird, P, Rain, 1. 
Five island game 
A: Flower, P, Umbrella, Wasp, Orange, Cloud. 
B: Flower, P, Umbrella, Mouse, Orange, Sun. 
C: Flower, S, Umbrella, Hamster, Pink, Snow. 
D: Cheese, S, Sunglasses, Wasp, Yellow, Rain. 
d, Blue, Cloud. 
start position and condition for each game in 
Lst island Last island South island Left island 
2 4 5 3 
B C Start E 
D 
4 3 5 2 
C E Start B 
D 
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Eight island game 
A: Flower, P, Umbrella, Ladybird, Orange, Cloud. 
B: Cheese, P, Sunglasses, Hamster, Pink, Sun. 
C: Cheese, S, Sunglasses, Ladybird, Orange, Rain. 
D: Flower, S, Umbrella, Hamster, Yellow, Sun. 
E: Cheese, P, Sunglasses, Wasp, Yellow, Rain. 
F: Cloud, S, Sunglasses, Wasp, Blue, Cloud. 
G: Flower, S, Umbrella, Mouse, P, Snow. 
H: Flower, P, Umbrella, Mouse, Blue, Snow. 
Table A3: Scroll number, island, start position and condition for each game in 
Experiment 5, eight islands. 
North East Last Third South Pepper Left West 
island island island island island -mint island island 
island 
Game Start B 4 1 E 3 2 5 
1 A C D F G H 
Game 4 1 2 5 Start E 3 B 
2 C D G H A F 
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Experiment 6 
Practice game 1 
West island: Flower, P, Umbrella, Wasp, Orange, Cloud. 
East island: Flower, P, Umbrella, Mouse, Orange, Sun, 1. 
Last island: Cheese, S, Sunglasses, Wasp, Yellow, Rain, 4, Start. 
South island: Cheese, S, Sunglasses, Ladybird, Blue, Cloud, 3. 
Left island: Flower, S, Umbrella, Hamster, Pink, Snow, 2. 
Practice game 2 
West island: Flower, P, Umbrella, Wasp, Orange, Cloud, 3. 
East island: Flower, S, Umbrella, Hamster, Pink, Snow, 5, Start. 
Last island: Cheese, S, Sunglasses, Ladybird, Blue, Cloud, 1. 
South island: Cheese, S, Sunglasses, Wasp, Yellow, Rain, 2. 
Left island: Flower, P, Umbrella, Mouse, Orange, Sun, 4. 
Experiment 6 used the same islands as the eight island condition of Experiment 5 
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Table A4: Scroll number, island, start position and condition for each game in 
Experiment 6. 
Within Within Between Between 
problem 1 problem 2 problem I problem 2 
North island 4 6 5 A 
A C B 
East island 5 2 6 3 
B D Start F 
C 
Last island 6 Start 4 6 
C G H Start 
C 
Third island 2 H G 4 
D H 
South island 3 4 3 G 
E A F 
Peppermint 1 3 A 2 
island F E E 
Left island Start 1 2 5 
G F E B 
West island H 5 1 1 L 
B D D 
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